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In theories of development, an important but 
controversial question is whether or not young infants 
are social beings. For example, it is often argued 
that, while infants may appear to interact with adults, 
this is a mistaken impression until such a time as they 
have fulfilled certain theoretically defined criteria 
for sociability. 
The aims of this study were first, empirically to 
evaluate arguments for and against the view that 
infants have an EtXel,i sensitivity to other persons, 
and secondly, if such a sensitivity were found, to 
discover how it develops during the first six months of 
life. 
Both an experiment and detailed naturalistic 
observations were made to answer the first question. 
The experiment produced preliminary evidence that the 
behaviour of two- month -olds is consistently different 
with persons and with graspable objects. This finding 
was supported by fine -grain analysis of a filmed 
interaction between a two -month -old and her mother 
which produced conclusive evidence that young infants 
are sensitive not only to the form of others' actions 
but to the social significance of their actions, insofar 
as those actions affect the infant's immediate 
interests. 
:.subsequent observations and experiments were made to 
find how social sensitivity or 'intersubjectivity' 
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develops during the first six months of life. These 
involved comparisons between infants' behaviour when 
interacting with their mother, with strangers and with 
novel and familiar face -masks. Behaviour was recorded 
on video -tape for approximately four minutes in each 
condition, twice a month, between six and twenty -eight 
weeks of age. Findings showed that there is a peak of 
social interest between six and ten weeks of age which 
is followed by a decline. This decline was due to a 
general increase in infants' ability to take active 
control of their surroundings - typified by their 
increased interest in objects and in playing inter- 
personal games (as opposed to participating in 'conver- 
sational' adult -infant exchanges). Associated with 
this decline of interest was increased 'negativity' 
during interactions with the mother and with other 
stimuli (i.e. actions of refusing or shutting out 
contact with other entities). Twelve examples of 
negativity are described in detail. 
The thesis also includes a theoretical contribution 
to Lacan's and Winnicott's notion of 'mirroring', based 
on the analysis of maternal babytalk. This suggests 
that mirroring is not simply a social phenomenon but is 
also an ideological phenomenon and constitutes, 
therefore, a complex and salient form of social 
influence during early infancy. 
The thesis concludes with a Spinozan argument that, 
notwithstanding their innate sensitivity to other 
persons, the development of infants as persons should 
be viewed as a more all- embracing process than is 
usually connoted by the phrase 'social development'; 
namely, as just one expression of the essential process 
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"And it's my firm belief ", said tumbril senior, 
adding notes to his epic, "that they make use of some 
sort of telepathy, some kind of direct mind -to -mind 
communication between themselves. You can't watch 
them without coming to that conclusion." 
"A charming conclusion ", said Mrs. Viveash. 
"It's a faculty ", Gumbril senior went on, "we all 
possess, I believe. All we animals." 
Aldous Huxley 1923 
"For faith is not believing something which our 
intelligence denies. It is the choice of the nobler 
hypothesis. Faith is the resolve to place the 
highest meaning on the facts which we observe." 
Gerald Heard 1949 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade an unprecedented number of publi- 
cations has been produced on the development of social 
behaviour in young infants (e.g. Fontana's "Developing 
Child" series, Wiley's "Origins of Behaviour" series, 
Bowlby's writings, Richards 1974a, Ciba 1975, Schaffer 
1977a, Lock 1978, Bullowa 1979a). This large and 
growing body of research represents a problem for the 
reviewer. While the publications in question are 
undoubtedly unified in terms of their subject- matter, 
their purposes and their conceptual underpinnings are 
diverse and, not infrequently, contradictory. About 
such central concepts as 'communication', 'intention', 
'cognition' and 'emotion' there is no academic concensus, 
and even the concept of 'social development' - the main 
focus of my research - is fraught with difficulties. 
In a fertile and growing scientific movement, this is as 
it should be. Nevertheless to review 'the literature' 
regardless of the contradictions which it contains 
would be unwise, as one's research will necessarily 
reflect the position one takes with respect to these 
contradictions. The first two chapters in this thesis 
are conceived both as an historical survey of the main 
'positions' which have been and are taken . in the study 
of young infants as social beings and, by criticism of 
these positions, as an introduction to the writer's own 
orientation and concerns. 
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1. Social Development 
The concept of 'social development' as psychologists 
know it today has its origins in the America of the 
1930's. Its emergence was linked with acute political 
concern following the Wall Street crash and the 
intensifying domestic problem of integrating numerous 
immigrants - the usual influx swollen during this period 
by refugees from pre -war Europe - into a coherent 
society. The growing awareness of the difficulties 
inherent in 'social progress' came increasingly to be 
associated with an undercurrent of belief that changes 
in society might be brought about by modifying methods 
of child training and education (Danziger 1971). 
Towards the end of the decade the term 'socialization' 
was being frequently used to refer to the process 
whereby individuals are made into members of society 
(Clausen 1968). 
Since this time, scientific studies of social 
development have tended to stress the word 'social' as 
meaning 'member of society' to the exclusion of the 
sense 'capable of interacting with others'. The idea 
is that social development is the process of becoming 
social. The corollary is that individuals are not 
social to begin with. Thus Martin Richards (19746) has 
written "the human infant is born with a predisposition 
to become both adult and social" and Rudolph Schaffer 
(1971) began his book 'The Growth of Sociability' by 
stating that "at birth the infant is essentially an 
asocial being ". 
But if young infants are asocial beings, can they be 
affected by social influences? How can an infant's 
behaviour be "made social by its recognition and inter- 
pretation by adults" (Richards) if the infant is not 
already able to understand the meaning of others' 
behaviour? Alternatively, if human beings are born 
with a ready -made understanding of others, why is it 
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that adults find it so difficult to communicate unless 
they have similar past experience and share a common 
language? How is it that overlapping cultures and 
consecutive historical epochs can differ as much as they 
do? 
In answering this type of question people usually 
take up one of two positions. They either stress 
individual and constitutional factors or the importance 
of experience in development but seldom both. Thus, 
in debates about race and I.Q.; about language 
acquisition; about sex differences; about mental 
illness; about creativity; about crime; about inter- 
group conflict; we repeatedly hear either that it is 
innate, instinctive, 'just human nature' or we are told 
that it is all to do with the way we are brought up, a 
social disease, 'the system'. But what both sides 
overlook - and what their frequent opposition expresses 
so eloquently - is that it is the tension between 
societal and constitutional factors which gives social 
development its character and that an adequate account 
of social development must focus not on society or the 
individual but on the interplay between the two. This 
is as true of the first six months as it is of any 
later period of life. 
2. Social Development from a Cognitive Perspective 
Schaffer's statement that neonates are asocial beings 
is supported by both observation and argument. First 
he points out that young infants lack important social 
abilities such as the discriminative use of vocaliz- 
ations and the capacity for imitation. But even in 
cases where young infants do treat people and things 
differently Schaffer argues that their behaviour cannot 
properly be called social behaviour until they have 
certain cognitive abilities that are universally 
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required for sociability. An example is the experi- 
mental finding that even very young infants will spend 
more time looking at an adult's face than at any other 
r4;aclan ía-107 
naturally- occurring stimulus. Schaffer argues that 
this is not because infants want or have a special 
relationship with other human beings but because infants 
are pre -programmed to be attracted by the stimulus - 
qualities which human beings happen to manifest. 
According to Schaffer's argument it should be possible 
to design a stimulus which satisfies young infants as 
much or more than their conspecifics (i.e. by combining 
pattern, contrast, brightness, cuddliness, colour, 
rhythmicity, multi -modality of stimulation, solidity, 
motility, etc. in an ideal way). His argument 
concludes that it is not until infants develop the 
concept of things as permanently- existing entities that 
they can begin to distinguish the qualities which make 
people different from complex physical objects (e.g. 
feeling and thought) and so become social beings. 
This argument is often expressed. As Lamb (1977) 
writes "there is near unanimity among theorists that 
infants are capable of [social] attachment only after 
they have developed cognitively to such an extent that 
they have appreciation of the independent and permanent 
existence of others ". This unanimity can be traced 
back to the profound influence of Piaget on our 
thinking about psychological development. 
In his seminal writings Piaget argued that social 
factors could not play any special role in development 
at least up to the fifth of the stages of sensori- 
motor intelligence that we have distinguished" (1947). 
In saying this he refers to a theory of infant develop- 
ment in which the primary psychological achievement is 
the attainment of an understanding that self and the 
world have independent existences. He argues that 
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this does not happen until approximately the tenth 
month of life. He supports this argument with a series 
of observations: 
"at about five to seven months of age, when the child 
is about to seize an object and you cover it with a 
cloth or move it behind a screen, the child simply 
withdraws his already extended hand or, in the case 
of an object of special interest (his bottle for 
example) begins to cry or scream with disappoint- 
ment. He reacts therefore as if the object had 
been reabsorbed." (Piaget and Inhelder, 1966) 
He reports that the recovery of hidden objects only 
appears in the child's behavioural repertoire between 
seven and nine months of age and that it is not until 
nine or ten months of age that infants begin consistent- 
ly to look for and find objects which are successively 
hidden in different places. Piaget argues that these 
observations show that before nine months of age 
children think an object which disappears no longer 
exists. In this case, they will misapprehend the 
external world and see it as no more than a flux of 
continually changing images. To the six -month -old 
people will just be pictures amongst pictures. Piaget 
concludes that only after acquiring the concept of 
'permanent and independent existence' will infants 
begin to differentiate between their perceptions and 
distinguish the more enduring internal qualities which 
make people different from other perceptual phenomena. 
The persuasiveness of this argument has, as we shall 
see, been reinforced by the influence of attachment 
theory (see pp. Z4- 43). Attachment theory proposes 
that the infant's first social relationship is charac- 
terised by precisely the quality which Piaget claims is 
misunderstood by young babies: constancy. As Mary 
Ainsworth (1973) puts it, "attachments bridge time and 
distance and cannot be conceived as being present or 
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absent, or varying in intensity, even over long periods 
of time ". On this basis psychologists generally 
accept Piaget's argument that infants cannot be genuinely 
social until they are seven or eight months old (see 
Bell 1970, Lamb op.cit.). 
In short the young infant's social life is considered 
by these psychologists to be unlike our adult social 
life in which the continuous existence of others - even 
those important to us - is seldom an issue. I may 
occasionally think of others who are absent and, under 
some circumstances, I may spend hours if not days wishing 
and hoping for some sign of life from them. But the 
vast majority of the people I know seldom if ever occupy 
my mind when they are not in my company. Attachment 
theorists and their like would seem not to recognise 
analogues of these less intense relationships in early 
infancy and, in consequence, they consider the acquisi- 
tion of 'object -permanence' to be an essential pre- 
requisite for social life. 
This highlights an important shortcoming of the 
cognitive argument that young infants are not social 
beings. Certainly an understanding of the proposition 
'people are permanently- existing entities' plays a part 
in adult social life. But so does an understanding of 
propositions like 'people are informative entities', 
'people are comforting entities', 'people are frustrating 
entities' and 'people are amusing entities'. There is 
no logical reason why an understanding of permanent 
existence is necessary before infants can understand and 
act on these other propositions - even though such 
thinking and such action may be restricted to the 'here 
and now'. This suggests that experiments on object - 
permanence do not give adequate cause to conclude that 
infants are asocial beings. 
Most This conclusion has important consequences. 
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importantly it rescues us from a predominant a priorism 
with respect to infant sociability. It has become 
commonplace to argue that even though young infants may 
act as if they are social beings, they are not truly 
social beings until they have mastered the concept of 
object -permanence (or 'reciprocity', or 'intentionality', 
see Schaffer 1977b). This means that observation 
is no longer the basis of beliefs about sociability: 
the criteria have become theoretical. But this attitude 
is contradictory. Piaget only drew the theoretical 
conclusions upon which psychologists are now basing 
their rejection of 'as if' evidence for early sociabi- 
lity because the babies he observed acted as if hidden 
objects did not exist (Piaget and Inhelder loc.cit.). 
To deny 'as if' evidence is thus to deny the validity 
of Piaget's claims. Alternatively, to accept Piaget's 
claims is to admit the adequacy of 'as if' evidence. 
We must accept therefore that the best scientific 
argument for or against the view that infants are social 
beings at birth will not be a theoretical argument about 
the presence or absence of certain cognitive abilities 
in the infant's mind but an argument about the empirical 
interpretation of early behaviours which look 'as if' 
they are social. (This point is taken up again in 
Chapter 2). 
3. The Presence of Social Behaviour in Early Infancy 
It has long been known that neonates are sensitive to 
both touch and taste. Until recently however it was 
thought they were relatively insensitive to sound and 
sight. We now know that this is not the case. 
It is generally accepted that focal or highly 
discriminating vision does not attain adult standards 
before the fourth month of life. Nevertheless, with 
the aid of their immature vision, neonates can discrim- 
inate varying intensities of light, can differentiate 
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features of visual displays separated by as small an 
angle as 40' (some estimates suggest differentiation at 
7.5' for optimal stimulus contrast, motion, etc.), are 
sensitive to colour, to visual motion and change, and 
will track a stimulus although somewhat jerkily (Haith 
1977; Braddick and Atkinson 199 ; Bornstein 1978). 
Hearing is comparable in complexity to vision at 
birth. Neonates, including prematures and those with 
known abnormalities of the central nervous system, can 
differentiate sound on the basis of at least seven 
variables (band- width; duration; repetition -rate; 
inter -stimulus interval; frequency; loudness and pattern: 
Eisenberg 1970). Signals within the speech- hearing 
range are differentially effective. Thus infants as 
young as one month of age are able to make discrimin- 
ations between voicing -onset times that distinguish 
similar sounding consonant -vowel pairs such as [be] and 
Epa)s There are even suggestions that they perceive 
speech sounds along the voicing continuum categorically 
with boundaries that are universal in adult perception 
(e.g. Eimas et . al . 1971; Trehub 1973) . 
Given this early sensitivity (neonates are also 
highly sensitive to differences between smells) it is 
important that neonates are ready learners (Lipsitt 
1966). They are not only quick to learn contingent 
relations between stimuli but can also learn higher - 
order rules governing the presentation of such relations 
- at least by four months of age. For example, 
Papousek (1969) set up an experiment where four- month- 
olds had to turn their head a certain number of times 
to the right and /or to the left to see a display of 
lights go on. They would work quite hard to solve the 
problems he set them (e.g. "left then right ", "two to 
the left ", "three to the right ", etc.), vocalizing and 
smiling with pleasure when they finally found the 
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correct solution or grimacing if they failed. In the 
light of propensities such as these, it is not surprising 
that neonates quickly learn to distinguish their mothers 
from other people. This has been demonstrated with 
sight by four weeks of age (Carpenter 1973e Maurer and 
Salapatek 1976), with hearing by three weeks of age 
(Mills and Melhuish 1974) and with smell by six days of 
age (MacFarlane 1975). 
Babies are also sensitive to the contingency of other 
persons' responses in interactions. Recent experiments 
by Lynne Murray (in prep.) have shown that eight -week- 
old babies will quite happily interact with their mother 
on 'live' closed -circuit television. But if a film of 
their mother is played back to them (i.e. no longer 
'live') they find this upsetting and aversive. This 
implies that by eight weeks of age, infants expect their 
mother's behaviour to be affected by (or 'contingent 
upon') their own in certain regular ways - and are able 
to detect when this is not the case. 
Observations such as these reveal something else 
about young babies: they are not just passively equipped 
for social life but exhibit a repertoire of social 
actions which sometimes appear as appropriate comments 
on their experience. This is something which was 
hardly guessed at before film and video -technology was 
used in observational research on infants. 
Perhaps the least obvious class of the infant's 
communicative activities is comprised of simple 
unspecified motions. In the discipline of kinesics, 
methods of microanalysis of films of human communication 
have revealed that elements of interaction exist in the 
configurations of physical motions accompanying speech 
(Birdwhistell 1970). These methods, applied to inter- 
action between neonate and caretaker, have revealed a 
synchronization of the organization of infant limb 
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motions with the articulatory segments of adult speech 
as early as the first day of life (Condon and Sander 
1974). More specifically, some, possibly all, motions 
of the hands and arms appear to be adapted in form to 
become gestures. Certain gesture -like patterns of the 
hands are closely associated with other communicative 
forms of behaviour - particular facial expressions, 
forms of vocalizing and prespeech (see below). Some 
such 'gestures' are more frequently combined with 
'expansive' open- mouthed expressions or calls - like 
those adults make in greeting or attracting attention, 
or to express excitement, surprise or anger. This 
category includes vigorous hand -waving and large open- 
handed or fisted movements. In contrast, index -finger 
pointing and finger -thumb closing with the hand held up 
over the shoulder or near the face are often synchro- 
nised with quieter moods of prespeech. (Trevarthen 
and Hubley 1978) 
Another group of specially adapted communicative 
behaviours are facial expressions. Since the innova- 
tion of Ekman and Friesen's Facial Action Coding System 
('FAGS' 1978), it has become possible to analyze adult 
facial expressions of affect into the 'atoms' of the 
different anatomical movements comprisonn them. There 
are forty -two elements. Virtually all -of these can be 
identified in the facial movements of both premature 
and full -term newborns. Moreover, despite the 
presence of some diffuse, low -level activity difficult 
to score with FACS, the facial muscle actions of young 
infants are often well -defined and highly discriminable, 
even when occurring in complex configurations. The 
combination of these elementary muscle movements are 
non -random. For example, smiling in infants as young 
as four weeks of age is a facial behaviour simultane- 
ously involving a relaxation of the brows and changes 
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in the lower face (Oster 1978). 
Expressions of feeling are not the only movements of 
the face associated with communication between adults. 
There are also the movements of lips and tongue involved 
in speaking. Young infants manifest movements related 
to these which Trevarthen (1974, Trevarthen and Hubley 
1978) has called 'prespeech'. The movements differ 
from adult speech however and are not voiced. This is 
to be expected as infant lower jaws are proportionately 
small, affecting mouth configurations used for vowel 
sounds and also limiting tongue mobility. Neverthe- 
less, the movements closely resemble lip opening, 
tightening, pursing, closing and lip and tongue opposi- 
tions essential to forming adult speech sounds. They 
are sometimes associated with rudimentary, speech -like 
breath -control and often appear appropriately placed 
in conversation -like exchanges with adults. 
Young babies make many different vocalizations. 
Four categories can be distinguished: crying, which may 
vary from consistent rhythmic vocalizations with a 
strained unhappy quality to arhythmic fussing with 
considerable pauses;'vegetative' sounds, associated 
with well -known physiological processes, such as burping, 
coughing, sucking, hiccoughing, etc.; 'neutral' sounds, 
such as grunts, groans, sighs and all other noises 
without obvious emotional content or physiological 
association; and cooing, which comprises sounds low in 
glottal stops and band -width, with smooth onset and a 
generally unstrained, happy auality. Of these cate- 
gories, most work has been done on crying. 
One of the best known studies of crying is Wolff's 
(1969). Wolff distinguished four types of crying in 
early infancy: the hunger cry, the pain cry, the frus- 
tration cry and the 'mad' cry. However, there is no 
evidence from spectrographic analysis that variation 
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between these cries is physically discontinuous. In 
interpreting them as he does Wolff places varying 
stress on his own intuitions, mothers' verbal inter- 
pretations and mothers' actual responses to the cries. 
More systematic work by Pratt (1977) has suggested that 
crying is not, as Wolff suggests, a 'discrete' system 
of signals, where cries are acoustically differentiated, 
being related to specific causes or infant needs (and 
thus decodable as such by others). Rather it is a 
'continuous' system for coding distress, where signals 
may vary from being quiet and infrequent to being loud 
and continuous but with no necessary connection between 
particular cries and particular internal states. 
Pratt did distinguish two patterns of crying however: 
one which begins at a low level and slowly increases in 
loudness and frequency (associated with physiological 
needs) and the other beginning suddenly at a high level 
and continuing until the cry is alleviated (associated 
with a change in the baby's situation). But even on 
this basis, maternal responses to crying do not always 
have predictable outcomes and at times a response leads 
to a rise in the cry signal where a fall would have 
been expected. 
Unlike crying, cooing is absent in the first month 
of life - there is thus no gradual transformation from 
one to the other. It increases in frequency during 
the second month and is at its height at the end of the 
third month (Lenneberg et.al. 1965, Stechler and 
Carpenter 1967). Cooing regularly accompanies smiling 
and is thus closely tied to the stimuli which elicit 
smiling. Longitudinally, the acoustic quality of 
cooing becomes gradually more variegated and by six 
months is differentiated into cooing and babbling, 
where babbling is characterised by consonant -like 
interspersions and supra- segmental intonation patterns 
(i.e. like cooing plus prespeech). It is from the rich 
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variety of infant babbling sounds that the first identi- 
fiable words emerge. 
The final class of potentially communicative activi- 
ties in early infancy are associated with gaze. During 
the first months of life visual motor behaviour (eye 
movement, eye closure and head turning) is the only 
motor system (besides sucking) over which the infant 
has substantial voluntary control (Papousek and Bernstein 
1969). It is also the only 'on -off' perceptual system. 
Through eye closure and head turning, the infant has 
considerable control over perceptual input, and in a 
social situation this means control over the amount of 
visual contact. This control exists long before he or 
she has the motor capabilities to approach or escape 
physically from objects. The social importance of 
infant gaze, both theoretically and empirically, has 
been repeatedly stressed (e.g. Wolff 1963, Winnicott 
1967, Robson 1967, Stern 1971) and is borne out by the 
behaviour and maternal commentaries reported later in 
this study. 
4. Learning - Theory Approaches to Social Development 
One of the most influential approaches to under- 
standing social development during this century has been 
that derived from the theory of learning. Simply stated 
this leads to a view that the child's social behaviour 
can be explained by considering the history of rewards 
and punishments for various kinds of behaviour that he 
or she has experienced throughout infancy. 
Learning theories of social development can be traced 
back to Watson's "behaviourism ", the central tenet of 
which is that "all complex behaviour is a growth or 
development out of simple responses" (Watson 1930: 137). 
With our rapidly increasing knowledge of the complexity 
of early infant behaviour, this view is becoming ever 
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less tenable (although no -one denies that learning 
plays a central role in development at all ages). It 
is thus not surprising that disenchantment with 
learning theory explanations is frequently expressed. 
On the other hand, some current explanations of early 
development have many features in common with those 
proposed by learning theorists (e.g.: "human babies 
become human beings because they are treated as if they 
already were human beings "; Newson 1979). For this 
reason it is important to point out that learning 
theory, and the behaviourism on which it is based, has 
deficiencies other than an underestimation of the 
empirical complexity of infant acts. 
In the first place, behaviourism was ostensibly a 
reaction against certain products of scientific idealism 
(i.e. psychological introspectionism; Watson 1930: 35). 
But one of the contradictions of behaviourism is that, 
insofar as it deals with traditional psychological 
phenomena, it remains dependent on a category of abstract 
mental phenomena in its explanations. Particularly 
revealing is the statement that "personality is but the 
end product of our habit -systems" (1930: 274). Habit - 
systems are clearly unobservable; they are also abstract 
and mental, although, Watson assures us, their true 
explanation will ultimately be physiological or chemical. 
However, he goes on, these physiological bases "are very 
complicated phenomena, far too complicated for us even 
to attempt to describe them ". But he concludes, 
"fortunately we can continue our work in behaviour 
without awaiting the true explanation of these biologi- 
cal phenomena couched in physio- chemical terms" (1930: 
210). 
Thus, while in theory subscribing to the view that 
all human behaviour can be accounted for in terms of 
material causes, and devoting a large part of his book 
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'Behaviourism' to a description of basic human physio- 
logy, in practice Watson finds little need to refer to 
physiological make -up in explaining human behaviour, he 
does it all in terms of mental habit -systems. And as 
behaviourism has developed into learning theory, its 
mental bias has become more, not less, elaborate. For 
instance, the fundamental form of causation in learning 
theory is the action of stimulus on response; yet such 
causation is seldom simply physical - highly labile 
mental faculties such as motivation, perception and 
memory are almost always required for a stimulus to 
become causally effective. Yet learning theory leads 
to a view of infants as non -psychological beings. All 
that they are endowed with is a number of unconditioned 
movement -patterns (in Watson: hiccoughing, sneezing, 
smiling, crying, etc.) and a potential for the forma- 
tion of habits by learning to respond systematically to 
the conditions into which they are born - insofar as 
these are somatically comforting or disturbing. So 
far as the behaviourist was concerned, what determined 
the outcome of development was not the infant's social 
constitution but 'society' - by which was meant "the 
men and women constituting it who have set up compli- 
cated patterns of response that must be literally 
followed" (because of the somatic rewards and punish- 
ments associated with them; Watson 1930: 208). 
Eventually, after infants have learnt these patterns of 
response, they will 'become social'. 
This view of development can only be maintained if 
the degree of organisation of neonatal behaviour with 
respect to the environment were very low and infant 
learning were wholly passive. But both these assump- 
tions are domonstrably false. Neonatal facial 
expressions, for example, are highly organised and show 
none of the qualities associated with the physiological 
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notion of 'reflex' (e.g. stereotypic form, constant 
conditions of onset). And, far from being passive in 
their acquisition of knowledge about what is going on 
around them, infants will work actively and persistently 
to discover the rules governing contingency relations 
between their own actions and environmental stimulation. 
Thus Papousek's (1969) experiment has shown that supine 
four -month -olds will make repeated attempts to work out 
what combination of lateral head turns (e.g. left -left- 
right; right -left; left- left -left; see p.(E above) will 
produce the illumination of a panel of flashing lights 
above their heads. But, more importantly in this 
context, he has shown that infants will work at this 
task when they have lost all interest in food -rewards. 
Apparently problem -solving is its own reward, as they 
make facial and vocal expressions of pleasure when they 
finally guess 'right' and then lose interest until the 
experimental contingency rule is changed. Similarly, 
Watson (1972) has shown that two -month -olds take great 
interest in mobiles which move contingently upon the 
infants' actions, smiling and cooing at it significantly 
more than at mobiles whose movements are not contingent 
on their actions. Findings such as these demonstrate 
that infants not only actively seek knowledge about 
their world but seek it for other reasons than the 
attainment of comfort and avoidance of discomfort (i.e. 
for the satisfaction of simple physiological needs). 
They seem to enjoy learning to gain control over the 
stimulation to which they are subjected. 
Behaviourist explanations can give no account of 
infants' pleasure in understanding and controlling the 
workings of their external world. Indeed behaviourist 
and learning -theory approaches to social development 
can only be maintained if the social senses of infants' 
facial and vocal expressions are systematically ignored 
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until such a time as these senses could have been 
learned. Thus, while most conditioning studies of 
infants ignore the significance of their social beha- 
viours, the studies which do take account of these 
behaviours reveal that much more goes on in condition- 
ing studies than conditioning. For example, Brackbill's 
(1958) study of "extinction of the smiling response as 
a function of reinforcement schedule" showed that after 
an initial period of social reinforcement by the experi- 
menter, the withdrawal of reinforcement led to a 
complete extinction of smiling in the infants, not 
just an extinction to the previous operant rate of 
response. This complete extinction of smiling was 
associated with increased fussing and a refusal to make 
eye- contact with the experimenter and was apparently 
the product of an active rejection of the experimenter 
by the baby. While the spontaneous appearance of 
rejection can be understood in this context if it is 
granted that infants have an innate social understanding 
and a dislike of being 'stood up' by co- interactants, 
it cannot be explained if social behaviour is thought 
to be just a product of the infant's previous learning - 
experiences - as behaviourists claim. 
Learning theory is tailor -made to supply a conception 
of development as 'socialisation' in the traditional 
American sense (see p.9 ). But it concentrates 
exclusively on the development of norms, values and 
conventions, and thus severely underestimates the 
constitutional aspects of social being. In the same 
way, Newson's (1979) view that "human babies become 
human beings because they are treated as if they 
already were human beings" - quoted above - tends to 
lead to neglect of the constitutional corollary: that 
human babies must be able to recognise when they are 
being treated as human beings in order to become human 
beings - in which case they must know, in some sense, 
25 
what being human is (in which case they are already 
human beings:). In a similarly behaviouristic vein, 
Newson (loc.cit.) refers to the infant as "biologically 
pre -programmed to emit 'signals'" but, although these 
are undoubtedly understood to be far more sophisticated 
than any of the unconditioned responses described by 
Watson and his followers, their status as meaningful 
human expressions of real social purposes is denied, 
though no empirical evidence is offered to support this 
denial (cf. Chapter 5 below). 
5. Psychoanalytic Approaches to Social Development 
All theories of socialisation assume psychological 
preadaptations for becoming a member of society as well 
as behavioural preadaptations. Even those environment- 
alists who eschew references to the constitutionally 
'given' aspects of social development have to employ 
notions akin to 'identification' in their accounts. 
Thus Bandura and Walters (1963) stress that an adequate 
social -learning account of development must find a way 
of accounting for 'modelling' effects - where the beha- 
viour of an observing child is modified vicariously 
through reinforcement administered to someone else. 
And Berger and Luckmann (1967: 67), who claim that there 
is no such thing as human nature in the sense of a 
"fixed substratum determining the variability of socio- 
cultural formations ", nevertheless accept Mead's (1934: 
160) proposition that the personality arises by the 
process of the child "continually taking the attitudes 
of those about him, especially the roles of those who 
in some sense control him or on whom he depends ". 
Identification was originally a psychoanalytic 
concept. It can be defined generally as the "psycho- 
logical process whereby the subject assimilates an 
aspect, property or attribute of another person and is 
transformed wholly or partially, after the model the 
other provides" (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 205). 
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But psychoanalysts distinguish different kinds of iden- 
tification. Central amongst these distinctions is that 
between identification achieved by introjection and 
identification achieved by projection. 
Introjection is the process by which the functions 
of an external 'object' (e.g. the mother) are taken over 
by its mental representation, by which the relationship 
with a person 'out there' is replaced by one with an 
imagined person 'inside' oneself. Thus the 'super- 
ego' is formed by introjection of parental figures and 
it may be analyzed into a number of component 'intro - 
jects' (The Good (Bad) Internal Father (Mother)). In 
psychoanalytic terms, introjection is both a defence 
and a normal developmental process; a defence because 
it diminishes (separation) anxiety, a developmental 
process because it renders the subject increasingly 
autonomous (Rycroft 1972: 77 -78). 
Projection is the process whereby "qualities, feelings 
or even 'objects', which the subject refuses to recognise 
or rejects in himself, are expelled from the self and 
located in another person or thing" (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 1973: 349). Projection is a primitive method 
of dealing with internal conflicts (a defence) which 
may be seen at work especially in paranoia, but also in 
'normal' modes of thought such as superstition. 
Projective identification is the process whereby a 
person identifies with a part of their self which they 
have projected into another who thus becomes a repre- 
sentative of their ego. 
In psychoanalytic terms, identification by intro - 
jection and identification by projection are complement- 
ary processes. Thus the introjection of a persecutory 
object is to some extent determined by the projection 
of destructive impulses onto the object. Similarly, 
the drive to project (expel) badness is increased by 
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fear of 'internal' persecutors. And the same 
relationship holds between the introjection of good 
objects and the projection of good feelings. Identi- 
fication is based on this duality. 
The concept of identification has found its way into 
psychological thinking despite Freud's equivocal posi- 
tion amongst psychologists. It is a central feature 
of his general theory of the adult psyche. Freud did 
not write much about the first year of life - indeed he 
is said to have viewed it only as "a dark mystery" 
(Jones 1961: 280). He did however express a view of 
development: that both constitutional 'instincts' and 
environmental 'traumata' play a role, that there is a 
capacity for both pleasure and 'unpleasure' in the 
child, and that understanding comes about only through 
environmentally -caused frustrations provoking ' unpleasure' 
in the child who, as a result, seeks to avoid such 
frustrations in the future by developing a better know- 
ledge of the world or "reality- testing" (e.g. Freud 1911 
1925, Spitz and Cobliner 1965). He also suggested 
that infants' major psychological preoccupations would 
be centred on things to do with their mouths, especially 
with respect to the breast and feeding. And, in line 
with his division of instincts into the self -preservative 
and the destructive, he suggested that there would be 
both an oral -erotic and an oral -sadistic stage in 
infancy (Freud 1933) . 
The most systematic theoretical development of these 
ideas is that represented by the work of Melanie Klein. 
Klein specialised in the psychoanalysis of children. 
She was enabled to do this by making interpretive use 
of the symbolism contained in children's play (the 
'play- technique'; Klein 1955). Also, unlike Freud, 
she observed infants behaving from the first weeks of 
life (Klein 1953a). Her major theoretical innovations 
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particularly concern the first six months of life. 
In this period she distinguished two phases which she 
called, respectively, the paranoid -schizoid position 
and the depressive position. (Klein 1953b) 
For Klein, as for most psychoanalysts, the major 
problem facing any individual - and also the major spur 
to development - is coping with anxiety. She thought 
that, in early life, anxiety resulted from the interplay 
of external and internal sources: the experience of 
external dangers (e.g. a traumatic birth) as anxiety - 
provoking depending not only upon the event itself but 
also upon the infant's ability to apprehend events as 
either threatening or benign which, in turn, depends on 
the innate conflict between destructive and preservative 
instincts. The paranoid- schizoid position consists in 
methods of dealing with the anxieties which characterise 
the first three or four months of life. The most 
important of these defences is splitting,. In splitting 
the infant denies the existence of internal conflict by 
viewing the 'good' (accepting, benevolent, comforting, 
nurturing, etc.) aspects of the world as having no 
connection with its 'bad' aspects (e.g. frightening, 
malevolent, denying, harmful). As Klein believed the 
young infant's social world was almost completely 
dominated by the mother (in particular, her breasts), 
she talks of infants denying conflict in themselves 
by imagining that they have two mothers: a good mother, 
whom they idealise as wholly loving, omnipresent, with- 
out fault, and a bad mother onto whom they project all 
their destructive impulses, feeling her to be persecu- 
tory and rejecting. Infants thus become involved in 
two relationships: a loving relationship with their 
good mother and a hateful sadistic relationship with 
their bad mother. In Klein's view the success of 
human social development is measured by the extent to 
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which individuals overcome such a division in the way 
they view their fellow beings. (Klein 1957) 
At about four months of age, provided constitutional 
and maternal adequacy, infants' attitude to their 
mothers begins to change - this is the beginning of the 
depressive position. The infant begins to realise 
that both love and hate have been directed at the same 
person. In becoming aware of their ambivalence they 
begin to feel guilty and to want to make reparation for 
the harm they think their hate has done to their loved 
'good' mother. Failure to negotiate this transition 
accounts for an inability to trust others in adulthood, 
obsessive envy and, in the worst examples, for paranoid 
and schizoid disorders. Success in working through 
both positions accounts for the ability to rise above 
jealousy and criticism, for genuine gratitude and 
generosity and for the ability to negotiate frightening 
and depressing experiences in adulthood (e.g. perse- 
cution and bereavement). 
Klein's theory of early social development is the 
most sophisticated of its type, detailing not only the 
emotional structure at the basis of development (i.e. 
conflict between preservative and destructive instincts) 
but the processes by which experiences affect that 
structure (e.g. projection and identification). What 
it lacks is an adequate base in rigorously -analysed 
descriptions of infant behaviour. The only obser- 
vational work Klein has published is apparently intended 
more to illustrate her theory than to test it (1953a,b). 
6. Attachment Theory 
The main influence of Klein's thinking - and of 
psychoanalysis as a whole - on modern developmental 
psychology has come through the work of John Bowlby. 
Bowiby was originally trained as a psychoanalyst under 
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the supervision of Melanie Klein. His principal 
contribution to psychology was combining psychoanalytic 
thinking with traditions and insights from the obser- 
vational science of ethology. The fruits of this 
combination found expression in a powerful theory of 
social development: 'attachment theory' (Bowiby 1969 
1973 1980). 
The idea inspiring attachment theory is that 
"human beings are happiest and able to deploy their 
talents to best advantage when they are confident 
that standing behind them there are one or more 
trusted persons who will come to their aid should 
difficulties arise" (Bowiby 1979). 
Bowlby's originality lay in proposing that this 
dependence had evolutionary origins. 
It is generally recognised that young human beings 
are more helpless, and helpless for a much longer time 
than other young mammals. Bowiby argued that there 
must therefore have been strong evolutionary pressures 
for the selection of infant behaviours which promoted 
parental protection during this period - especially 
protection from predators. He argued further that 
this evolutionary endowment would have important 
psychological consequences - amongst which would be 
universal dependence on trusted persons in times of 
difficulty. 
This was a controversial view when considered from 
the perspective of social -learning theories of develop- 
ment which were prevalent in psychology when it was 
first put forward (Bowlby 1958). These did not assume 
that babies were, or would naturally become, social - 
as Bowlby was suggesting - but argued rather that they 
were made social by those who brought them up, 
ultimately through the child associating social beha- 
viour with somatic rewards (see pp.20-25 above). 
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In marshalling evidence to corroborate his view, 
Bowlby's attention turned particularly to the first and 
second years of life. He showed that young humans - 
along with other young primates - are biologically 
endowed with a number of behaviour -patterns which 
naturally promote the protective proximity of the 
mother: sucking (nutritional and non -nutrutional), 
clinging, following, crying, smiling, babbling, 
calling, grasping, reaching, visual orientation, eye - 
to -eye contact, and locomotion as used in approach and 
seeking. Many of these behaviours are present at 
birth. Bowlby then proposed that, during the first 
year of life, the behaviours become incorporated into 
sophisticated 'goal- corrected' systems which serve to 
maintain mutual proximity between mother and infant 
under all conditions. A number of phases can be 
distinguished in this development: familiarisation with 
caretakers, discrimination of the mother from others 
and recognition of the mother's (or mother -surrogate's) 
continued existence when not perceptually present. It 
is only with this last development - with the acquisi- 
tion of 'object -permanence' - that the infant's 
behaviour takes on the time- and space- bridging 
qualities that distinguish 'attachments' from the 
infant's other transactions with the environment. 
The influence of attachment theory in both lay and 
scientific circles has largely been due to the support 
and apparent 'explanation' it gives to a number of far - 
reaching conclusions about social development which 
Bowlby had published in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The central tenet of all these conclusions concerned 
the crucial importance of experiencing a warm and 
continuous relationship with a single adult during 
early childhood as a basis for maturing into a sane and 
healthy adult. Thus, from a study of forty -four 
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juvenile thieves which he published in 1947, Bowlby 
concluded: 
"There is a very strong case indeed for believing 
that prolonged separation of a child from his 
mother (or mother -surrogate) during the first five 
years of life stands foremost among the causes of 
delinquent character development and persistent 
misbehaviour." 
And, in his next book - a review of scientific studies 
of the needs of homeless children with respect to 
mental health (1951, 1953) - Bowlby came to the more 
far -reaching conclusion: 
"that when deprived of maternal care, a child's 
development is almost always retarded - physically, 
intellectually and socially - and symptons of 
physical and mental illness may appear ". (my 
emphasis) 
Bowlby's first formulation of attachment theory was 
published in 1958. Because it appeared to provide an 
explanation for the above conclusions as well as 
defining the principal parameters for early social 
development, it attracted immediate and widespread 
scientific attention. Subsequent research has revealed 
that it has both empirical and logical deficiencies. 
These deficiencies are summarised below. 
(i) Maternal deprivation does not necessarily 
damage a young child's social development. 
Bowlby (1953: 14) made a distinction between partial 
and complete deprivation. If a child is separated 
from his or her mother for any length of time - but is 
subsequently reunited with her - this is known as 
partial deprivation. Complete deprivation occurs when 
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"a child has no one person who cares for him in a 
personal way and with whom he may feel secure" - as 
might be the case in orphanages, residential nurseries 
and hospitals. 
"Partial deprivation brings in its train anxiety, 
excessive need for love, powerful feelings of 
revenge, and, arising from these last, guilt and 
depression ... Complete deprivation has even more 
far -reaching effects on character development and 
may entirely cripple the capacity to make relation- 
ships with other people." 
Subsequent research has shown that these conclusions 
were too sweeping. Thus, although short -term 
separations - even those lasting only a few minutes - 
may result in increased ambivalence in one- year -olds on 
reunion with their mothers (i.e. intensified contact - 
maintaining behaviour combined with contact -resisting 
behaviour, avoidance, pushing away and crying; Ains- 
worth and Bell 1970), this sort of reaction depends 
very much on the circumstances in which the separation 
occurs. If it occurs in familiar surroundings or in 
the company of friends, the baby's negative reactions 
are less intense or completely absent - (Rheingold and 
Eckerman 1973, Solomon and Décarie 1976). The effects 
of longer -term separations are also dependent on the 
social circumstances in which they occur. Thus Rutter 
(1976) reports a study which shows that a single 
separation from both parents only causes an increased 
tendency to antisocial behaviour (in boys) if the boy 
comes from a 'poor marriage' home. However repeated 
separations even from 'good marriage' homes do predict 
greater anti -sociality. (These findings correspond to 
the findings of Hinde and his colleagues (see Hinde 
1974) from studies of mother - infant separations in 
rhesus monkeys; namely, that the infants who showed 
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greatest disturbance following a short separation were 
those who had shown the most 'tension' in their 
relationship with the mother prior to separation.) 
Even 'complete deprivation' of mother or mother - 
surrogate does not necessarily result in increased 
delinquency. Thus in studies of children from broken 
homes, a distinction can be drawn between those broken 
by death and those broken by divorce or separation. 
As Rutter (1972) reports, it is only the latter which 
show a strong association with delinquency. 
(ii) There is confusion between the concepts of 
'attachment' and 'relationship' in research on infant 
development. 
Bowlby's initial conclusion from observations of the 
protest and despair associated with separation of 
mothers from children was that from the first year of 
life there must exist a mother -child 'bond' which 
separation broke or damaged. Attachment theory 
focusses on describing and explaining the development 
of this bond. What subsequent research on maternal 
deprivation has shown is that a distinction must be 
drawn between infant -adult attachments and infant -adult 
relationships. Thus Rutter concludes his reassessment 
of findings about the effects of maternal deprivation 
on young children, published in 1972, on almost the 
same note as Bowlby's 1951 conclusion: that the long- 
term consequences of maternal deprivation seem to point 
to 
"lack of a stable, persistent, harmonious relation- 
ship with a parent [as] the crucial variable ". 
Yet, in the same book, Rutter shows that there is good 
cause to question many features of Bowlby's attachment 
theory (especially his claims about 'monotropism'; see 
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below). This suggests that an adult- infant'attachment' 
is not the same thing as an adult -infant relationship. 
To begin with, it appears that the literature on 
attachment theory disconfirms the claim that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between 'attachment' and 
'relationship'. Thus, both Mary Ainsworth (1969), who 
entitled her review article, "Object relations, 
dependency and attachment: a theoretical review of the 
infant -mother relationship ", and Schaffer and Emerson 
(1964), who write about "the infant's first social 
relationship ... and subsequent attachments ", treat the 
two concepts as interchangeable. Even Bowlby (1969: 
221 -222) makes a claim that attachment theory is a 
theory of "the nature and origin of the child's first 
social relationship ". Elsewhere, however, he makes a 
distinction: 
"a child's attachment is only one component in the 
bigger system of a mother and child in interaction" 
(1969: 394) . 
Indeed, if one refers to his original theoretical 
formulation, one finds that he only proposed attachment 
theory as a theory "of the positive aspects of the 
child's tie" (1958; my emphasis). 
This conceptual confusion has had important conse- 
quences because, in their general statements about the 
importance of infant -adult relationships, attachment 
theorists have usually been proved correct by subse- 
quent research. But in their specific statements 
about 'attachments', they have usually been proved 
incorrect. 
(iii) Young infants are not monotropic. 
A good example of(kspecific claim which Bowlby built 
into his theory of 'attachment' (as opposed to 
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'relationship's and which has subsequently been shown to 
be incorrect in his claim that young infants are 
'monotropic'. He argued (1958 1969) that there is a 
natural bias for children to attach themselves to one 
figure only, whereas they may have a number of less 
intense 'relationships' with other figures. He then 
went on to claim that a child's 'attachment' differs in 
kind from relationships with other subsidiary figures. 
Subsequent research has shown this claim to be incorrect. 
For example, Schaffer and Emerson (19644 report a 
large -scale study (N =60) in which they found the sole 
principal attachment was to the mother in only one half 
of the eighteen- month -old children they studied and in 
nearly a third of the cases the main attachment was to 
the father. Although there was usually one particu- 
larly strong attachment, this seemed to be a product of 
social circumstances - the absence of second caretakers 
- rather than of an innate 'monotropism'. Thus most 
of the children showed multiple 'attachments' which 
varied in intensity from person to person and from day 
to day. A similar picture was revealed by Ainsworth's 
(1963) study in Uganda. 
Interestingly, the observations made by Schaffer and 
Emerson when their subjects were twenty -four weeks old 
showed that all sixty of them had formed "indiscriminate 
attachments" by this age - that is, a preference for 
human company over isolation - while only four had 
formed "specific attachments ". This suggests, once 
again, that social life in infancy is much more complex 
than the concept of a single, bond -like 'attachment' 
would lead us to believe. 
(iv) Research on early social development suggests 
thài 'attachments' may not form in the way attachment 
theory proposes. 
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Schaffer and Emerson's (1964) findings raise impor- 
tant questions about how attachments form. Bowlby 
(1969) proposed that attachments are control -systems 
which grow from the infants' species -specific endowment 
of reflex -like behaviours which promote proximity to 
their main caretaker. But Schaffer and Emerson (1964) 
found that, even where infants' primary caretakers 
might be their mothers, their most intense relation- 
ships were not infrequently formed with their fathers 
(or other relatives). This suggests that the posses- 
sion of reflex -like behaviours promoting proximity is 
not the only factor in the formation of attachments, 
but that an added element of selectiveness must be 
involved. Schaffer and Emerson tested a number of 
variables and came to the conclusion that the most 
important were the attachment -figure's responsiveness 
to the infant's crying and the number of interactions 
he or she initiated with the infant. Subsequent 
research has reinforced and amplified this conclusion. 
Thus Ainsworth and her colleagues have picked out four 
important factors in the development of attachments 
which not only determine to whom attachments are formed 
but also how secure they are: the caretaker's sensi- 
tivity to the infant's signals, his or her acceptance 
of the baby's demands (as opposed to rejection of them), 
co- operation with the baby's actions rather than 
interference, and his or her availability for inter- 
action with the baby (Ainsworth Bell and Stayton 1974). 
Findings such as these suggest that there are two 
co- existent views of attachment -formation. The first 
is the 'official' theoretical view that 
"the child's tie to his mother is a product of the 
activity of a number of behavioural systems [e.g. 
crying, following, sucking, looking - formerly 
called 'component instinctual responses'] that have 
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proximity to mother as a predictable outcome" 
(Bowlby 1969: 223). 
The second or common -sense view is that a child's 
attachments to adults are the product of the history 
and nature of his or her interactions with them. 
While these two views are not necessarily incompatible, 
only the second has empirical support. 
(v) The empirical claims that attachment theorists 
make about adult -infant interaction have many 
deficiencies. 
These deficiencies can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Attachment behaviours are usually referred to 
as 'reflex -like' (e.g. Ainsworth Bell and Stayton 1974). 
But, when examined in detail, the majority of the 
behaviours referred to as 'refltx -like' - smiling, 
crying, calling, following, sucking, etc. - are not 
reflex -like, varying both in form and in conditions of 
elicitation (see pp. 14-- 20 above) . 
(b) Attachment theory and the research to which it 
has given rise seriously underestimate the range of 
infant social behaviours and the sophistication of 
early infant -adult interactions. For example, attach- 
ment theory makes no mention of the negative, inter- 
action- denying, social behaviours which infants manifest 
from the first days of life onwards (e.g. gaze - 
avoidance, 'fretting', 'negative' facial expressions, 
back -arching when picked up, etc.). Neither does the 
research supporting attachment take account of the 
impact of infants' interactive behaviours - both 
negative and positive - on their caretakers having 
attained proximity with them. This leads to a neglect 
of the infants' activities in determining their own 
social development (cf. Bell 1968 1971). 
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(c) Attachment theory depends to a large extent 
on extrapolations into our evolutionary past. However 
plausible these extrapolations may be they never 
constitute convincing evidence for a particular point 
of view, simply because there is so little possibility 
of us finding out whether they are correct. 
(d) Attachment theory refers to attachment forma- 
tion as the product of species -specific mechanisms 
inherited by human infants and mothers. The phenome- 
non of 'wolf children' (Malson and Itard 1972) - where 
human babies are reared by and coexist with non -human 
mammals - would seem to show that this assumption is 
incorrect. 
(e) Much of the experimental evidence supporting 
the theory of attachment -formation is in the form of 
causal conclusions drawn from correlations between 
infant behaviours and maternal behaviours (e.g. 
Ainsworth Bell and Stayton 1974). But correlations 
can reveal nothing about causal relationships - more 
detailed description would be required for that. 
The study most usually quoted to refute this objec- 
tion is that by Bell and Ainsworth (1972) on infant 
crying. This study showed statistically significant 
positive correlations between maternal unresponsiveness 
and duration of infant crying in each of the last three 
quarters of the infant's first year. Similar positive 
correlations were found between the number of episodes 
of crying ignored by mothers and the frequency of their 
infants' crying during the second six months of life. 
There were also statistically significant correlations 
showing that infants whose mothers most frequently 
ignored their crying in any one quarter of the year 
were likely to be among the most frequent criers in the 
next quarter. (This was also true of maternal 
unresponsiveness and infants' subsequent duration of 
crying). Much was made of this fact, suggesting as it 
did temporal cause -effect relations between maternal 
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behaviour and infant crying. However, this is not a 
simple cause -effect relation, for Bell and Ainsworth's 
figures show almost as many significant positive 
correlations in the opposite direction (i.e. between 
infant crying and subsequent maternal behaviour: 4 
significant correlations versus 5 for duration, 2 
versus 3 for frequency). Moreover, 'crying' was 
treated as a unitary phenomenon in this study: no 
account was taken of individual differences in cry qual- 
ity or in facial and behavioural accompaniments to 
crying. Individual differences such as these might 
well have affected maternal responsiveness in ways 
unknown to Bell and Ainsworth. Their conclusion that 
"maternal responsiveness tends to result in a decrease 
of crying behaviour" is thus to be viewed with scepti- 
cism - particularly since subsequent research has failed 
to support it (Clarke -Stewart 1973). 
Diverse as these empirical deficiencies may seem, 
they do have some underlying consistency; they tend to 
suggest - incorrectly - that infants' awarènesses and 
activities play no role in the formation and disruption 
of early infant -adult relationships. 
(vi) Attachment theory conforms to dominant 
ideological patterns in our culture. 
Becuase there are so many empirical gaps in attach- 
ment theory, one must ask where the bits of it which 
are not empirically supported came from. We have seen, 
for example, that Bowlby claimed that infants were 
'monotropic' without empirical support. Similarly, 
Stayton, Hogan and Ainsworth (1971) argue that infant 
disobedience is caused by maternal insensitivity, when 
their results (consisting of simple correlations) could 
equally well support the opposite conclusion. Lee 
Oahner (1974) suggests that biases like these conform 
to an unconscious sexism with respect to child- rearing 
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practices in our society. Thus what unifies the 
inadequacies of attachment theory is their contribution 
to the view that rearing children is the responsibility 
of mothers rather than fathers, and if children do not 
develop into desirable members of society, then the 
mother is to blame - not the child or the father or the 
social circumstances which provide a background for 
children's upbringing. 
While few would claim that psychological theories 
can ever be completely independent of ideological 
forces, awareness of those forces is clearly an 
advantage when putting forward such theories. The 
inadequacies of attachment theory have a unity which 
suggests that its proponents may be less independent 
than they might be from the prevailing Western ideo- 
logies concerning the rearing of children. 
(vii) Due to Bowlby's dependence on Piaget's 
assumption that infants cannot relate to 
people until they have acquired the concept of 'obiect- 
permanence', attachment theory underestimates the 
social competence of ,young babies. 
Attachments are not supposed to form until infants 
have acquired the concept of object -permanence (Bowlby 
1969, Ainsworth Bell and Stayton 1974). Following 
Piaget, this is supposed to occur approximately nine 
months after birth. However, as argued on pages 10 -14 
above, there is no logical reason why infants should 
not relate to people as people before they recognise 
that people are permanently- existing entities. 
Moreover, from experiments on person- discrimination 
(e.g. Macfarlane 1975, Carpenter 1973, Mills and 
Melhuish 1974) it appears that young infants do know 
the difference between their mothers and other people 
within the first weeks of life. Thus it might well 
be that this difference is important to them but that 
until eight or nine months of age they are unable 
to conceive the passing of time: they 
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have no conception of past or future, everything that 
happens to them just 'is so' - even when they are active 
(e.g. crying or reaching), their activity is just 'the 
thing to do at the time'. 
Even if the concept of object -permanence is necessary 
for the formation of certain types of relationship, its 
acquisition occurs much earlier than attachment theorists 
generally recognise. Experiments by Bower (1974) show 
that infants are aware of the continued existence of 
imperceptible objects at least as early as the third 
month of life. 
In the light of these criticisms, attachment theory 
cannot be said to provide a viable explanation of 
social development in the first year of life. Yet, to 
dismiss completely the writings of attachment theorists 
would be a mistake because at the heart of what they 
are saying is an important truth: that 
"human beings are happiest and able to deploy their 
talents best are confident 
that standing behind them there are one or more trus- 
ted persons who will come to their aid should diffi- 
culties arise" (Bowlby 1979) 
Attachment theory does not explain why this should be 
so yet both the findings of attachment theorists and 
those of their critics suggest that it is so. 
In reading the literature on attachment theory one 
comes across many similar statements which, while not 
directly deducible from attachment theory, have the 
ring of truth about them and are not refuted by any 
published empirical work known to me. For example: 
"To an infant, an adult's commands and prohibitions 
are not at first semantically meaningful; rather he 
is likely to respond not so much to the verbal content 
of a command as to the tone of voice with which it is 
issued, and to accompanying facial expression, gesture 
and posture" (Ainsworth Bell and Stayton 1974). 
This ability is well -known to many of those who have 
cared for young babies (or for animals), yet how babies 
should 'know' the difference between a command and, let 
us say, a joke is difficult to explain. One- 
43 
/explanation which makes sense is that such knowledge is 
'natural'to all human beings. In this case the diffi- 
culties adults have in communicating in intimate conver- 
sation would seem to suggest that this natural under- 
standing is somehow interfered with during development. 
Whether and why this might be the case is discussed in 
the final two chapters of this thesis. 
7. Recent developments in observational research on 
early infancy 
Whereas the link between Klein and attachment theory 
was their common stress on emotional structure, the link 
between Klein and the most recent developments in observ- 
ational research on early infancy has been an interest in 
the types of psychological process supposed to underlie 
socialisation. This latter movement has quite different 
origins, namely,the psychology of early linguistic communi- 
cation rather than the psychology of early relationships. 
During the 1960s Chomsky's views of early language deve- 
lopment dominated research on the subject. This was char- 
acterised by two major stresses, the first on the grammar 
of children's utterances, the second on the autonomy of 
language development. Research suggested that children 
acquired a sophisticated understanding of the grammar of 
the language to which they were exposed very quickly. So 
fast was this acquisition that Chomsky supposed children 
to be born with a specific device for the abstraction and 
formulation of syntactic rules from speech, a device which 
operated quite independently from the processes involved 
in their slower progress towards more general cognitive 
understandings (e.g. Piaget and Inhelder 1966). 
Although it is now recognised that young children have 
much more sophisticated cognitive skills than was proposed 
in the 1960s (Donaldson 1978), the principal attack on 
Chomsky's position originated from linguistics. Without 
denying the innate sophistication of infants' sensitivity 
to the linguistic structure of speech (Schlesinger 1977), 
it has become usual to argue that Chomsky's view takes 
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insufficient account of meaning. This argument is put 
forward on two counts, that of production (Bloom 1970 
1974) and that of comprehension (Macnamara 1972). 
Bloom's argument was based on a detailed study of 
her own daughter's early production of language. This 
was the first significant psycho- linguistic diary -study 
for three decades (cf. Leopold 1939). It was also new 
in making a systematic attempt to relate individual 
childhood utterances to their immediate context in such 
a way that the underlying meaning was made clear. 
These methodological innovations gave Bloom enough 
ammunition to expose the inadequacy of current 'pivot - 
grammar' accounts of child language development. A 
simple two -word utterance consisting of "Pivot + x- word" 
could code a number of important distinctions for the 
child. Thus "Mummy sock" coded such different semantic 
relations as agency (the mother putting a sock on the 
child) and possession (pointing to the mother's sock). 
Similarly, in terms of prosody and its non -verbal 
accompaniments, it might be uttered as a request, as a 
question or as a declaration. In the light of examples 
such as these, Bloom concluded that the form of early 
utterances was determined primarily by what children 
intended to talk about and not by syntactical rules. 
A similar case was argued by Macnamara (1972) for 
comprehension. Taking the lexicon, syntax and phono- 
logy in turn he showed that, in order to resolve the 
many ambiguities in linguistic systems, the infant must 
be pre -equipped with cognitive strategies that function 
as shortcuts in the task of relating symbols to 
speakers' intentions. For example, he suggested that 
children could only learn a word such as 'and' after 
they had experienced a need for it in their own 
thinking. Similarly, for syntax, he argued that 
children would only be able to equate such grammatically 
different utterances as 'Give the book to me' and 'Give 
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me the book' on the basis of an appreciation that books 
can be given to people whereas people cannot be given 
to books. Macnamara's conclusion was that 
"infants learn their language by first determining, 
independent of language, the meaning which a speaker 
intends to convey to them "; 
only then can they go on to work out the relationship 
between the meaning and the utterance they heard. 
With the appearance of these critiques, it was not 
surprising that researchers began to ask more detailed 
questions about the nature of the infant's psychological 
preadaptations for communication. Macnamara suggested 
that the different forms of speech act (denial, request, 
declaration, question, etc.) 
"probably correspond to deeply rooted mental 
attitudes of assertion, seeking for information, 
wishing to have others perform certain acts, etc." 
And in an influential review -article, Ryan (1974) pro- 
posed that language acquisition is based on the estab- 
lishment of intersubjectivity between adult and child, 
where 'intersubjectivity' consists in the mutual 
recognition of various complex forms of intention, as 
previously defined by the philosophers Grice, Austin 
and Strawson: for example, the speaker's intention 
that his audience should recognise his intention to 
produce a certain response in the audience. She went 
on to say that the major empirical problem in research 
on language development was 
"of identifying and describing the kind of intentions 
involved and how the necessary mutual recognition 
develops ". 
The most sophisticated solution to this problem - which 
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has both a theoretical and a practical aspect - was 
that proposed by Colwyn Trevarthen (cf. Richards 1974a, 
Bruner 1975a,b, Schaffer 1977a) . 
Trevarthen's )ççLjajl innovations were related to 
his use of film and TV.(although he was not alone in 
this - e.g. Bullowa 1979b). This led to a massive 
increase in the observable detail of infant behaviour, 
which, in turn, allowed the description of a hitherto 
unsuspected complexity in the actions of young infants 
(viz. 'prespeech'). Film was already in use in other 
branches of psychology in the late '60s. But its 
introduction was particularly consequential in the 
study of infants because the majority of their movements 
are fleeting and small. It is for this reason that, 
until the middle of this century neonates were thought 
to be deaf at birth. Similarly, until the early '70s, 
their social equipment was thought to consist entirely 
of simple reflexes (Bowlby 1969). It is only with the 
use of film and video -tape that the formal organization 
of their facial expressions and indeed the temporal 
organization of all their behaviours has come finally 
and properly to notice. For this reason use of audio- 
visual technology is one of the major stimulating and 
unifying factors in current research on early sociabi- 
lity. (The methodological significance of this deve- 
1 ame t is discussed 
more fully in Chapter 2). rr2 
AResearch on early social development is unified by 
ideas as well as methods. Thus contemporary research- 
ers generally agree that infants' biological preadapt- 
ations to social life are extraordinarily complex and 
highly organised - both in themselves and in their 
temporal relation to the behaviour of the people with 
whom they interact. Much work has been done on these 
early dyadic regularities. Two forms are distinguished: 
interactional synchrony and systematic alternation 
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between partners or 'turn- taking' (e.g. Brazelton et.al. 
1974, Stern et.al. 1975, Trevarthen et.al. 1975, Condon 
and Sander 1974, Snow 1977, Kaye 1977, Fogel 1977, 
Tronick et.al. 1979) In the course of the past decade 
many other discoveries have been made about early inter- 
active bahaviour - some of which have already been 
described (pp.1L{ -10 above), and others of which are used 
to support or question arguments in the empirical 
chapters below. Nevertheless, the psychological status 
of the infant's complex preadaptations to social life 
remains uncertain. This uncertainty is exacerbated by 
an apparent lack of agreement as to what constitutes a 
psychological finding. Many believe that psychological 
phenomena such as thoughts and feelings cannot be sub- 
mitted to direct empirical investigation. This means 
that, although what infants do may be described in 
physical terms (e.g. of 'rate', 'speed', 'length', 
'duration', 'combination'), it is seldom described in 
psychological terms (e.g. of 'motivation', 'thought', 
'feeling', 'intention', 'meaning') - so that psycho- 
logical topics receive mainly theoretical attention. 
This leads to a great diversity of opinion. 
The onset of communication is one of the topics about 
which there is most speculation. Some claim that any 
appearance of motivation in the young infant's signalling 
is illusory and that shared meanings and intentions have 
to be "programmed into" babies before they can be said 
to communicate (Richards 1974b, Kaye 1979, Newson 1979). 
Some believe that communication grows - in unspecified 
ways - out of the successively more elaborate levels of 
interactive behaviours built on a basis of behavioural 
synchrony observable in mother -neonate pairs from the 
first week of life (Kaye 1977, Chappell and Sander 1979) 
or, alternatively, with the development of selective 
attention (Junker 1979). And some claim that communi- 
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cation cannot occur until certain cognitive develop- 
ments have taken place - in particular the development 
of the "concept of dialogue" (which subsumes the 
concepts of intentionality and reciprocity; Bates 
Camioni and Volterra 1975, Schaffer 1977b). Others 
believe that, as well as beginning "extra- uterine life 
with a repertory of sophisticated behavioural mechanisms, 
[the infant] establishes a refined system of social 
communication directly with its mother and indirectly 
with society at large" (Wolff 1976, Brazelton 1979) 
And yet another group claim that communication either 
should not or cannot be studied in the early months of 
life (Plooij 1976, Bruner 1975a, Collis 1977) 
What is striking in this diversity of opinion is 
that, unlike the consensus about the sophistication of 
the neonate's behavioural mechanisms, it is not based 
on exact observation but on impressions and ad hoc 
hypotheses. No -one has reported a project which goes 
beyond physical descriptions to give a rigorous analysis 
of the senses of infant and maternal movements - showing 
whether or not the infant's movements can justifiably be 
called communicative. When a decision is made as to 
whether or not an infant can communicate, it is made on 
theoretical grounds: for example, communication involves 
intentionality, intentionality does not develop until 
the end of the first year according to Piaget's theory, 
therefore infants younger than this cannot communicate 
(Bates, Camioni and Volterra 1975, Schaffer 1977b, see 
pp. to -t4. above). 
The uncertainty produced by this a priori form of 
argument means that, even when researchers do discover 
behaviours which seem to have a comprehensible social 
sense, they are loath to give them any theoretical 
significance (e.g. Tronick et.al. 1979) The only 
exception to this statement is found in the work of 
Trevarthen. 
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Trevarthen's theoretical innovation was his appli- 
cation of psychobiological findings to infant develop- 
ment. These necessitated a conceptualisation of early 
infancy more sophisticated than the previous more 
abstract psychological and linguistic conceptualisations. 
Concentrating purely on the main facts of developmental 
biology - for example, the fact that the human body is 
completed in rudimentary form eight weeks after 
conception whereas it takes a further thirty -two weeks 
of development, mainly in the tissues of the cerebral 
hemispheres and cerebellum, before a human being is 
ready for birth - he concluded that the major functions 
of the human mind must be sketched out before birth 
(Trevarthen 1978 ). The anatomically distinct areas 
of the brain which, in adults, each regulate such dis- 
tinct psychological functions as motor skill (cerebellum), 
perception, volition and memory (cerebral neocortex), 
language (Wernicke's area) and visual- spatial abilities 
(right hemisphere), are all distinguishable in the brains 
of neonates. It was still possible however that, 
although anatomically distinguishable, these areas of 
the brain remained largely inactive in young infants. 
For this reason Trevarthen began to analyse films of 
early behaviour, a venture he described as "behavioural 
embryology" (Trevarthen 1973) 
Starting work in 1968, Trevarthen soon accumulated a 
substantial body of evidence that infants' brains were 
operating in a complex manner from the first moments of 
extra -uterine life onwards. For example, newborns 
minutes old make very well- ordered eye movements, indi- 
cating that their space -organizing cerebral processes 
endow them with an innate faculty for awareness of the 
spatial characteristic of the visual world (Trevarthen 
1974., see also Bruner 1974). Similarly, neonates 
make embryonic reach - and -grasp movements toward objects. 
Although rarely successful, this 'pre- reaching' behaviour 
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shows that an innate faculty for motor coordination is 
also operative in early infancy (Trevarthen 1974 , 
Trevarthen et.al. 1975). But Trevarthen's most signi- 
ficant finding so far as linguists are concerned was 
his discovery that infants exhibit specific behavioural 
adaptations for communication including rudimentary 
efforts to speak and highly characteristic gesticula- 
tions of the arms and hands (pp.I(o - ($ above). In 
conjunction with increasing evidence of infants' preco- 
cious sensitivity to persons and person -like stimuli, 
this suggested that - above and beyond the faculties so 
far described - infants must be born with a faculty 
specifically adapted to the recognition and control of 
cooperative intentions and joint patterns of awareness 
(Trevarthen 1974 , 19790.). It was the close similarity 
between his conclusions and Ryan's (1974) conclusions 
about the mental requirements for the early use of 
language which led Trevarthen to call this faculty a 
faculty of 'intersubjectivity'. 
Since making this proposal Trevarthen has conducted 
concentrated research on the first year of life. He 
has found that intersubjectivity differentiates during 
this period, taking on three successive forms. The 
first distinguishable form he designates as "primary 
intersubjectivity" (Trevarthen 1979 a,c). This covers 
the first ten weeks, of which the first five are pre- 
dominantly negative in social terms. Thus very young 
infants often react to the en face approaches of care- 
takers by looking away, curling up, fussing and sleeping 
behaviours (Stechler and Carpenter 1967). They may 
reject being spoken to, avoid eye -to -eye contact and 
struggle when picked up. And although they respond 
positively to holding, cuddling, rocking, etc., this 
appears to be because it permits them to shut out more 
complex engagements: their behaviour is "autistic" 
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(Mahler et.al. 1975). 
At about four or five weeks of age there is a pro- 
nounced change in the social orientation of the infant 
and by six weeks highly responsive 'positive' responses 
are easily elicited. For example, smiling and visual 
attention come to be obviously and preferentially 
directed at caretakers and, in face -to -face inter- 
actions, six- or eight- week -olds are easily involved in 
complex interchanges of expression (Trevarthen 1974 , 
1979a). It might be expected that the complex positive 
response and interaction with the mother of two- month- 
olds would go on to develop quickly into even more 
complex forms of positive enjoyment. But, as Trevarthen 
reports (1979c.), this is not the case. 
From approximately eleven weeks onwards "there are 
signs of a complex negative motivation towards intimate 
personal rapport" in babies' interactions with their 
caretakers (Trevarthen 1979c). Thus, when approached 
and spoken to, the three -month -old may 'shut out' the 
interactant by looking down and concentrating gaze on 
the feet or hands. This period of renewed negativity 
is followed at around four months by the development of . 
simple interpersonal games. Early games generally 
involve simple rhythmical noises on the part of the 
caretaker highlighted by physical contact (e.g. poking 
in the stomach, shaking the legs). Trevarthen calls 
these 'person -person' games (Trevarthen and Hubley 
197$). Their appearance coincides with the appearance 
of infant laughter (Washburn 1929). Meanwhile the 
infant will have begun to show an increasing interest 
in objects (White Castle and Held 1964, Bower 1974). 
Around sixteen to twenty weeks attempts to reach and 
grasp objects start to be consistently successful. 
Improved prehension is reflected in the social sphere 
by the increasing popularity of person- object games 
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between five and six months: the child will begin to 
laugh more at objects animated by the mother than at the 
mother herself. 
Once again one would expect this eager interest in 
games to lead to an increasing ability to relate to 
others and to cooperate with them. But, once again, 
the achievements of the second phase of intersubjective 
development appear to undergo a transformation, making 
games frustrating for the child and people threatening 
(Schaffer 1966 ). This third period of negativity 
ushers in a third phase of intersubjective development 
which lasts for the next six or seven months. Once 
again, an initial preoccupation with objects is resolved 
socially: in the emergence (at around ten months of 
age) of "truly cooperative activity" (Trevarthen and 
Hubley 1972, Trevarthen 1979b). It is this development 
which Trevarthen believes to underlie - among other 
changes in cognition - an interest in the way adults 
make objects disappear (Piaget 1941); the use of vocal- 
isations to refer to objects and events in the external 
world (Halliday 1975); spontaneous giving to others 
(cf. 'reparation' in Klein 1953b 1937) and willingness 
to be instructed - all of which first appear at approx- 
imately ten months of age. 
Trevarthen's publications outline a scheme of early 
social development which is more complex and more 
detailed than that of any other research worker in the 
area. As yet, it is too early to judge its validity. 
Nevertheless, certain comments can be made concerning 
both its empirical and theoretical bases. 
In quantitative terms the evidence for Trevarthen's 
developmental scheme is scanty. This is partly 
because most of the observational work currently being 
published is normative or records only isolated ele- 
ments of the infant's social repertoire ('gaze', 
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'sucking', 'vocalization') which do not provide adequate 
evidence for the presence or absence of the sort of 
complex social actions about which Trevarthen writes. 
And although Trevarthen's own publications are rich in 
illustrations, he has as yet published only one syste- 
matic case -analysis of the first year of life (concen- 
trating primarily on the second six months of life; 
Trevarthen and Hubley 197ß). In this light, claims 
such as "infants show invariably a cooling of their 
interest in chatting with the mother" at four months of 
age (Trevarthen 1975, my emphasis) must be treated with 
caution. Nonetheless, Trevarthen's original claim - 
that there is an innate faculty of intersubjectivity 
which operates from birth - apparently has more sub- 
stantial empirical support (but see pp. ÿ;-g-6 below). 
First, there is evidence that babies as young as four 
weeks old can imitate movements of the face and hands 
(Maratos 1973, Meltzoff and Moore 1977) This suggests 
that infants have a cerebral representation of persons 
(Trevarthen 1979b). Secondly, Trevarthen reports a 
film study in which it was discovered that young infants 
"categorize unliving physical objects as different from 
living intelligent objects like their mothers and behave 
quite differently to these two kinds of thing" 
(Trevarthen 1974 ). This suggests that babies have not 
only a repertoire of social behaviours but an idea of 
what these behaviours are appropriate for. He backs 
up this second finding with the observation that during 
mother -infant interactions there is, on the infant's 
behalf, "subtle modification to the form of her actions 
proving that the baby can perceive the mother's unique 
person -like attributes" (Trevarthen 1979C). Finally, 
if this sort of conversational exchange is perverted by 
the mother immobilising her face or behaving unrespon- 
sively, young babies will quickly become upset, sug- 
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Besting that they already know how people 'ought' to 
behave in such circumstances (Tatam 1974, Tronick et. 
al. 1975, Trevarthen 1979e, Murray in prep.). 
Trevarthen's theoretical claims are unusual among 
those of psychologists in placing primary importance on 
interpersonal rather than cognitive development. Most 
psychologists believe that social development - and 
'consequent' awareness of persons - is just one aspect 
of cognitive development (Piaget and Inhelder 1966, 
Schaffer 1971, Bower 1974). Trevarthen believes the 
opposite - putting forward the idea that there is an 
interactive competition between the development of 
object- oriented intelligence ('object- cognition') and 
the person- oriented intelligence ('intersubjectivity') 
by which it is dominated and regulated (Trevarthen 
1975). With respect to the units of psychological 
development, he originally presented his work as "the 
natural history of intention" (1975). Very recently 
however he has suggested that motives are more funda- 
mental; in particular the motives "to master objects in 
the environment and to obtain a community of motives 
with others" (1979c). He believes this substitution 
to be desirable because motives are relatively more 
enduring and less dependent on experience than inten- 
tions.(they are "the core of the subject's intrinsic 
mental organisation "). An additional advantage is that 
motives implicate a lower level of conscious conceptual- 
isation on behalf of the subject than do intentions 
(e.g. Hampshire 1959). Thus, it rings truer to say 
that infants are motivated to communicate from birth 
than to say that they intend to communicate. Implicit- 
ly this is a criticism of the abstractness of Ryan's 
(1974) summary of the intersubjective requirements for 
language -use. it comes closer to Macnamara's (1972) 
suggestion that different forms of speech act - such as 
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denial and request - "correspond to deeply rooted 
mental attitudes ... which are innate or develop almost 
without benefit of learning ". The closest parallel to 
Trevarthen's conception of motive is the psychoanalytic 
concept of instinct (i.e. "an innate biologically 
determined drive to action "; Rycroft 1968, cf. 
Trevarthen 1979b). 
Both in the precocity of the psychological processes 
attributed to young babies and in the detail of the 
empirical claims made about early social development, 
Trevarthen's theory of' intersubjectivity is more far - 
reaching than any other modern psychological treatment 
of young infants as social beings. Boldness combined 
with empirical specificity are, in Popperian (1972) 
terms, the two most important characteristics of the 
most refutable and (therefore) best scientific theories. 
As yet, empirical tests of Trevarthen's hypothesis are 
incomplete. The studies he quotes to show that one - 
month -olds selectively imitate movements of the mouth 
and hands (Maratos 1973, Meltzoff and Moore 1977) have 
recently been questioned on the grounds that neither 
controlled for increases in the frequency of these 
behaviours as an effect of generally increased arousal 
while also controlling for the alternative explanation 
that 'imitation' is a released response which can be 
elicited by a broad (but delimited) class of incentive 
stimuli (Jacobson 1979). The study by Trevarthen and 
Richards which is claimed to show that a group of young 
infants categorise inanimate objects as different from 
persons has never been published as such, although it 
is not infrequently referred to (e.g. Bruner 1968, 
Richards 1974, Trevarthen 1974 ). Neither are there 
in the literature any systematic presentations of 
adult - infant communication showing that infants 
recognise the specific significance (i.e. not just the 
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occurrence or non -occurrence) of others' social 
actions. The strongest experimental evidence for a 
faculty of intersubjectivity in early infancy is to be 
found in the studies which show that infants are upset 
by 'unnatural' perturbations of adult -infant inter- 
actions (e.g. Tatam 1974, Brazelton et.al. 1975, 
Tronick et.al. 1979, Murray 1980). But these studies 
do not show what role intersubjectivity plays in 
normal development. 
The study of intersubjectivity poses special 
difficulties for the scientist. Thus in Chapters 2 and 
4 of this thesis it is argued that no quantitative 
survey of infant behaviours can give satisfactory evidence 
for the existence of a faculty as sophisticated as the 
faculty of intersubjectivity is claimed to be, because 
'motives' and 'the control of joint patterns of aware- 
ness' belong to a higher order of psychological phenomena 
than the order of motions - such as smiles, grimaces and 
gesticulations (Bernstein 1967, see pp.62 -65 below). 
This argument raises an epistemological query about 
Popper's (1972: 342) belief that, in the progress of 
science by conjecture and refutation, it is observation 
which plays the decisive role, because, in order to 
observe or 'become aware of' patterns of awareness, epist- 
emologists must assume the existence of what they are trying 
to question. Such an assumption need not trouble the 
scientific journeyman but, for the epistemologist, it 
raises a difficulty about the part played by assumptions in 
scientific endeavour. Popper suggests that assumptions 
receive their form from individuals' expectations and 
biological dispositions, which are, ultimately, of phylo- 
genetic origin. Thus, in his terms, assumptions constitute 
'subjective knowledge' - a less adequate order of knowledge 
than the truly scientific and specifically human order of 
'objective knowledge' (i.e. linguistically formulated 
expectations submitted to logical criticism). 
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In the study of observable or quantifiable subject - 
matter, Popper's epistemological proposals can be 
accepted and the scientist can proceed. But the study 
of intersubjectivity disqualifies the student from 
being a scientist in Popper's terms, because inter- 
subjectivity can only be studied 'subjectively'. Thus 
the researcher who believes that intersubjectivity - 
and other such phenomena - can be studied scientifically 
must propose that there is an order of knowledge more 
adequate than 'objective', 'linguistically formulated' 
knowledge. In fact this is a natural conclusion from 
the study of logic, - as Spinoza's (1910) philosophy 
and Lewis Carroll's (1904) allegory, "What the Tortoise 
said to Achilles ", show. There is no logical argument 
that will enforce the acceptance of a logical argument, 
therefore there must be extra -logical criteria which 
determine the acceptance or non -acceptance of logical 
arguments. And, insofar as our knowledge of the world 
increases, these extra -logical criteria must, more 
often than not, accord with the structure of the world. 
These 'correct assumptions' or 'intuitions' constitute 
what Spinoza (1910 Pt.II prop.63) calls the third and 
most adequate order of knowledge, where the first and 
second orders roughly correspond to what Popper calls, 
respectively, subjective and objective. 
In the light of this discussion it is interesting to 
note that there are two strands of intuitive reasoning 
which have received 'objective' support throughout 
this literature survey: namely, an emphasis on the 
active 'motivatedness' of young infants' actions 
and an emphasis on the importance of 'basic 
trust' for adequate social development (cf. Erikson 
1950). Trevarthen's theory of intersubjectivity 
incorporates both these insights (e.g. motives are "the 
core of the subject's intrinsic mental organization "; 
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1979a) - indeed, intersubjectivity might well be 
thought of as a formulation in theoretical terms of the 
psychological processes responsible for creating inter- 
personal trust. In these two respects, the theory of 
intersubjectivity is the true heir to the previously 
reviewed theories of development and its claims will be 
considered in detail in the first three empirical 
chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
8. Implications of past research for the present study 
Perhaps the most unequivocal conclusion to be drawn 
from the preceding sections of this chapter concerns 
the beneficial effects of increasing observational 
rigour in advancing our understanding of young infants 
as social beings. It was the advent of direct observ- 
ation which marked the progression from Freud to Klein. 
It was the application of more rigorous ethological 
methods to social development which allowed the 
progression from Klein to Bowlby. It was the observ- 
ational detail of Bloom's single case -study which 
introduced psycholinguists to the importance of infant 
development for language acquisition. And it was the 
introduction of film and video -technology which has 
permitted the current burgeoning of research in this 
field. 
However, it will be remembered that in the intro- 
duction to this chapter, an argument was put forward 
that psychological research must do justice to both the 
constitutional and the societal aspects of social being 
if social development is to be understood (cf. Wrong 
1961, Bell 1968 1971). While the advent of film and 
video -technology has led to much greater sophistication 
in our understanding of infants' social constitutions, 
it has tended to have the reverse effect on our under- 
standing of societal influences on development. Thus, 
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as TV and film have become more important in develop- 
mental psychology, detailed observational research is 
more frequently conducted at the psychologist's place 
of work than in the home. This means that observations 
on social development take place more than ever in a 
"social vacuum" (Riley 1978). In the past, 'social 
influences' have been assessed by questionnaires and 
lists of categories. But as behavioural analyses 
concentrate more and more on the fine detail of 
interactional dynamics, these techniques have become 
inappropriate. More and more, the societally regulated 
parameters of social development (e.g. Newson and 
Newson 1965, Snow et.al. 1979) are left out of psycho- 
logical accounts of early interactions. 
This means that there is a pressing need for a means 
of representing adults' contributions to infant -adult 
interactions which does justice both to the behavioural 
detail their 
with the adults' different positions in society. It 
is suggested in the following chapters that this need 
can best be met by the analysis of adults' 'babytalk' 
(see Chapters 5, 7 and 8). 
Another important lack in the recent scientific 
literature dealing with social development is a 
treatment of negativity. The fact that young infants 
manifest complex negative social responses like 
ignoring, avoidance, anger, frustration and rejection 
is not infrequently mentioned in empirical studies 
(e.g. Brackbill 1958, Polak et.al. 1964, Stechler and 
Carpenter 1967, Ainsworth and Bell 1970). Yet modern 
psychologists reveal an odd restraint when it comes to 
discussing whether and how negativity plays a part in 
social development - usually treating it as a develop- 
mental aberration. The observations discussed in 
Chapter 7 suggest that this is an important oversight. 
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Despite the apparent diversity of theoretical 
statements about early social development, there does 
seem to be an empirical basis for a consensus on two 
central issues: the active, purposive role which 
infants play in relating to the external world - 
whether it be in the developemnt of cognitive schemata 
(Schaffer 1971, Piaget 1973), in learning contingency 
relations (Papousek 1969) or in interpersonal inter- 
action (Trevarthen et.al. 1975) - and, secondly, the 
importance of trust for adequate social development 
(see especially section 5). The only theoretical 
statements which provide a potentially acceptable 
account of these two characteristics of social develop- 
ment are to be found in Trevarthen's theory of inter - 
subjectivity. For this reason, and because evidence 
for Trevarthen's formulation of the development of 
intersubjectivity is as yet scanty, it is his theory 
upon which we shall concentrate in the first three 
empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
One problem which emerges from reading the relevant 
psychological literature is the widespread absence from 
descriptions of early infant behaviour of the mention 
of infants' internal states as having psychological 
status (e.g. as 'moods' or 'emotions'). Psychologists 
generally only discuss internal states in physiological 
terms (e.g. 'arousal'). Yet many of the difficulties 
encountered in both childhood and adulthood are known 
to have important emotional aspects. It seems 
unlikely that the same is not true of infancy. While 
references to emotions - if not moods - are made in the 
psychoanalytic literature on infancy, observational 
studies have usually excluded them on methodological 
grounds (e.g. Hutt and Hutt 1970). As argued in the 
next chapter, this exclusion is no longer justifiable. 
To summarise, the empirical chapters of this thesis 
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bear on three issues which have emerged from the 
foregoing literature survey - the validity of 
Trevarthen's theory of intersubjectivity as a descrip- 
tion and explanation of social behaviour during the 
first six months of life, the role played by psycho- 
logical 'states' in early interactions and the role 
played by socital factors in infants' social 
development. The principal assumption made in study- 
ing these issues is that they can be studied with 
observational rigour. The next chapter presents a 
justification for making this assumption. 
N.B. Two words - -'purposive' and 'intersubjectivity' - 
are frequently used in the following chapters of this 
thesis. Unless otherwise stated, 'purposive' is used 
as meaning "with purpose" or "directed towards an end" 
and 'intersubjectivity' is used to refer to express- 
ions of a complex social sensitivity, that is, of 
a sensitivity to others' actions as having a compre- 
hensible social significance. While intersubjectivity 
must involve the perception of others as purposive 
agents at some level, no assumption is made as to the 
degree of understanding of others' intentions such 
perception involves. 
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Chapter 2: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The previous chapter introduced the writer's 
concerns by means of an historical survey of research 
on social development. This chapter presents a 
rationale for the practical procedures used in 
collecting and interpreting the data on which the 
empirical chapters are based. The procedures 
themselves are described in the next chapter. 
1. Motions and Actions 
The units of analysis upon which the research 
concentrated were actions rather than motions. 
Actions are defined as 'the performances of deeds' where 
a 'deed' is something which is important to the indivi- 
dual who performed it (i.e. which is in the service of 
his or her motives). Actions are distinguished from 
motions - defined as 'physical changes of position'. 
The significant difference between actions and motions 
is that the nature of an action depends on its relation 
to a motive whereas the nature of a motion does not. 
On the other hand, motion is necessarily measurable 
whereas action is not. 'Behaviour' and 'movement' are 
used as generic terms to cover both motion and action. 
This is a thesis on psychology, not on physiology or 
anatomy, and, while motions can be studied by both 
psychologists and physiologists, actions can only be 
studied psychologically and are, thus, the psycholo- 
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gist's true preserve. The importance of this point is 
made clear by the work of Nikolai Bernstein on "the 
coordination and regulation of movements" (1967). 
Bernstein's research concentrates on analysis of the 
physiological coordination of such simple purposive 
actions as hammering, filing, striking piano keys and 
walking. In considering these actions he demonstrates 
that all the details of the constituent motions must be 
organised with the required degree of precision some 
time before the action is undertaken. In other words 
there exist in the central nervous system exact formu- 
lae (or 'engrains') which contain in some form of brain - 
trace the whole process of the action in its entire 
course in time. He then goes on to show that a one - 
to -one correspondence between the psychological 
features of central engrams and the details of the 
muscular motions they describe does not and cannot 
exist. For example, one can draw an 
aerial circle with the hand in different positions with 
equal ease and in response to the same instruction, but 
the circular movements made with the arm extended in 
different positions are accomplished by completely 
different innervational programmes. This illustrates 
"that a determinate effect is possible for a 
movement only in a case where the central impulse 
is very different under different conditions, being 
a function of the positions and velocities of the 
limbs and operating very differently in the differ- 
ential equation [describing the movement of the 
limbs] with various initial conditions ..." 
In other words, purposive movements entail a 
variable relationship between physiological means and 
practical ends. This means that, in order to under- 
stand the physiology of particular movements, physiolo- 
gists must take as their guiding principle the end to 
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which those movements are directed, that is, the motor 
problem as understood by the agent and his or her 
understanding of the result required for that problem's 
solution. And this, says Bernstein, "is a topic for 
psychological investigation ". 
Bernstein's work has significance for any work on 
infants where an attempt is made to conceptualise 
behaviour as a product or manifestation of physiologi- 
cal variations - variations in 'arousal' for example 
(e.g. Stern 1977). As Bernstein has shown, a one -to- 
one correspondence between cerebral 'engrams' and other 
somatic phenomena does not and cannot exist. To talk 
in purely physiological terms about infant behaviour is 
to leave out of account the most crucial level of 
explanation - the level of mental function. As one 
would expect from Bernstein's work, when variations in 
infant behaviour and in physiology are compared empiri- 
cally, no clear relationship can be found to 
between these two classes of phenomena. For example, 
Ashton (1973) could find no equivalence between varia- 
tions in the 'psychological' state of neonates before 
and after being fed (defined behaviourally) and physio- 
logical state, defined in terms of physical responsivity. 
Similarly, Sroufe and Waters (1977) were unable to find 
any systematic relationship between emotional changes 
(e.g. before and after seeing a fear -provoking stimulus) 
and variations in heart -rate. This is not surprising 
when one considers that attempts to define fear and 
hunger in terms of physiological indices leave out of 
account a central fact - that fear and hunger are 
primarily mental events and thus cannot be understood 
physiologically unless they are first submitted to 
psychological investigation. 
Bernstein's work also bears on those observational 
studies of infant behaviour which pick out simple 
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physical movements from the gamut of ongoing action and 
study them in isolation: facial expressions such as the 
smile, the cry, head and eye movements, sucking and so 
on (e.g. Kaye 1977). Bernstein shows that such 
studies can throw no clear light on psychological pro- 
cesses, because there is never an unequivocal relation- 
ship between physical movements and the psychological 
actions of which they form part (excepting the special 
case of 'fixed action patterns'; Tinbergen 1951). 
Researchers must enquire beyond physical phenomena and 
understand the significance of infant movements in the 
light of the tasks they are trying to undertake. Thus 
our methodology must include not only systems of 
measuring and describing behaviours in physical terms 
but also a systematic way of determining their inter- 
pretive significance. 
2. The Setting 
One might claim that walking is a natural human act, 
but where one walks, when one walks and how one walks 
are intimately related with the social circumstances in 
which one is living. The human problems which are 
solved by motor action arise from the external environ- 
ment. For this reason psychological studies of human 
action must take due account of the society in which 
those actions occur. 
As noted by Schaffer (1973, there has been a tendency 
in developmental research to be more interested in 
hypothetical 'processes' than observable 'products'. 
For example, until recently, developmental psycho - 
linguists almost all based their research on the formal 
properties of what children say and not its semantic 
content. Neglect of content allows researchers to 
circumvent the fact that when caretakers and children 
communicate there is always something particular at 
stake - the child is about to tumble down stairs; the 
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father is late for dinner; the child has just been sick. 
These issues arise 'naturally' from the social environ- 
ment in which the family lives: they live in a flat so 
the baby does not know about stairs; the father has 
been switched to night -shift or has been caught up in a 
game of bezique at his club; the mother is hygienic but 
cannot find the tissues. 
In modern developmental studies such factors as 
these are frequently neglected. Babies are usually 
studied in large anonymous groups from which unusual 
babies are excluded or in which their presence is 
systematically counterbalanced. Their behaviour is 
often recorded away from home at the researcher's place 
of work. Indeed it is considered methodologically 
desirable to ensure uniformity of external conditions 
so far as is possible: subjects are studied in the same 
room with the same toys and the same furniture in the 
same spatial configuration. Furthermore, uniformity 
of internal factors is also sought; babies are recorded 
in a uniform physiological /psychological 'state': well - 
fed, not tired and not fussy. Yet when it comes to 
theorising, pyschologists often forget that none of the 
conditions under which psychological studies are gene- 
rally conducted obtain generally in babies' everyday 
lives. 
With this tradition in mind, the research reported 
in this thesis was conducted in a manner which differed 
from many other studies (see pp.l3 -11 for details) - 
although similar to those of such researchers as Kaye, 
Brazelton, Wolff, Trevarthen, Stern, Papousek and 
Richards. 
3. Analysis 
One of the peculiarities of past psychology has been 
its failure to develop an orthodox taxonomy. Taxonomy 
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is usually defined as the theory and practice of classi- 
fying entities (biological organisms, chemical compounds, 
physical elements, etc.) - a definition which implies 
that the collection of materials is distinct from their 
classification. Thus, for example, biologists build 
up archives of collected specimens to which they can 
refer if questions about classification are raised. 
Orthodox taxonomy is thus the product of an interplay 
between two distinct realms - the material realm of 
specimens and the linguistic realm of nomenclature- - 
which are linked together by generally accepted proced- 
ures of interpretation. But until recently this 
process has been short -circuited in psychology: there 
has been no practical distinction between the collection 
and classification of behaviour: behaviour was not 
collected, it was transcribed, and it was transcribed 
in terms of pre- arranged linguistic categories, that 
is, a behavioural classification. This meant that 
questions such as whether'failures to replicate' were 
just due to differences in interpretation or reflected 
genuinely different results could never be satisfactorily 
settled (e.g. Bower 1972, Dodwell DiFranco and Muir 
1976). 
However, with the growing availability of sophisti- 
cated audio -visual recorders, all this is changing. 
Psychologists are now in a position to undertake a 
natural history of human action in which data -collection 
is genuinely distinct from their classification. 
Indeed, moves are afoot to inaugurate a national 
archive of video -material which will provide a point of 
reference for future debates about classification 
(Maxwell Atkinson, pers.commn.). With this techno- 
logical revolution in mind, an attempt was made to 
analyse the behavioural records reported in this thesis 
along orthodox taxonomic lines (e.g. Mayr 1969). 
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In working out how taxonomic principles should be 
applied in the analysis of human actions, help is to 
be derived from a study of law. The problems of 
forensic science and of psychological taxonomy are 
closely related. For hundreds of years lawyers have 
been developing methods for establishing whether or not 
claimed human actions really occurred and - if they did 
- for correctly interpreting them. As a result, law 
can make at least four sorts of contribution to the 
quest for a valid methodology in the human sciences: 
(i) Theoretically; for example, the legal critique 
of the concept mens rea (the mental state associated 
with culpability) bears directly on the psychologist's 
concern with the possible interrelationships between 
action, emotion, motive and intention. This critique 
is particularly well- developed in legal discussions of 
recklessness and criminal negligence (e.g. Hall 1960). 
(ii) Logistically; one of the principal features of 
law and legal theory is that it has to be practically 
oriented: there is at all times a well -defined procedure 
for the trying of cases, in terms of which legal 
problems are solved. Where the accepted methods of 
testing hypotheses in the physical sciences often lead 
to confusion in psychology (e.g. see Joynson 1974), the 
orderly nature of legal procedure serves as a clear 
alternative: the importance of establishing a prima 
facie case; the maintenance of a distinction between 
evidence and fact; the notion of having matters of 
which proof is not generally required (e.g. facts which 
must have happened according to the invariable course 
of nature, the meanings of common English words, the 
rules of logic), and of having features of proof which 
are generally but explicitly accepted (e.g. the 
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presumption of continuance: that things or circum- 
stances, once proved to have existed in a certain state 
at a particular time, continue to exist in that state 
for a reasonable period thereafter); the notion of 
having explicit standards for the admissibility of 
evidence; the use of precedents and so on. An 
explicitly laid -out procedure for proof would be of 
considerable value in psychology where one often gets 
the impression that procedure is either manufactured on 
idiosyncratic, ad hoc bases or accepted wholesale with 
many methodological assumptions unexplicated. 
(iii) Heuristically; law uses particular methods 
and specific principles of enquiry which are little 
known in psychology. Law could thus make substantive 
as well as procedural contributions to psychological 
method (e.g. the reasonable man test, the principle of 
co- occurrence, etc.). 
(iv) Factually; legal cases provide evidence for 
the variety of human actions which would prove valuable 
in certain psychological studies. 
Forensic procedure makes clear a more general point: 
the classification of human actions is necessarily 
uncertain: the most stringent standard of proof in law 
is proof 'beyond reasonable doubt', which, as Lord 
Denning (1947) has pointed out, does not mean 'beyond a 
shadow of doubt'. The more common standard of proof, 
the standard used in civil law and the standard which 
would seem most applicable in psychological research, is 
proof by establishing 'a preponderance of probability' 
in favour of one among a number of alternative construc- 
tions of a case. 
Viewed in this light, psychology will never be more 
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than a form of advocacy. For instance, a scientist 
who claims that blacks are inherently less intelligent 
than whites (e.g. Eysenck 1971) is not reporting a 
finding about the world but is merely advocating this 
conclusion and marshalling evidence to support it. 
The same goes for the claim that infants are social 
beings at birth. This cannot be proved. It can only 
be advocated more or less convincingly (on the grounds 
of more or less empirical evidence). 
4. Categories and Analytic Procedure 
(a) Establishing a prima facie case. 
The first phase of the film and tape analysis was 
conducted along traditional observational lines. 
Depending on the hypothesis at issue, a number of 
behavioural categories were defined and applied to the 
behavioural record (see Chapters 4 and 6). Another 
observer independently applied the same categories to a 
small proportion of the same data (of which there were 
more than fifteen hours) to assess inter -observer 
reliability. In taxonomic terms this phase is 
equivalent to initial 'identification' (Mayr 1969) - 
of 'negativity' for example. Subsequent analysis may 
prove initial identifications to be wrong (see below). 
(b) Classification: a posteriori weighting. 
Observational studies of human behaviour are often 
based on classification- schemes which are set up before 
the study is begun - usually by means of a pilot -study 
(e.g. Hutt and Hutt 1970, Blurton -Jones 1972). But to 
use these classification -schemes as a basis for the 
final classification of the behaviours observed, would 
be to be guilty of a priorism. 
In biological taxonomy, the Aristotelians and their 
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successors often assigned a priori weights to certain 
characters. Cain (1959) has pointed out the fallacy 
of this approach. Neither function nor conspicuousness 
nor any other known aspects of a character gives it a 
priori a greater weighting than other characters. 
Indeed the very same structural difference may have 
high weight in one taxon and low weight in a related 
taxon (see Mayr 1969 Ch.6). 
In the same way, to classify an action by means of 
descriptive categories which are fixed before the act 
is observed is to assume that movements which have been 
labelled as having a particular sense in the past are 
automatically to be given the same interpretation 
whenever they recur. But, as shown by Bernstein (1967), 
purposive actions are based on an alterable relationship 
between physiological means and practical ends: the same 
physical movement may have different psychological 
senses on different occasions. 
The way this difficulty has been overcome in 
zoological and botanical taxonomy is by a posteriori 
weighting. The same method was adopted in this study. 
In contrast to initial identification, which is achieved 
by the application of a few a priori categories as 
described above, classifying taxa "means looking at the 
totality of characters as a single integrated ensemble, 
not at single, disconnected characters in an atomistic 
manner" (Mayr 1969: 76). This allows for the 
classification of unique or idiosyncratic actions as 
well as those which are more common. 
Once initially identified, actions were then re- 
analysed on the video -tape (or film). This second 
analysis was much more detailed than the first and all 
forms of physical motion were considered to be poten- 
tially significant (see Chapters 5, 7 and 8). The 
'taxonomic characters' employed were manifold - kinesic, 
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proxemic, vocal, facial, gestural, postural and visual 
- the most frequently used being facial (see Appendix 
I). 
The next chapter describes how the methodological 
principles discussed were put into practice. 
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Chapter 3: PROCEDURES 
This chapter describes the procedures used to 
collect and analyse the data presented in the next five 
chapters. 
1. Setting 
In conformity with the argument put forward on pages 
bS -(cb above, the research reported in this thesis was 
conducted in a manner which differed from many other 
studies. Behaviour was recorded on film and video- 
tape in a laboratory setting. But no great effort was 
made to isolate the baby from the external world while 
her behaviour was being recorded. Voices were audible 
from adjoining rooms and, not infrequently, the experi- 
menter or mother would enter the recording- chamber 
while recording was in progress - to adjust equipment, 
to wipe the baby's clothes and so on. Very often 
these interruptions produced interesting social 
reactions on behalf of the baby (see Chapter 5 Event 3 
for example). 
Neither were recording sessions necessarily dis- 
continued if the baby began to cry. Babies seldom 
became very distressed in the laboratory although there 
was a fair amount of 'frustrated' crying. (If mothers 
did want to remove their babies from the baby -chair and 
comfort them they were encouraged to do so.) Even 
when not with the mother personally, the babies were 
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always visible to their mothers, either through a 
window or via television, and could be taken from the 
chair at a moment's notice if need be. 
The recording chamber was a square brightly furnished 
room (floor: 4m x 4m). In addition to normal room - 
lighting one 100 -watt photoflood with a translucent 
shield was used for filming. The baby was secured in 
a specially designed baby -chair with a broad elastic 
waist -band. The chair supported the baby's trunk 
while allowing maximum movement of the arms and legs. 
In front of the baby sat the mother. Both baby and 
mother were filmed from the adjoining control -room 
through a plain glass window (1.1 x 0.75m): the 
mother's face being reflected by an appropriately 
angled front -silvered mirror. The control -room was 
kept in darkness during recording. 
The height of the baby -chair was adjustable as was 
the angle at which the baby sat. The chair was 
adjusted so that the infant's eyes were approximately 
level with the mother's eyes when she was sitting on a 
normal chair and the baby's body was held at between 
10 and 20 degrees to vertical depending on the maturity 
of the infant's postural control. When looking at the 
mother the infant would be facing approximately 20 
degrees away from the camera (see Photo.41). 
With one exception - who was recruited through 
friends - mothers were selected and contacted via 
health visitors (by whom they would be told that the 
experimenter was interested in early social development). 
If they wanted to participate, they and their baby 
would be brought by taxi to the lab at a time when they 
thought their child most likely to be alert and active. 
(This would be fixed at the last possible moment by 
telephone.) When recording began they would simply be 
asked to sit down in front of their baby and chat with 
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her (most of the subjects were girls). Any queries 
they had were honestly answered. The only restriction 
on their behaviour was against sitting in such a 
position as to obscure the baby from the camera. Each 
interaction lasted approximately five minutes. Each 
recording session, including breaks and cups of tea, 
lasted between half an hour and an hour. 
It is recognised that the conditions in which data 
were collected for this research could be described as 
unnatural. Quite what the word 'natural' means with 
reference to babies is debatable. In at least one 
sense, the conditions of this research were natural in 
that the mother -baby dyad was hardly at all disrupted 
during recording sessions (no more than during washing - 
up for instance). Probably the most 'unnatural' thing 
was the presence of video -cameras - and these were more 
salient for the mothers than for the infants. 
The argument that recording conditions are 
'unnatural' usually leads on to the argument that 
'unnaturalness' will infect the observed behaviour of 
the subjects and thus make findings inapplicable to 
everyday life. It must be said that this second 
argument depends on the assumption that 'everyday life' 
naturally lacks diversity. No -one who considers 
social inequalities or Western technological advances 
of the last decade, century or millenium can accept 
this assumption. The real question is: in what did 
the specific unusualness of these recording sessions 
consist so far as the mothers - and, thus, indirectly, 
their babies - were concerned? 
Perhaps the most obvious effect was that mothers 
appeared to want their own and their babies' behaviour 
to reflect well on themselves. They wanted to impress 
the psychologist that they were good mothers, or, 
alternatively, they were worried that he would think 
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they were not good mothers. This wish might appear in 
a number of forms. The mother might simply want the 
child to show off its latest trick - such as a new- 
found ability to imitate 'raspberries'. The mother 
might be concerned that the baby should not disarrange 
their best clothes. Or, alternatively, she might 
become more authoritarian or cold- hearted with regard 
to her baby's crying if she thought the psychologist 
thought this was what a good mother should be. Quite 
often mothers would pass comment on their babies' 
behaviour in a manner suggesting 'detached' social 
judgement: "You're being cheeky ", "You're just a 
rogue ". But comments such as these form part of most 
mothers' repertoires - particularly when in the company 
of adult friends (into the category of which the 
experimenter attempted to insinuate himself:). The 
most striking observation was the range of moods 
mothers displayed whilst being recorded. One week 
they might play games with such gusto that, afterwards, 
they would seem slightly embarrassed when remembering 
they had been 'on the tele'. The next week they might 
be transparently bored, spending most of the recording 
session flicking looks into the mirror to see what was 
going on in the control -room behind them. In general 
mothers said that they enjoyed coming to the laboratory 
as their visits added interest to the job of child- 
minding which they had each taken on for the first time 
(i.e. Nv6F- 5uhjecf-S were first -born). 
No systematic evidence is available to suggest 
whether or not the interactions recorded in the labora- 
tory were 'abnormal' with respect to the interactions 
in which mother and child participated at home. 
Informal home- visits and tape- recordings of interactions 
made by the mothers at home suggested that there is 
considerable variation in the extent to which mothers 
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talk to and play with their babies under normal 
conditions, and also in the intensity of those inter- 
actions. Some mothers would come into a recording 
session determined to show off a 'new game' which had 
obviously emerged in recent home -interactions of the 
type recorded in the laboratory. But other mothers 
never played this sort of game in the laboratory and I 
have no evidence that the babies of these mothers were 
involved in anything more intense than gentle babytalk 
during a feed or nappy- change, cuddling when distressed, 
and hearing a comment or two while sitting in their 
baby- chairs such as "Are you lookin' at the tele ? ", "Is 
that all the bright lights you see ? ". 
As for the findings of the study, informal comments 
did suggest that some mothers - even some having no 
knowledge of our research - do encounter interactive 
phenomena corresponding to those recorded in the labor- 
atory (especially early negativity). But, in the 
absence of systematic evidence as to the nature and 
frequency of adult -infant interactions at home, we can 
make no general statements about infant behaviour. We 
can only claim that the recordings reported in the 
following chapters show what babies can do under the 
laboratory conditions described above. On the other 
hand - in the same way that theoretical physicists are 
not put off from drawing theoretical conclusions as to 
the structure of the atom by the fact that atoms can 
only be split under specific conditions - the specifi- 
city of the conditions under which our findings about 
infants were made should not prevent us from drawing 
theoretical conclusions from these findings. 
2. Analysis 
(a)Initial identification: establishing a prima facie 
case. 
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The first phase of the fibiand tape anaysis was, as 
stated on page 70, conducted along traditional observational 
lines. Depending on the hypothesis at issue, a number of 
behavioural categories were defined and applied to the 
behaviour. Another observer independently applied the same 
categories to a small proportion of the same data (of which 
there were more than fifteen hours) to assess inter - 
observer reliability. In taxonomic terms this phase is 
equivalent to initial 'identification' (Nayr 1969) - of 
'negativity' for example. Subsequent analysis may prove 
initial identifications to be wrong (see 2b below). 
Categories were of two sorts: referring to the simple 
incidence of a phenomenon (for example, smiling) and 
referring to the duration of a behavioural phenomenon. 
Inter -observer reliability was calculated in the same 
way for both sorts of category; by using the formula 
Q = No. of agreements (Observer A + Observer B) 
(No. of agreements (A +B) + No. seen by A only 
+ No. seen by B only) 
(from McGrew 1972). Both observers coded the 'start' and 
'finish' of each behaviour, thus proportion of overlap 
constituted 'agreement' as to duration and lack of overlap 
constituted 'disagreement'. 
The three main categories were Smiling, Crying and 
Looking. 
(i) Smiling is defined by Oster (1978) as a behaviour 
involving the action of zygomaticus major - a muscle which 
raises and draws out the corners of the mouth - in conj- 
unction with an elevation and 'expansion' of the infra - 
orbital triangle (the cheeks), a pronounced deepening and 
straightening of the infraorbital furrow below the lower 
lids - changes produced by action of 
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orbicularis oculi. In line with this definition 
(which includes laughing), smiling was only recorded 
when an outward and upward motion of the lip corners 
coincided with raising of the cheeks and crinkling 
around the eyes. 
Of the three major behavioural categories used in 
this study, smiling was the most difficult to code 
reliably. Different observers tended to disagree 
about smile- movements of low intensity. For this 
reason a policy was adopted of ignoring doubtful cases. 
This means that the quantity of smiling is if anything 
underestimated in this thesis - particularly during the 
early months when smiles are most ambiguous. [Inter - 
observer reliability: Duration = .84, Incidence = .78.] 
(ii) Crying was defined as any negative vocalisa- 
tion associated with a 'cry face' - the expression in 
which the lip corners are lowered and spread, the 
eyebrows are lowered and drawn together, the upper 
eyelids are lowered and the lower lids slightly raised 
and the lower lip projected in a 'pout' (Eibl- Eibes- 
feldt 1975; see Photo 61). A cry was counted as 
continuous if vocalisations were not separated by more 
than half a second. 
Crying became more difficult to code with age, as 
the variety of the babies' negative vocalisations 
increased and became more idiosyncratic. It was for 
this reason that the 'cry -face' was included in the 
definition of çrying. [Inter- observer reliability: 
Duration + .89, Incidence = .87.] 
(iii) Looking was the most frequently used 
behavioural character of all. It was defined as a 
visual fixation of the other's face (N.B. not the 
other's eyes). Looks at or away from the face may be 
of two sorts - they may be glances which only involve 
eye- movement, or they may be looks involving both head 
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and eye movement. Disagreements as to coding mainly 
concern glances as these are usually quicker and less 
obvious than looks. During movements of the head and 
eyes, it was sometimes difficult to see at exactly 
which instant the eyes made or broke contact with the 
other's face. For this reason looks were timed from 
the end of the head -movement which first brought the 
eyes into contact with the other's face to the end of 
the head -movement which first took the eyes away from 
the face. 
Looking became easier to code with age, as the 
infants developed greater postural control. Below two 
months of age, babies not infrequently adopted a 
'defocussed stare' at their opposite number. In these 
cases, looking was coded in terms of head position 
alone. (Babies of this age can distinguish quite fine 
differences of pattern by using their peripheral 
vision; Maurer et.al. 1979). [Inter-observer 
reliability for babies: Duration = .93, Incidence = .82; 
for mothers: Duration = .89, Incidence = .89.] 
The following behaviours were coded in terms of 
incidence alone. 
(iv) Eyebrow Raise was defined as any appreciable 
movement by both brows upward from the modal eyebrow 
position. This definition excludes upward movements 
of the brows from an already raised position. 
[Inter- observer reliability: Incidence _ .90.] 
(v) Eyebrow Lower was defined as any appreciable 
movement lowering both brows from their modal position. 
This definition excludes downward movements of the 
brows from an already lowered position. [Inter - 
observer reliability: Incidence = .80.] 
(vi) Tongue Protrusion was defined as any outward 
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movement of the tongue which made the tongue visible. 
This definition excludes those occasions when the 
tongue was already visible before it was protruded. 
This category was occasionally confounded by the next 
because the tongue was occasionally moved when the 
mouth was already wide open. However, most tongue 
protrusions were made with the mouth relatively closed, 
the tongue being hidden in shadow. [Inter- observer 
reliability: Incidence = .87.] 
(vii) Mouth Open was defined as any movement of the 
lips creating a space of shadow between them. Because 
of the relatively harsh downward studio -lighting, this 
was a pronounced effect. However, the definition 
excluded any widening of the oral cavity from an 
already 'open' position because such movements, when 
small, were impossible to code reliably. [Inter - 
observer reliability: Incidence = .85.] 
(viii)Yawning is a characteristic movement involving 
an involuntary wide opening of the mouth together with 
intake of breath and (relative) closing of the eyes., 
[Inter- observer reliability: 
Incidence = 1.00.] 
(ix) Reaching proved a very difficult movement to 
code. It is defined by Bower (1972) as the infant's 
hand being raised sufficiently to cross a line midway 
between his body and the object being sought. As 
argued in Chapter 4, movements such as these become 
easily confused with gesticulations. Nevertheless 
Bower's definition of reaching was adhered to in the 
one experiment for which this measure was used. 
[Inter -observer reliability: Incidence = .68.) 
(x) Vocalisation was defined as any vocalisation 
not associated with a 'cry -face' (see (ii) above) and 
not including 'vegetative' sounds (Lenneberg et.al. 
1965: burps, coughs, etc.). As with crying, 
vocali- 
sations separated by less than half a second were 
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scored as continuous. [Inter -observer reliability: 
Incidence = .88.] 
(xi) Hand movements were defined as any appreciable 
change of direction of hand movement. This definition 
includes the initiation of hand movements but not their 
cessation. Many hand movements were arcs - continuous 
changes of direction. However, in practice these were 
fairly easily distinguished from the more abrupt, 
decisive, angular changes of direction. Only the 
latter were scored as 'hand movements'. C Inter - 
observer reliability: Incidence = .91.] 
(xii) Maternal utterances were defined as any word 
or group of words separated from preceding and 
succeeding utterances by a perceptible pause and united 
in terms of intonation and phrasing. When verbal, 
utterances universally coincided with sentences or 
reductions of sentences. When non -verbal, utterances 
were distinguished in terms of rhythm and phrasing - 
distinctions which were usually reinforced by differ- 
ences in sound -content (e.g. Pa- pa- pa- pa -pa: Hey: 
Pgh- gh -gh: Hey, booboo:: 4 utterances). Utterances 
proved relatively easy to distinguish; their duration 
was more difficult to code reliably. [Inter- observer 
reliability: Incidence = .96, Duration = .70.1 
The minimum number of incidents from which inter - 
observer reliability was calculated was 20. Duration 
was measured by means of a digital clock of which the 
display was recorded on video -tape simultaneously with 
the infants' behaviour (minimum unit = .01 seconds). 
Duration was calculated on films by counting frames 
(i.e. each frame interval = .04 seconds). 
(b) Classification: a posteriori, weighting. 
Once initially identified, actions were 
then re- 
83 
analysed on the video -tape (or film). This second 
analysis was much more detailed than the first and all 
forms of physical motion were considered to be 
potentially significant (see Chapters 5, 7 and 8). 
Thus the 'taxonomic characters' employed were manifold 
- kinesic, vocal, gestural, postural and visual. 
Amongst these, the most frequently used were facial 
motions. (Appendix 1 contains a condensed account of 
Ekman and Friesen's (1975) system for analysing facial 
expressions as used in this thesis.) 
The main problem with undertaking this second stage 
of analysis was in establishing inter -observer 
reliability for the classifications of actions which 
were finally reached. Because each analysis was 
essentially 'one -off', normal procedures for testing 
the reproducibility of analyses were inapplicable. 
For this reason, fairly long descriptions of the 
experimenter's reasoning for arriving at particular 
conclusions are presented. These descriptions are 
supported by photographs from the film or video -tape in 
question. By this means it is hoped that enough 
evidence is presented to provide grounds for the 
resolution of genuine disputes about interpretation. 
However, in every case, the ultimate point of reference 
is the original behavioural record. 
An attempt was made to support one a posteriori 
analysis by more systematic experimental means. This 
is reported in detail in Chapter 5. More than fifty 
naive judges were exposed to seven photographic samples 
from a film of seventy seconds of mother -infant 
interaction. One- sentence descriptions of the seven 
events the photographs were supposed to portray were 
then matched by the judges with the photographs 
themselves. The results of this analysis showed that 
the judges were performing at a level significantly 
84 
better than chance - a level of performance comparable 
to that reported by Schlosberg (1941) and other 
workers for the independent judgement of adult facial 
expressions. Thus it was concluded that - in one case 
at least -- the experimenter's system of behavioural 
analysis and interpretation had an acceptable level of 
inter -observer reliability. 
The next five chapters present and discuss the 
findings produced by the procedures for collecting and 
analysing data described in this chapter. Wherever 
specific sophistications of analytic technique are 
introduced - as in some analysis of maternal babytalk 
for example - these are discussed in the chapter 
concerned. 
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Chapter 4: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
FOR INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
As reported in Chapter 1, Trevarthen supports his 
claim that infants are born with a faculty for inter - 
subjectivity by mentioning evidence from a film study 
that two -month -olds 
"categorise unliving physical objects as different 
from living intelligent objects like their mothers 
and behave quite differently to these two kinds of 
thing ". (Trevarthen 1974 ) 
Trevarthen and Richards have never published this study 
as such. However a subsequent analysis of the same 
films has been published by Brazelton, Koslowski and 
Main (1974). The films recorded the behaviour of five 
infants with their mothers and with a suspended 
inanimate object at weekly intervals between the ages 
of two and twenty weeks. Brazelton et.al.'s 
"most striking observation was that there were two 
very different patterns of attentional behaviour 
present early in each infant, which were called 
upon in response to an object versus a familiar 
person. ... We felt that we could look at any 
segment of the infant's body and detect whether he 
was watching an object or interacting with his 
mother - so different was his attention, vocalising, 
smiling and motor behaviour with the inanimate 
stimulus as opposed to the mother ". 
Brazelton et.al.'s conclusion clearly coincides with 
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Trevarthen's and contrasts sharply with Schaffer's 
(1971) contention that for young infants people 
"do not constitute a class of stimuli distinct 
from the inanimate world" 
as well as the interpretation presented by Piaget and 
Inhelder (1966). Nevertheless, Brazelton et.al.'s 
paper is not itself particularly conclusive, partly 
because the small number of subjects they used pre- 
cludes statistically -based generalisations and partly 
because they present no substantive results to corrobo- 
rate the story they tell. For this reason it was 
decided to preface the present study with an experi- 
mental test of the hypothesis that there are statisti- 
cally significant differences in the behaviour that 
young infants direct towards people and the behaviour 
they direct towards things. 
1. Procedure 
(a) Subjects. 
Eight mothers who had babies between nine and eleven 
weeks of age (average age: ten and a half weeks) were 
contacted through their health visitors. Six of the 
babies were first -born, two were second -born. Six were 
girls and two were boys. After an initial home -visit 
each mother brought their baby by taxi to the Department 
of Psychology at a time when they thought their child 
most likely to be alert and active. 
(b) Treatments. 
Once the infants had been settled in the baby chair 
(see Chapter 3 for details), their behaviour 
was 
recorded in two conditions: with their mothers and with 
a stimulus to elicit 'pre- reaching' (see below). 
In 
the 'mother' condition, the mother sat in a chair 
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face -to -face with her infant at about forty centimetres 
distance. She was asked to chat with and entertain 
her infant. This instruction gave rise to an animated 
facial display accompanied by a varied flow of baby - 
talk. Mothers were instructed not to touch their 
children on the face or body in order that direct 
evidence of their presence did not appear on the video - 
record during analysis of the infant's behaviour. 
(Mothers quite often circumvented this restriction by 
holding their babies' feet outside the camera's field). 
The video -camera was 'zoomed in' so that the image 
contained only a three -quarters view of the baby. 
In the 'reaching' condition, the infants were con- 
fronted with a red wooden ball, 4.5 centimetres in 
diameter, moving slowly backwards and forwards towards 
them and across their field of vision at distances 
varying between 15 and 40 centimetres. (Their mothers 
watched an adjoining room.) The ball 
from a rod on a transparent nylon thread. The rod was 
held by the experimenter who stood as silently as 
possible behind the baby- chair. The ball was not 
moved evenly but in slow saccadic surges of between 10 
and 15 centimetres. 'Fishing' movements such as these 
are the most efficient elicitors of 'pre- reaching' 
(Trevarthen 1977). 
For four infants (randomly preassigned) the 'mother' 
condition preceded the 'reaching' condition; for the 
other four this order was reversed. Once the 
recording of a condition had started, approximately two 
minutes of behaviour was recorded, whatever that 
behaviour consisted of. (The average length was 127 
seconds.) By this means the issue of what social 
behaviour is was not prejudged. However, as the 
infants were always in an alert and active state at the 
beginning of the 'two minute' session, the range of 
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behaviours possible was reduced - for example, no baby 
fell asleep during recording although some did grow 
drowsy towards the end. 
(c) Behavioural measures. 
Nine categories of behaviour were coded (Mouth Opens, 
Tongue Protrudes, Smile, Eyebrows Raise, Eyebrows Lower, 
Yawn, Reach, Duration of Looking, Incidence of Turning 
Away: see Chapter 2 for definitions). Vocalisation 
was not scored in order that the behaviour could be 
analysed in ignorance of which condition the babies 
were in (if the sound had been turned on, the mother's 
babytalk would have been audible). 
These behavioural categories were selected from those 
used by Brazelton et.al. (1974), and in Trevarthen's 
work, to best differentiate between what Trevarthen and 
Richards distinguished as 'communicating with people' 
and 'doing with objects'. Thus MO and TP were chosen 
to represent prespeech, S, ER and EL to represent 
facial expressiveness, R to represent object -directed 
arm movements, DR and Y to express general level of 
interest and TA to represent what Brazelton et.al. call 
'approach and withdrawal'. From Brazelton and 
Trevarthen's reports, object- directed activity is 
associated particularly with object- directed arm 
movements, intent visual regard of the subject, a lack 
of facial expressiveness, and a lack of prespeech. 
Communication is associated, on the other hand, with 
both facial and oral activity. 
2. Results 
The results do show statistically significant 
(p x.05) differences in infant behaviours between the 
two conditions (see Table 1). 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































more frequently when interacting with their mother than 
when interacting with a reachable ball (p4.05; Wilcoxon 
matched -pairs, signed -ranks test, two -tailed: Siegel 
1956). They lowered their eyebrows significantly more 
often with their mothers than with the ball (p6.01; 
Wilcoxon). They also raised their eyebrows more often 
with their mothers than with the ball, a tendency which 
only narrowly failed to attain the .05 level of signif- 
icance on the Wilcoxon (two -tailed) test. The length of 
time for which they looked at their mothers was not much 
different from the length of time for which they looked 
at the ball (averages: 100.4 secs at mother, 97.5 secs 
at ball) . Neither was the frequency of reacing sig- 
nificantly greater in the 'reaching' condition than 
in the 'mother' condition. However, there was a trend 
in that direction. This trend may have been somewhat 
obscured by the significantly lower level of overall 
animation in the 'reaching' conditions (i.e. all move- 
ments summed in each condition for all babies p4.02; 
Wilcoxon) . If the frequencies of the different movements 
are ranked for each baby, 'reaching' ranks lower in the 
'reaching' than in the 'mother' condition for only one 
baby (p =.11; Sign Test, one -tailed). 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
These results confirm the hypothesis that there are 
statistically significant differences in the behaviour 
that young infants direct towards people and the 
behaviour they direct toward things. They disconfirm 
Brazelton et al.'s (1974) stronger claim - that one can 
look at any aspect of an infant's behaviour and tell 
whether he or she is in the company of a person or with 
an object: all coded behaviours were manifested by some 
infants in both the 'reaching' and the 'mother' 
condition. 
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A possible criticism of this second conclusion is 
that not enough attention was paid during the experi- 
ment to getting the infants into the 'right mood' 
before recording began. Perhaps infant moods are not 
as quickly- changing as they would have had to be to 
have shown categorical behavioural differences between 
the 'reaching' and 'mother' conditions. If infants in 
a sociable mood had been tested only with their mothers 
and tests with the reaching -ball had been kept for when 
the infants, while being alert, were not in a sociable 
mood, it is possible that greater divergences in beha- 
viour would have been recorded. Perhaps this experi- 
ment was over -crude in simply exposing infants to 
pre- assigned conditions whatever their mood - like 
forcing someone in the middle of their favourite 
television programme to go for a jog: 
Further analysis of the results lends some support 
to this A Spearman's Rank Correlation 
Coefficient was calculated to see whether, -- when the 
data for both conditions were taken as a whole, and the 
subjects were ranked with respect to the frequency with 
which they performed each of the nine coded actions, 
there were any consistent relationships between high - 
rankers and low -rankers for the different actions. As 
Table 2 shows, a fairly consistent pattern was found in 
which the orders of subjects ranked in terms of fre- 
quency of mouth -opening, tongue -protrusion, smiling, 
eyebrow- raising, and, less significantly, yawning were 
all positively inter -correlated. The order of ranks 
for this grouping (MO, TP, ER and S) - a grouping which 
might be called the manifestation of 'sociability' - 
was correlated negatively with respect to subjects as 
ordered with respect to duration of regard (DR) and 
with respect to eyebrow -lowering (EL). However, DR 
and EL did not form a second behaviour -grouping in 
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TABLE 4/2: Rank -order correlations between different 
ac ions or eac saq a ing L e s uy as a wno e 
Infants' 
Actions S TP 
Infants' Actions 
ER Y TA R DR EL 
kO .79 .76 .76 .31 .19 .43 -.64 -.45 
S .71 .38 .29 .36 .10 -.57 -.69 
TP .72 .79 .57 .10 -.83 -.30 
' ER .00 .29 -.50 -.24 
Y .62 .10 .48 -.10 
TA -.10 -.24 .10 
R -.26 .19 
DR .07 
(Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients with p G .05 
underlined) 
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themselves: their coefficient of rank inter -correlation 
was only .07. Further analysis suggested that the 
pattern of correlations in Table z arose because 
certain infants remained in a 'sociable' mood throughout 
both recording sessions. That is, babies who raised 
their eyebrows, opened their mouths and stuck out their 
tongues most frequently at their mothers, tended to 
raise their eyebrows, open their mouths and stick their 
tongues out most frequently at the ball also. Thus, 
when individuals are ranked in order of the frequency 
with which they performed the coded behaviours for the 
'object' and 'mother' conditions separately, the order 
of ranks for M0, ER and TP correlate positively with 
each other for the two conditions (see Table 3). 
Smiling in the 'object' condition correlates positively 
with M0, ER and TP in the 'mother' condition but not 
vice versa. This shows that babies who indulged in 
oral activity and eyebrow- raising more often than their 
fellows with their mother smiled at the ball more often 
than their fellows (but not vice versa). 
To summarise, these new results suggest that there 
is a number of behaviours which are associated together 
in what might be called the manifestation of a 'sociable 
mood', but that infants do not adapt their mood 
particularly quickly to a change of situation. This 
provides a potential explanation for why the initial 
results did not reveal great differences in the beha- 
viour infants directed towards objects and towards 
people. With this possibility in mind, a second study 
was done in which up to forty minutes of recording time 
was set aside for each of five babies. Each infant 
was exposed to the reaching- stimulus and their mother 
as many times as was necessary to obtain optimum one - 
hundred second samples of 'object- adapted' and 'person - 
adapted' action. Table 4 gives figures for the most 
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TABLE 4/3: Correlation of the ranked frequencies of 
different actions in each condition (for each baby) 




Actions in 'object' condition 
MO TP ER S Y TA R DR EL 
MO .74 .60 .55 .81 .00 .19 .45 -.50 -.38 
TP .69 060 064 .71 .21 .57 .05 -043 -.36 
ER .67 .24 .33 .50 -.31 -.43 .45 -.07 -.31 
S -.07 -.14 -.29 .05 -.31 -.12 -.26 .05 -.71 
Y .57 .48 .38 .60 .19 .67 
......_ 
.48 .29 .10 
TA .07 .36 .17 .45 .21 .90 .07 -.36 .17 
R .33 .33 .33 .57 .19 -.19 .95 -.26 033 
DR -.26 -.55 -.31 -.48 -.33 -.98 -.05 055 -.10 
EL -.33 -005 -.10 .19 .10 .10 .02 -.10 .90 
(Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients with p 4 .05 
underlined) 
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TABLE 4/4: Scores for one infant (aced 9 weeks) 






Mouth opens 38 7 
Tongue protrudes 18 1 
Smile 7 1 
Eyebrows -raise 8 3 
Eyebrows -lower 5 10 
Yawns 0 0 
Turn -away 11 12 
Reaches 19 18 
Duration regard 79.88s 28.59s 
Vocalisation 23 5 
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contrasting samples recorded for any one baby. As can 
be seen, even under these more favourable conditions, a 
number of 'social' behaviours occurred in both 
conditions, as did 'reaching'. This suggests that 
babies do not make a categorical (behavioural) distinc- 
tion between animate and inanimate objects under three 
months of age - as both Trevarthen (1974 ) and Brazel- 
ton et.al. (1974) claim. However, a possible alterna- 
tive interpretation is that the categories of behaviour 
coded in this study were too crude or unnatural and 
that analysis with more refined functional behavioural 
categories would reveal all -or -none differences in 
infants' responses to social and physical entities. 
Even if further work along the lines just indicated 
produced clear quantitative evidence, this would be 
unlikely to prove that young infants are social beings 
- for the methodological reason discussed in Chapter 2: 
that no human behaviour pattern can have an unambiguous 
psychological significance. For example, even the 
smile, which one would think is a social signal par 
excellence, is interpreted by Watson (1972) as an 
asocial response to the recognition of a fulfilled 
contingency- expectation. Similarly, oral activity 
(MO and TP) of the type described as prespeech by 
Trevarthen is interpreted by Polak, Emde and Spitz 
(1964) as related to feeding; eyebrow- raising (ER) has 
been related both to greeting (Eibl -Eibesfeldt 1975) 
and surprise (Ekman and Friesen 1975); eyebrow- lowering 
can be a product of concentration or displeasure (Oster 
1978); TA can arise as 'cut -off' due to over -arousal 
(Chance 1962) or in searching for new stimuli to look 
at (Tronick and Clanton 1971); gaze (DR) can have a 
number of interpretations, from information- uptake to 
threat (Argyle and Cook 1976) and yawning (Y) may 
betoken both physiological and psychological tiredness 
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(boredom). Perhaps most important of all in this 
experiment, the category 'reaching' is ambiguous. 
In the first place, it was found that none of the 
one hundred and twenty -three actions coded as 'reaching' 
in the main study reported here conformed to the stereo- 
typed reach - and -grasp pattern described by Trevarthen 
et.al. (1975) which is 
"closely comparable to the unconscious sequence of 
movements subscribed in the intention to reach for 
and pick up an object by an adult - at the climax 
of which the base of the index finger is aimed at 
the target, the climax occurring at the peak 
extension of the wrist or arm - and -wrist, a little 
under one second from the start of the movement ". 
The movements observed in this study were either 
amorphous or crude and abrupt. However, it is well - 
known that, between the ages of four and sixteen weeks, 
reaching very elicit 1974, 
Bower 1974). Trevarthen suggests that what happens 
during this period is not that infants lose interest in 
objects, but that, due to muscular and neural maturation, 
the way in which infants express their interest in 
objects changes. He suggests that early infant - 
reaching results from uncluttered exposure of a total 
pattern, combining distal and proximal motor systems, 
which is disrupted from months one to four by dis- 
proportionate growth of proximal motor systems and, 
thus, the infant's reaching attempts become cruder 
during this period; fisted swipes taking the place of 
oriented grasps - a description subsequently corrobor- 
ated by van Hofsten (1979). 
This being the case one would still expect a higher 
frequency of hand and arm movement in the 'reaching' 
condition than in the 'mother' condition of the above 
experiment: and it was for this reason that 'reaching' 
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was defined broadly (see p.$t above). The problem 
with the broad definition employed was that a y type of 
arm extension was a potential candidate for inclusion 
in the 'reaching' category provided that it was in the 
direction of the stimulus. This means that the 
'reaching' category included not only ostensibly 
object- directed swipes but also poorly formulated 
social gestures (see pp.4b -( above). Thus 'reaching' 
formed an ambiguous category which makes it less 
surprising that no significant differences were found 
between the frequencies of reaching in the two contras- 
ting experimental conditions. 
Recognition of the interpretive ambiguity of 
purposive behaviour shows that the question whether or 
not infants are innately social beings cannot be settled 
by experimental quantifications of infant behaviour in 
different conditions. This experiment has confirmed 
what few people doubt: that infants behave differently 
with people and with things (unless the things are made 
to behave like people; Watson 1972). What remains 
doubtful is the interpretation of these differences. 
This leads on to the conclusion that the question 
whether or not young infants have a complex social 
sensitivity - as proposed in Trevarthen's theory of 
intersubjectivity - will only be answered by increased 
exactitude in both the observation and the interpret- 
ation of behaviour. The next chapter follows up this 
conclusion by describing a 'social' interchange between 
a mother and her nine -week -old daughter in enough 
detail to evaluate the relative merits of competing 
interpretations of the baby's behaviour. 
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Chapter 5: DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
FOR INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
WITH EXPERIMENTAL CORROBORATION 
As noted in Chapter 1, Trevarthen offers more than 
one form of evidence for the existence of a complex 
social sensitivity to people (intersubjectivity) in 
infants. Perhaps the most important is that young 
infants respond, not to the atomistic motions adults 
make (e.g. the 'smile') but to the social significance 
of their actions (e.g. 'friendliness'; Trevarthen 
1979c). However, neither he nor any of the other 
workers in this field (Brazelton, Stern, Fogel, Wolff), 
have ever presented systematically described specimens 
of infant social behaviour, showing them to constitute 
comprehending responses to actions by another person - 
actions which are themselves systematically shown to be 
the expressions of specific intentions or feelings. 
In other words, although he writes that 
"infants in our films show many exceedingly sensi- 
tive and specific replies to the movements of their 
mothers. Expressions like smiles, surprise 
expressions or frowns produce immediate reactions. 
A smile may elicit a call or wave. Raised eyebrows 
may elicit a smile. Frowning may cause the 
expressions of surprise, fear or even sudden 
crying." (1979a), 
he does not provide empirical information to show that 
infants' responses to these facial expressions are not 
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merely responses to different configurations of stimulus 
properties, as proposed, for example, by Kagan (1970), 
but are responses to expressions of an idiosyncratic 
personal consciousness. 
It might seem that other research has resolved this 
issue. For instance, Wolff (1963 1969) reports that 
provided they are not fussy or sleepy, infants will 
smile at low whistles and the ringing of bells, and 
laugh at being tickled within the first two months of 
life. However, there seems nothing in Wolff's analyses 
to prevent one from considering these infant responses 
in the same light as the hungry herring -gull chick's 
response to the red spot on a piece of cardboard or his 
parent's bill (Tinbergen 1959) - that is, as something 
akin to a 'fixed action pattern'. This is because the 
social meaning of stimuli described as 'a low whistle' 
or 'a ringing bell' is not obvious enough for us to 
argue that the infants' responses to it are socially 
appropriate: in adult terms, 'a low whistle' is not 
unambiguously a joke or an obvious pleasure; one is 
therefore prepared to accept purportedly simple non- 
social explanations for the infants' smiling in these 
cases (see e.g. Watson 1972). Similar examples are to 
be found in Bower's work where infants are reported to 
show surprise, for example, to events which do seem 
inherently surprising (e.g. the discovery of objects 
which can be seen but not touched). But, although 
surprise is a social expression, the events which cause 
it do not appear to have a social meaning, because they 
are not the actions of another person (Bower 1974). 
The most relevant work in the literature is that 
which shows young infants to be upset by odd social 
behaviour on behalf of the people with whom they are 
interacting. Thus Tatam (1974) reports that when two - 
month -old infants, interacting normally with their 
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mothers, see their mothers start interacting with an 
adult while still 'looking' at them (but in fact 
looking at the adult by way of a half- silvered mirror), 
they show tension and distress: facial expressions of 
surprise, yawning, grimacing and frowning, as well as 
gaze avoidance, crying, threshing and struggling. 
Similar results are produced by asking mothers to stop 
reacting and freeze their expressions for a minute in 
the middle of a normal, happy exchange with their baby. 
(Brazelton et.al. 1975, Tronick et.al. 1979). Murray 
(1980) finds that the effects of these 'unnatural' 
interruptions in mother -infant interactions are 
different in quality from those caused by 'natural' or 
functional interruptions - when the mother briefly 
turns away from her infant to talk to a third party. 
Infants react less aggressively and with less surprise 
- often themselves turning to look at the intruder 
after a few seconds. Furthermore, when the mother 
re- engages the infant in conversation, the infant shows 
fewer signs of ambivalence and hesitation after a 
'natural' interruption than after an 'unnatural' 
interruption. 
This work suggests that infants expect their mothers 
to behave in a certain 'sociable' way when interacting 
with them. It also demonstrates that the reactions of 
infants to their mothers do have appropriate social 
meaning under some circumstances. Yet it remains 
possible that the infants' differential responsiveness 
in these experiments only reflects an understanding of 
the difference between 'natural' and 'unnatural' 
behaviour on behalf of those with whom they are 
'interacting' and not an ability to understand signifi- 
cant differences within the realm of naturally- occurring 
social behaviours. For example, it might be that 
infants who become upset in these 'unnatural' 
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interactions are merely responding to the difference 
between coordinated and uncoordinated en face behaviour on 
behalf of their mothers (a difference to which their 
sensitivity is well known; Watson 1972, Murray 1980) 
and not to the fact that they have been rebuffed. The 
only procedure that can show infants are able to 
respond differentially to the senses of a whole ringe 
of different adult actions in the course of normal 
'conversations' is a systematic fine -grain analysis of 
both infant and adult actions during such a conver- 
sation, demonstrating that the former are adapted to 
the significance of the latter. This chapter reports 
an attempt to produce such an analysis. 
1. Method 
a. Initial identification. An intersubjective 
exchange was sought containing high levels of prespeech 
and visual attention in the baby and varied social 
behaviour in the mother. A suitable stretch of 
interaction was found in films of a week -by -week pilot 
study of one mother -infant pair. It constituted the 
first seventy seconds of the second recording session, 
when the subject was nine weeks old. This exchange 
was subjected a posteriori to frame -by -frame analysis. 
b. Analysis. In interpreting the significance of 
the mother's actions, particular attention was paid to 
four aspects of her behaviour. 
(i) Babytalk. Some of the strongest evidence for 
particular interpretations of the mother's behaviour 
came from analysis of what she said. Her babytalk 
during the seventy- second period under discussion 
consisted of ten segments: 
1 "Hello darling. Hello. 
Hello." 
0o- oo- oo -oo: Hello. 
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2 "Are you going to have a talk today? Are you going to have a talk? Are you? Oooh: Goin' 
t' have a - ." 
3 "Ahaha: Ahaha: You've had a busy day? You've 
had a busy day? Yes you have. Yes you have. 
You've had a busy day my darling." 
4 "Hello. Bobedebop: Hello." 
5 "Had a really busy day, eh? Had a busy day ?" 
6 "Hello. Hello Sarah." 
7 "What do you see ?" 
8 "Boo- boo -boo'" 
9 "Are we going to have a big talk about it? Oh 
yes: Oh, we goin' to have a big talk about it, 
are we? Goin to have a big talk about it ?" 
10 "You're clever, aren't you. You're clever. 
You're a clever girl. Yes you are. Yes you 
are. You're very clever." 
(70 second period ends.) 
These groupings are distinguishable principally on 
the basis of changes in topic. Thus, out of the forty - 
two utterances listed above, twr,thj -one are straight 
repetitions or partial repetitions (entailing only 
grammatical variations) of the other utterances in their 
grouping; for example, 
"You ( )re a clever girl. Yes you are ( 
You ( )re ( ) very clever ( ). ", etc. 
Exceptions, such as 
"Are you? Oooh: Goin' t' have - ." 
) 
are generally contentless utterances included within a 
particular grouping because (a) they do not introduce a 
new topic into the babytalk, as, for example, the 
utterance 
"You're clever aren't you." 
would if it were included in grouping 9, and (b) because 
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they form only a single interjection between two 
otherwise related utterances: for example 
"Hello. Bobedebop: Hello. ". 
Not all the lines of demarcation are easy to draw 
however. The most difficult is that between groupings 
2 and 3. Although contentless lexically, the 
utterances 
"Ahaha: Ahaha:" 
are deemed to constitute the first utterances in 
content -grouping 3. This is because they appear to be 
a reaction to something the baby has just done in that 
they override the completion of the preceding utterance 
"Goin' t' have - . ". 
And the following utterances, with which they are 
grouped, 
"Ahaha: Ahaha: 
had a busy day?" 
You've had a busy day? You've 
are consistent with the same interpretation: they appear 
to be an imaginative response to something the baby has 
just 'said'. 
Transitions between content -groupings were inter- 
preted as fairly deliberate attempts to adapt to the 
baby's mood, the type of adaptation being reflected in 
the words chosen. Thus, in the investigation of 
several events (nos. 1, 5 and 6), critical words 
were 
picked out for simple semantic analysis with 
help from 
the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
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Content -groupings were also analysed with respect to 
the grammatical structure of the utterances which 
comprise them. Work reported by Sylvester -Bradley and 
Trevarthen (1978: 84) serves as an example. They 
suggested that certain grammatical transitions are 
responses to infant actions. The instance given in 
that discussion - dealing with the same mother -baby 
pair as in the present study - was: 
"You're looking very pensive, aren't you. You're 
looking very pensive. Mmm. What are you doing? 
You don't want to smile. No. No." 
Here there is a transition from a succession of 
questions and positive statements to a series of 
negative statements. It was argued that this transi- 
tion was contingent upon an action of Sarah's which was 
conversationally appropriate and could thus be incor- 
porated into the stream of speech interpreting the 
baby's mood: during the utterance, 
"What are you doing ? ", 
Sarah's head moved from side to side (and also, 
subsequently, during the mother's first utterance of 
"No "). That the mother picked up these slight 
movements as negative head -shakes was suggested by the 
emphatic head -shakes with which she accompanied her 
utterances immediately following it: 
"You don't want to smile. No. No." 
Other aspects of babytalk used as evidence for 
interpretations of maternal behaviour were changes in 
intonation and volume, in pauses between utterances, 
speed of delivery (in syllables /second) and length of 
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utterances in syllables and in seconds. Babytalk was 
described as 'normal' in volume and 'conversational' in 
intonation if it did not sound appreciably different 
from the mother's manner of speech in adult -adult 
interactions with the experimenter. (Divergences were 
coded only as 'decrease' or 'increase' in volume and 
pitch from this standard.) 
(ii) Facial expressions were also an important 
source of evidence as to the mother's motives. The 
most frequently used facial movements were smiles and 
raising or lowering of the eyebrows. However reference 
was also made to Ekman and Friesen's (1975) system for 
categorising facial expressions (Appendix 1). Many 
types of facial movements seen during this interaction 
occurred only once (e.g. Event 1: the mother's mouth - 
shape; Event 6: the mother's 'extreme surprise'). 
Methods for determining inter -observer reliability were 
thus inapplicable. For this reason, some facial 
expressions used as evidence are supported by photo- 
graphs to allow the reader to judge the validity of the 
interpretation being proposed. 
(iii) Proximity. An important variable in dyadic 
interaction is proximity of the interactants to each 
other (Hall 1966). Most importantly, Argyle and Dean 
(1965) have shown proximity to be an index of intimacy 
(in an experimental situation). In this study, the 
distance of the mother from her baby was measured from 
a film -image every ten frames (.42 seconds) on an 
arbitrary scale (approximately 1 inch of real distance 
between mother and infant per unit). An average 
proximity for every fifty frames was then plotted on a 
graph (Fig.1 ). Changes in proximity were due to 
movements by the mother, as the baby was strapped to 
the baby chair. 
(iv) The mother's gaze at the baby was almost 
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FIGURE 5/1 : Variations in the proximity of mother to baby with time. 
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continuous. It was broken on only three occasions. 
These breaks are discussed in some detail as evidence 
for changes in the mother's motivation and intentions 
during the interaction. 
In interpreting the baby's actions, particular 
attention was paid to: 
(i) Prespeech. Following Trevarthen (1974 1979a), 
a combination of oral and gesticulatory movements was 
categorised as prespeech. Adult communicative ges- 
tures are usually made near or in front of the face. 
It was therefore decided to include only a subset of 
the baby's hand movements (see Chapter 2 for inter - 
observer reliability) as gestures - namely, those above 
the line of the shoulder. The incidence of gestures 
was summed with that of lip and tongue movements (i.e. 
open mouth, close mouth, tongue in, tongue out) for 
each second of the interaction. (62% of all movements 
were oral, 38% were super -humerus hand movements). 
When changes in these movements were plotted for the 
whole interaction in 21),- second blocks, a regular and 
comprehensible pattern of animation levels emerged 
(Fig.2 ). Particularly striking was the observation 
that, if only the most concentrated bursts of activity 
were counted as bona fide bouts of prespeech (i.e. 
those greater than 6 movements /second) further regu- 
larities in the relationship between prespeech and 
smiling were found: all five bouts of prespeech 
coincided with a smile, usually near the beginning of 
the prespeech. The only exception to this rule was 
the case at 3g.5 seconds when the infant's expected 
smile was interrupted by the mother turning away to 
look at the experimenter - as soon as 






















































































































































































































































































































































bout of prespeech commenced (see discussion of IA3 and 
IA4 below, pp. t2'1- 140. Furthermore, it was interesting 
to note how these bouts of prespeech interlocked with 
the mother's questioning tone of voice (see Fig. ). 
It seems that whenever Sarah's level of utterance -like 
animation dropped below its peak level ( 6 movements/ 
second) the mother, sooner or later, started to question 
her as if she were trying to encourage Sarah to say 
something else; thus, questions only occurred in the 
infant's animation 'troughs'; a question from the mother 
always preceded a bout of prespeech, and, as soon as 
prespeech began, the mother stopped questioning. This 
is strong evidence that the animation-peaks, differenti- 
ated as prespeech proper, are indeed functionally 
distinct in interactive terms. 
During this interaction, smiles at the mother were 
all preceded (within an average 2.0 seconds; range = 
.75 - 4.0 seconds) by Sarah looking away from her 
mother - something which occurred after every bout of 
prespeech, while, with the exception of Event 4, smiling 
was in no case followed by a period of looking away 
from mother before the end of the associated bout of 
prespeech (average smile -TA separation = 7.67 seconds; 
range = 3.25 - 14.67 seconds; see Fig. 3 ). This 
observation reinforces the impression that prespeech 
plays a systematic role in infant sociability. 
(ii) Infant facial expressions were analysed by 
reference to Ekman and Friesen's (1975) system, as 
adapted by Oster and Ekman (1977) (see Appendix 1). 
The key elements were smiling and eyebrow movement (see 
Fig.3 ). But, as with the mother, many of the move- 
ments discussed occurred only once so that the only 
appropriate form of corroborative evidence for 
interpretations of facial expression was photographic 
















































































































































































































































































































(iii) Body movements were few in number as the baby 
was, in general, attentive to her mother and quiet. 
Nevertheless, on two occasions, there were fairly gross 
trunk movements. These were analysed as evidence for 
changing interests and motivations in the baby and are 
illustrated photographically. 
(iv) Gaze. Although the baby spent 86.2% of the 
seventy seconds looking at her mother, gaze was broken 
by the baby on nine separate occasions (see Fig.3). 
All but one of these breaks were very brief - less than 
two -thirds of a second long (see Fig.9 ). Particular 
attention is paid to the one long look away from the 
mother (see Event 4). 
The analyses presented below (see Fig. ti- ) concentrate 
on seven interactive events which were each initially 
demarcated in terms of an action by the mother. 
Analysis then turned to the infant's behaviour which 
coincided with and immediately followed the mother's 
actions, to see whether the infant was or was not taking 
account of their social significance. 
2. Analysis 
Event 1: the mother greets her baby with a joke. 
The mother walked from the door to the chair in 
which she had been told to sit and talk to her daughter. 
As she was walking, she said: 
"What are you doing? What do you see? What do 
you see ?" 
It was not until she actually began to sit down (at 5.1 
seconds) that she greeted her baby, saying: 
"Hello darling (sitting down). Hello. 0o- oo -oo- 
0 0 ' 
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FIGURE 5/4: Summary description of seven. e've t- s- o s'eve 7 Sa7 interaction between a mother and her nine - 
week -old daughter Sarah 
EVENT DESCRIPTION l 
1 MA: 
IA: 
the mother greets her baby with a joke 




the mother listens with restrained 
amusement to her baby - as if the baby 




the mother, still conversing animatedly 
with Sarah, hears someone enter the room 
behind her and turns away from her baby 




the mother turns back to' her baby without 
much animation or interest in interacting 
with her 
rejection of the mother 
5 EA: 
IA: 
the mother suddenly becomes more 
animated, leans forward and teases her 
baby 
pleasure in regaining conversation 
6 NA: 
IA: 
the mother begins to respond to her 
baby's actions in an exaggerated manner, 
as if enthusiastic to be interested in 
what the baby was 'saying' or doing 
puzzlement and upset 
7 MA: 
IA: 
the mother drops her exaggerated manner 
and asks the baby a cuestion - 
introducing a new topic of conversation 
reinvolvement 
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Justification for This Interpretation 
a. "Hello" is one of the commonest forms of 
salutation or address used in greeting. However, 
there are exceptions, particularly in the attempt to 
attract someone's attention. And a simple equation of 
"hello" with greeting is precluded by the fact that the 
mother says "hello" twenty -three times in the next 426 
seconds of interaction, six of which fall in the 
seventy- second period under discussion. The majority 
of these "hello "s are spoken when Sarah appears to be 
'acting deaf', either by not paying attention to what 
her mother is doing - by not looking at her for example 
- or when she appears to be acting non -contingently 
with respect to her mother's actions (cf. Murray in. 
prep.). It seems likely that the mother says "hello" 
in these circumstances in order to re- engage the 
attention of her baby rather than to greet her. 
"Hello "s also occur at the ends of the infant's periods 
of inattention. These do constitute a form of 
'greeting on arrival'. 
In the case under discussion, it is unlikely that 
"hello" was uttered purely as part of an attempt to 
attract the baby's attention, as Sarah looked at her 
mother almost as soon as the latter entered the room - 
before she said "Hello darling ", etc. 
b. Evidence that the mother's action constituted a 
greeting can also be drawn from its context. The baby 
had been sitting on her own for approximately two 
minutes while her mother was in an adjoining room, 
receiving instructions. Thus, the mother's entrance 
to the room constitutes a reunion - and greetings mark 
reunions. Furthermore, greetings occur at the begin- 
nings of interactions, and this act occurs in the 
first 
few seconds of the mother's interaction with 
her baby. 
The mother does not say "hello" as soon as she 
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enters the room, but this is probably explained by the 
fact that 
"What are you doing? What do you see? What do you see ?" 
are the mother's response to the fact that her baby is 
not looking at her as she enters the room and, thus, 
serve principally to attract Sarah's attention. The 
words 
"Hello darling. Hello. ", etc. 
are an immediate response to Sarah looking at her 
mother, an act which preceded them by '046 seconds. 
c. If the mother's act were intended as a greeting, 
one would expect the mother to be concerned about her 
daughter's response to it in a characteristic way - to 
receive that response in a different way from the way 
she would have received her daughter's subsequent 
actions if she were simply intending to 'get through' to 
her baby for example. In this respect Event 1 
contrasts with Event 5: as a result of both, Sarah 
looks at her mother, then smiles at her. But whereas 
in Event 5 - which is interpreted as an attempt by the 
mother to 'get through' to the baby (see below) - both 
Sarah's look and her smile are followed by the mother 
asking a question; in Event 1 look and smile are followed 
by the mother saying "hello ": 
"What are you doing? What do you see? What do 
you see ?" (Sarah looks at her.) "Hello darling. 
Hello. 0o- oo- oo -oo:" (Sarah smiles at her.) 
(Mother begins to laugh.) "Hello. Hello." 
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Only after these repeated greetings does the mother go 
on to ask Sarah questions: 
"Are you going to have a talk today? Are you going 
to have a talk? Are you ? ", etc. 
The fact that she repeats "hello" both when Sarah looks 
at her and when Sarah smiles at her and the fact that, 
when Sarah smiles at her, she laughs, displaying a 
change in facial expression which fulfils all Ekman and 
Friesen's (1975) (see Appendix I , Photos. 3-6) criteria 
for happiness, is completely consistent with the 
interpretation of this maternal act as greeting. 
d. Given that the utterance "Oo- oo- oo -oo!" took 
place in the midst of a greeting, it is unlikely to be 
simply a neutral 'filler' utterance because, if the 
mother's intention is to greet her baby, she is not 
likely to forego it half way simply to utter something 
irrelevant. Thus, any interpretation of "Oo- oo- oo -oo:" 
must be consistent with the intention to greet. 
Joking appears, therefore, to be the only obvious 
interpretation of this utterance. (A joke is defined 
as "something said or done to excite laughter or 
amusement" in the S.O.E.D.). 
e. There is suggestive evidence from the exact 
form of the mother's mouth -shape as she utters "Oo -oo- 
oo -oo:" that she is imitating a slightly vacant look 
which Sarah has as the mother enters the room. In 
this way, the utterance, as a joke, would consist of a 
gentle form of ridicule. The utterance is also 
associated with slightly raised eyebrows ('questioning') 
which are lowered as the mother sees her joke has been 






































































































































The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's actions 
accompanying and succeeding her mother's greeting can 
be summarised as a display of happiness in appreciation 
of her mother's humorous behaviour. 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. The main evidence supporting this description 
comes from analysis of the baby's facial expression: 
6.42 seconds after the mother entered the room, the 
baby directed a smile at her which was longer and purer 
than any other smile during the interaction. It was 
also a broad smile and was maintained as a broad smile 
for longer than any other smile during the 
in2ro.tíon. That the smile was considerably 
longer than other smiles during the interaction can be 
seen from Fig. 5 . The smile lasted 6.33 seconds; the 
next longest were 3.42, 2.92 and 1.71 seconds respec- 
tively. By saying that this was a 'purer' smile than 
the rest I mean that, in Ekman and Friesen's (1975) 
terms it was not only broad but not a blend of 
different 'primary' emotional expressions. Sarah's 
expression was a pure expression of happiness. 
If photographs of this smile and the other smiles 
are taken at their points of greatest broadness it can 
be seen that the latter incorporate the action of other 
muscle units than those described by Ekman and Friesen 
for 'happiness' (see PF oS.ú-l2). It is for this 
reason that this smile is interpreted as an expression 
of unalloyed happiness. It occurred, moreover, at the 
time at which the baby was least animated in terms of 
arm and mouth movement (see Fig. 2 ). 
b. It is only after her mother has walked towards 
Sarah, sat down, said "Hello" and then leant forward to 
make her joke that Sarah begins to smile (i.e. the smile 
begins at Frame 18; "00- 00- 00 -00" lasts from Frames 









































































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Durations of smiles (seconds) 
(IA1 shaded) 
IZI 
a response to 'mother's face' or 'mother talking' 
(although it could be a response to these plus increasing 
proximity). One criterion for true communication laid 
down by Mackay (1972) is that interactants must not 
only perceive their partners as 'visible structures' 
but as 'goal- directed agents'. The details of this 
exchange give evidence that Sarah does fulfil this 
criterion for communication. Thus, if her smile were 
simply a response to the stimulus of seeing the 'visible 
structure' of her mother, one would not expect a time - 
lag of over six seconds between the mother's appearance 
and Sarah's smile. The slow response cannot be due to 
an inability to respond more quickly, as is shown, for 
example, in Event 3. 
Taken together, the form and timing of Sarah's 
actions suggest that Sarah is not simply smiling at her 
mother, or even at being greeted by her mother, but at 
being greeted by her mother with a joke. 
c. Having interpreted Sarah's happiness as a 
response to her mother's preceding actions, it remains 
to be shown that this response makes sense in terms of 
the baby's own actions, i.e. that it is not simply one 
section in a disconnected sequence of behaviours which 
is 'appropriate' to the mother's behaviours only by 
chance or by reflex response. The smile in question 
was preceded by visual fixation and scrutiny of the 
mother's face, accompanied by an impassive facial 
expression (see Photo. I ). 
The sudden transformation of expression achieved by 
smiling has been described in detail by Harriet Oster 
(1978) - and it is interpretable as a switch from seeing 
the mother as an object to be looked at (a 'visible 
structure'; Mackay 1972) to recognising her as an agent, 
as someone with whom to interact. This is an 
experience which many adults acknowledge - for example, 
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when, while one is absent -mindedly musing over 
something unusual in a stranger's face, the stranger 
looks up and smiles (Sartre 1958: 252 -302). In short, 
there is comprehensible continuity in interpersonal 
terms between Sarah's response to her mother's joke and 
her preceding actions. 
Similarly there is a clear relationship between this 
response and the actions which follow it: the baby 
begins to make prespeech movements and gestures - i.e. 
having been greeted by and greeted her mother she 
begins to 'talk' to her. 
Event 2: the mother listens with restrained amusement 
to her baby - as if the baby were telling her something. 
Justification for This Interpretation 
Sylvester- Bradley and Trevarthen (1978) suggested 
that certain grammatical transitions in maternal baby - 
talk are responses to infant actions which are 
conversationally appropriate (see pp.lo4 -to5 above). 
As examples of communicative behaviour were being 
sought in this study, it seemed appropriate to locate 
such a grammatical transition in the babytalk which 
followed the mother's initial greeting in this inter- 
action - preferably, a transition which suggested that 
the mother had obtained an answer having asked a 
question. 
Grammatical transitions of the type being sought 
occur within content -groupings. The first such 
transition during this interaction occurred after 28 
seconds: 
"You've had a busy day? You've had a busy day? 
Yes you have. Yes You have. Yes you have. 
ve had a busy day my darling.' 
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Here, there is a transition from questions to a series 
of affirmative statements. This suggests that Sarah 
has reacted to the mother's conversational gambits 
with an appropriate 'conversational' response during 
the transition marked *. The utterance "Yes you have" 
was deemed to be the beginning of Event 2. 
a. Although the utterances "You've had a busy 
day? You've had a busy day ?" are not questions by 
syntactic criteria (i.e. inversion of subject -verb 
order), they were both delivered at a relatively high 
pitch compared with the mother's utterances, and, with 
a rising intonation. They were also delivered with 
what Ekman and Friesen (1975: 39) call a questioning 
facial expression, that is, with a "surprise- brow" (see 
Photo. l3 , Appendix 1) . This facial expression was 
held in place during both the questioning utterances 
(3.17 seconds). 
b. The fact that the utterances "Yes you have. 
Yes you have." are not questions does not differentiate 
them from their predecessors. However, they were not 
delivered at a high pitch, and they were not delivered 
with a rising intonation but with a descending intona- 
tion. This contrasts with the previous utterances. 
Furthermore, there was a marked change in the mother's 
facial expression at this point of the interaction (see 
FigE. ): the questioning expression which had been 
held in place for the preceding utterances is replaced 
by a very different, happy expression simultaneously 
with the proposed grammatical transition. 
None of the features involved in this change of 
expression (see Appendix 1) had changed for 2.82 
seconds; they all change at the transition -point under 
discussion, and are subsequently held in place for 6.25 
seconds. In addition to these facial changes, the 
























































































































forward position, which she held for 3.33 seconds, she 
moved her head back 2.2 distance units (see Fig.I ) 
to a position held for the next .83 seconds. This 
observation offers incidental aupport for the notion 
that the mother is changing from a more dominant, 
interrogating role to a more receptive, listening role 
at this point. 
c. How can the mother's utterances, "Yes you have. 
Yes you have. Yes you have. ", be described as the 
mother listening to her baby, 'as if the baby were 
telling her something'? 
In adult conversations, listening and speaking are 
normally incompatible. However, there are some 
occasions on which one adult will speak in order to 
demonstrate her or his understanding of someone, or, to 
help the person to whom she or he is listening. This 
phenomenon is called 'predictive monitoring' by 
Ferguson (1975). It has been suggested elsewhere 
that much maternal babytalk in the early months must be 
seen as predictive monitoring or 'mirroring'; it is the 
mother's way of developing and expressing her compre- 
hension of her infant's actions (Sylvester -Bradley and 
Trevarthen 1978). Thus, statements of agreement, such 
as "Yes you have. Yes you have." do suggest that the 
mother understands her baby to be expressing something 
- something with which she is agreeing and, therefore, 
to which she is 'listening' - although in a more active 
way than is usual in adult -adult conversations where 
semantic content is attended to (N.B. the mother's talk 
does not interfere with 'hearing' what the baby is 
'saying' because the baby's equivalent of 'speech' is a 
visible expression). 
d. Is the mother's action genuinely conversational? 
Babytalk does appear to be conversational even 
though it does not form part of a genuine conversation. 
This impression is corroborated by the work of Snow 
(1976). Snow has demonstrated that maternal babytalk 
can be adequately described as conversational using the 
model developed by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 
(1974) for the description of conversations between 
adults. 
The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's actions accompany- 
ing and succeeding her mother's 'listening' can best be 
described as prespeech. 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. During this interaction, the most sustained and 
most animated bout of prespeech - as defined by the 
previously described indices (see p.Io ) - was the one 
immediately succeeding the transition from question to 
statement discussed above. ($¢.2 Fi . î. 
) 
PN*05. i4 -(i). 
This seems good evidence that Sarah behaved as if she 
were trying to speak at this point of the interaction 
(i.e. to reply appropriately). 
b. This is one event during the interaction in 
which the infant appears to take the initiative and the 
mother to adopt a more receptive role. (It is not 
impossible however that the infant's action is, in 
part, a response to the questioning quality of the 
mother's action.) So, whereas 
in the previous case of 'greeting' it was shown that 
Sarah had responded to her mother's action appropriately, 
in this case it is necessary to show that the mother's 
response to the infant's actions as conversational is 
appropriate - that the infant's actions are 
'conversational'. 
To argue - as does Trevarthen for example (see 
mmlga) - that these prespeech movements are conversation 
- 
like because they occur in the right context would 
here 
be circular. We must rely on the more general 
claims 
that, in the first place, photographs of prespeech 
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movements look similar to photographs of adults 
speaking (Trevarthen 1979); secondly, that the fine 
complexity of the movements and their association with 
animated face -level arm movements militates against 
simpler alternative explanations of them - as "bottle - 
movements" for example (Polak, Emde and Spitz 1964); 
and thirdly, that they have been observed in a number 
of babies of the same age as Sarah while these are 
interacting in an homologous conversational setting 
(see Chapter 1). 
c. As with the preceding event, the infant's 
actions here appear to make sense in sequence with the 
actions which precede and succeed it. Thus a change 
from being fairly passive (see Fig. 2) and looking glum 
(see Photo. l ) to smiling and 'talking' is comprehen- 
sible on analogy with adult conversations, in which it 
is natural for bouts of relative passive inexpressivity 
(listening) to alternate with bouts of animated 
activity (talking) (see Kendon 1972, Sacks and Schegloff 
1972, Brazelton et.al. 1974, Trevarthen et.al. 1976, 
Kaye 1977). 
Event 3: the mother, still conversing animatedly with 
Sarah, hears someone enter the room behind her and 
turns away from her baby to find out what is happening. 
(Time: 41.1 seconds) 
Justification for This Interpretation 
In some senses, this description is unequivocal. 
There is no doubt that after 38.4 seconds the experi- 
menter audibly entered the room in which the mother was 
sitting, through a doorway which she could not see, and 
that almost immediately she turned from her baby to 
look in his direction. The only real questions are: 
(i) that her intention in turning to look at the 
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experimenter was "to find out what was happening" and 
not, for instance, because she was bored, or because 
there was something troubling her about which she 
wanted to ask the experimenter. 
(ii) whether she was "still conversing animatedly" 
right up to the point at which she turned away from her 
daughter. 
(i) With respect to the first issue, the following 
evidence is relevant: 
a. that she looked in the experimenter's 
direction for only .60 seconds 
b. that she did not speak to or smile at the 
experimenter (who was adjusting a photographic light), 
which was unusual, judging from other similar occur- 
rences. 
Both a. and b. militate against boredom - in which 
case she is unlikely to have passed up an opportunity 
for diversion by conversation with an adult so quickly 
or impassively - or a wish to speak. She kept her 
mouth closed while looking away from the baby. 
(ii) There is evidence that the mother was not 
interacting animatedly right up to the point when she 
turned away from the baby. The last utterance prior 
to the interruption "Had a really busy ?" was delivered 
relatively quietly and without much facial animation. 
Immediately prior to her turn -away there are signs of 
sadness in her facial expression: although otherwise 
neutral, the corners of her lips are turned down 
slightly which is one of the four characteristics of 
sadness distinguished by Ekman and Friesen (1975) 
This is, in all probability, a reaction to the aural 
stimulus of the experimenter's entrance, and, in this 
sense, forms a necessary component of her turn -away. 
(The experimenter could be heard one second before he 
entered the room.) 
The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's behaviour 
accompanying and succeeding the mother's turn -away are 
best described as a manifestation of distress. 
Justification for This Inter.retation 
a. The evidence supporting this description comes 
mainly from the changes in the baby's facial expression 
immediately succeeding her mother's turn -away from her 
to see what the experimenter was doing ( r h't s. 14-2c) ) . 
As can be seen from Photos. 2( -14, there was a marked 
transformation from the smile which began 1.3 seconds 
before her mother withdrew and continued until a 
different expression ensued, .4 seconds after her mother 
had turned away. 
At first (Photo.18) Sarah showed a low -intensity 
smile. But this smile faded, to be replaced by an 
expression according with Ekman and Friesen's (1975) 
description of mild fear or apprehension .83 seconds 
after her mother turned away. Sarah's expression 
continued to change, so that within 1.29 seconds of 
Event 3 her face registered sadness or distress. And 
four -fifths of a second later it began to exhibit a 
mixture of sadness and anger in that the eyebrows were 
no longer raised at the inner corners but were completely 
lowered and slightly drawn together (as can be seen 
from the incipient wrinkles between them, e.g. Photo. 14 ), 
while the corners of her mouth were further pulled 
down. 
When Sarah's brow movements and smiling during this 
interaction are plotted against time (Fïg.3 ), it can 
be seen that this is the only direct transition from an 
expression of happiness to an expression of apprehension 































































































































lowered - possibly a signal of incomprehension - 
intervened on all other occasions). 
b. Associated with these facial transformations 
was a decrease in prespeech and gesticulatory 
movements (Fig. 2. ) - i.e. the baby talks less to her 
mother. 
c. Many psychologists explain infant- mother 
interactions in terms of the mother 'fitting' her 
actions to the behaviour of her infant (e.g. Collis and 
Schaffer 1975, Kaye 1977). While this cannot be 
completely true - because infant behaviour is not 
completely predictable (see pp.I74- -117 below) - it must 
be true to a certain extent, simply because all human 
interaction involves a certain amount of hypothesis - 
testing or 'predictive monitoring' (e.g. Garfinkel 
1972, Fergusson 1975). 
Nevertheless, the context of Event 3 suggests that 
in this interaction the opposite was also true: that 
Sarah was predicting her mother's behaviour, but that 
her predictions were upset by something about which 
neither mother nor baby could have had prior knowledge 
- the experimenter's entrance into the room. The mother 
reacted to this occurrence by turning to see what was 
going on, thereby ceasing to adapt her behaviour to 
Sarah's. Sarah, who showed no sign of adapting to the 
experimenter's entrance directly (i.e. she did not 
modify her behaviour until after her mother had turned 
away from her - and she did not turn to look at him), 
continued to adapt her behaviour to her mother's 
actions. At first she appeared not to know what was 
happening (apprehension), then she became distressed 
(because the interaction had been broken). 
Event 4: the mother turns back to her baby without 
much animation or interest in interacting with her. 
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Justification for This Interpretation 
There is no doubt that the mother turned back to her 
baby exactly one second after she turned away to find 
out what the experimenter was doing. 
Bcck does she turn back without animation or 
interest? If animation is defined as the total sum of 
coded maternal social behaviours per unit time, what is 
the evidence that there is a relative lack of animation 
in the period immediately following the mother's turn - 
away? 
a. Speech and Vocalisations. She made only two 
utterances during the nine seconds following her turn 
back to her baby, and the pauses between these utter- 
ances were, respectively, 66, 54 and 51 frames (i.e. 
2.75 seconds, 2.25 seconds, 2.1 seconds). These are 
the three longest pauses in the interaction (see Fig. 6 ). 
The two utterances in question, "Had a busy day? 
Hello ", were delivered at relatively low volume and 
without any marked intonational stress. Furthermore, 
there was no evidence that the mother was exercising 
her imagination in the content of what she said - her 
utterances were merely repetitions of immediately 
preceding utterances. 
b. Gaze. The mother looked continuously at her 
child's face up to the point at which she turned away 
to look at the experimenter (i.e. 41.13 seconds). She 
turned back to her daughter one second later, but in 
the subsequent seven seconds she looked away from her 
daughter twice more - not to look at the experimenter 
but at the floor. These are the only examples of the 
mother looking away from Sarah at nothing in particular 
during the seventy second interaction. The first 
example came 3.3 seconds after the initial look at the 
experimenter and lasted .75 seconds. The second came 
two seconds after the first and lasted .92 seconds. 
t33 
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For the remainder of the seventy seconds the mother 
looked continuously at her baby (and longer: 42.9 
seconds in all). This evidence supports the idea that 
the mother had less interest than before in what her 
baby was doing during the seven -second period following 
the initial break in their interaction. 
c. Proximity. A marked increase in the mother's 
average distance from the baby was recorded for the 8 
seconds immediately succeeding her one -second turn to 
look at the experimenter. As can be seen from Fig.,7, 
the limit of forward and backward movements was in 
general within the range of 10 to 16 units average 
distance from the baby. The figure shows the four 
50 -frame (2.08 seconds) time blocks immediately succeed- 
ing the mother's turn -back to the baby from the experi- 
menter. In the first three of these, proximity was in 
the range between 22 and 24 units average distance from 
the baby. During the fourth interval, which included 
the mother's re- engagement with the baby (Event 5), 
proximity was between 18 and 19 units. 
d. Facial Expressiveness. During the period of 
the interaction being analysed (45.0 - 51.3 seconds 
after its start) a marked decrease in the mother's 
facial animation was noted. It appeared that the 
mother more or less neutralised her facial expressions 
during this period as well as saying very little. 
Smiling and eyebrow- raising were taken as the two most 
observable indices of facial animation. It was found 
that the mother smiled for 56.4% of the interaction and 
had her eyebrows raised for 44,4% of the time; 
yet for 6.42 seconds following her turn - 
away she neither smiled nor raised her eyebrows at 
Sarahn(Fig. lc). The next longest comparable pause 
without eyebrow raises or smiling is 1.13 seconds. 
This seven -second period of reduced attention to the 
13Sa l3(0 
FIGURE 5/8 : The mother's facial impassivity during Event 4. 
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infant also constituted the longest period without 
either smiling or eyebrow- raising if these are plotted 
independently (see Figs. $ (AAA gb ). The contrast 
between this and the mother's previous animation can 
also be shown by comparing photographs taken at one 
second intervals before and after the turn -away (Event 
3; see Photos. 2.5-27 and! ZS-30). 
Taken together, these various indices of speech, 
gaze, proximity and facial expressiveness constitute 
strong evidence that after turning away to find out 
what the experimenter was doing, the mother turned back 
to her baby, but without any animation or interest in 
interacting with her. If we wonder why this should 
have been, it seems likely that the mother was biding 
her time until the experimenter went out of the room 
again before she reinvolved herself in the interaction. 
This may have been because she believed that her 
instructions to chat with the baby no longer held, as 
the experimenter had 'stopped' filming to come in and 
adjust a light (although, in fact, the camera was still 
running). Another possible cause was embarrassment on 
the part of the mother. This was only her second 
visit to the Psychology Department; she did not know 
the experimenter well and she may well have felt 
unwilling to reinvolve herself whole -heartedly in an 
interaction with her baby while sharing the room with a 
relative stranger. Indeed, there is a sense in which 
such a reinvolvement could have been considered 
impolite in the presence of someone with whom she was 
not interacting. 
The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's behaviour 
accompanying and succeeding her mother's disinterested 




PHOTOS. 25 -30 : Photographs of the mother's face taken at one 
second intervals before(25 -27), and after(28 -30) 
her turn to look at the experimenter. 
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Justification for This Interpretation 
a. Sarah's 'rejection' of her mother is most 
obviously understood in terms of her visual behaviour. 
Sarah looked away from her mother for a continuous 
period of 6.17 seconds following Event 4. Of the nine 
breaks in Sarah's gaze at her mother's face, this was 
by far the longest: the others were all less than two - 
thirds of a second long (see Fig. 9 ). However, it is 
clear that this was not simply a response to the 
mother's break in face -to -face gaze during Event 3: 
Sarah broke gaze 3.17 seconds after her mother had 
turned back to her and, even then, Sarah only turned 
away after she had directed a short burst of prespeech 
at her mother (see Fig. ' .3) . 
b. Why then did Sarah withdraw from her mother 
while her mother continued to solicit communication 
with her? The most likely explanation is to be found 
in terms of the reactions of infants to experimental 
perturbations in their mother's behaviour (see p. 101 
above). Thus, Brazelton et.al. (1975) and Murray 
(1980) describe how, when a mother becomes unresponsive 
during a mother- infant interaction, the infant responds 
with "facial expressions of fear, yawning, grimacing 
and frowning as well as by gaze avoidance, crying, 
startle movements and threshing or struggling" (see Mur /&./ ii3 D 
also Trevarthen 1979, Maurer and Salapatek 1976). As / 
argued above, - Sarah's 
mother turned back to her after Event 3 without much 
animation or interest in interaction: that is, she 
became unresponsive to her child. In these terms Event 
4 was a second rebuff, adding insult to the injury 
caused by Event 3: Sarah greeted her mother's return 
with a bout of prespeech (Fig. 2 ) only to find that 
her mother was still 'not talking to' her. 
c. In this light, Sarah's facial expressions 
during Event 4 also appear comprehensible. As 
14-0 
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reported by Brazelton et.al. and Murray, with infants 
facing experimentally interrupted maternal communi- 
cation, Sarah manifested a range of expressions includ- 
ing frowning (Photo. 32) , grimaces (Photo. 34-) and 
expressions of fear (Photo.3Lf-). There was no smiling 
and very little oral and manual activity after the 
initial burst of prespeech (Fig. 2 ). 
d. There were a series of gross trunk movements 
towards and away from the mother, before Sarah settled 
down to look approximately 1200 to the left of her 
mother's face (Photo. 36). These correspond to what 
Trevarthen calls "threshing and struggling movements ". 
Event 5: the mother suddenly becomes more animated, 
leans forward and teases her baby. (Time: 51.3 
seconds) 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. The mother said "Hello Sarah. What do you 
see? Boobooboo: ". These utterances were strikingly 
different from their two predecessors ( "Had a busy day? 
Hello. ") in their relative imaginativeness) 
in their much 
increased loudness and in their speed of delivery (the 
three utterances were spoken in under five seconds 
whereas only "Hello" had been spoken in the preceding 
five seconds and only two utterances in the preceding 
ten). Furthermore, this quicker speed of delivery 
was maintained - all pauses being under one second long 
from this time until the end of this sample of inter- 
action (see Fig. (2 ). 
b. Fifteen frames after uttering "Hello Sarah ", 
the mother moved herself towards her baby 8 distance 
units (see Fig. I ). She maintained at least this 























































































c. As she leant forward to say "Hello Sarah." the 
mother smiled for the first time for over 73 seconds. 
This smile was held for 2i seconds - towards the end of 
it, the mother raised her eyebrows for the first time 
in 113 seconds. From this time until the end of the 
interaction, there was no period longer than 1.13 
seconds in which the mother did not either smile or 
raise her eyebrows (see Fig. 3 ). 
d. Technically, the utterance "Boobooboo" is 
contentless, and, as shown elsewhere, in a discussion 
of this same mother -infant pair, contentless utterances 
are associated with game -playing (Sylvester- Bradley and 
Trevarthen 1978). This supports the notion that this 
utterance was humorous. But could it not also be 
described as "a little joke" as was the utterance 
"Oo- oo- oo -oo" in Event 1? "Boo" is defined in the 
S.O.E.D. as an expression of contempt or aversion. I 
take the exclamation "Oo" to be an expression of surprise 
or excitement. It is the more aggressive aspect of 
"Boo" - contrasting with the fact that (repeated thrice) 
it was both preceded and succeeded by a smile directed 
at the baby during unbroken face -to -face regard - which 
leads me to call it a tease rather than a joke. This 
interpretation accords with the frequent use of "Boo" 
to evoke surprise in the well -known adult -infant game: 
'Peek -a -boo'. This comparison gains further weight 
from the fact that the utterance in question was spoken 
immediately after Sarah re- established face -to -face 
regard with her mother - following a break of six 
seconds. Thus, the immediate interactive context of 
the utterance "Boobooboo" is identical with that 
defined by Bruner and Sherwood (1975) for the utterance 
"Boo:" in the game of peek -a -boo. That this inter- 
active exchange is not agame of peek -a -boo is shown by 
the fact that no effort was made by either interactant 
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to sustain contact during the six -second period of 
visual withdrawal. 
The utterance "Boobooboo" thus suggests that 
initiative belonged more strongly to the mother in this 
event than in a genuine game, or in Event 1, where 
"Oo- oo- oo -oo" appeared to be an imitation of something 
the baby had initiated (i.e. the way she was holding 
her mouth). The fact that jokes are usually shared, 
whereas teasing is more uni- directional, suggests that 
a distinction between Event 1 and Event 5 on these 
lines is appropriate. 
e. If we ask why the mother should suddenly have 
become more animated at this point in the interaction, 
two further facts must be taken into account. First, 
the experimenter had been heard to leave the room one 
second before the occurrence of Event 5 - thus the 
mother was liberated from any uncertainty that his 
presence provoked. And, second- 
ly, the mother's instructions were to chat with her 
baby - something she had not been doing for the 
preceding seven seconds, during which time her infant 
had become relatively less sociable (see below). 
Thus, if her visit to the Psychology Department was 
going to be a success, she had to re- establish contact 
with her baby. Event 5 appeared to be an attempt to 
do this. 
The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's behaviour accom- 
panying and following the mother's increased animation 
and teasing is best described as 'pleasure in regaining 
conversation'. 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. One third of a second after the beginning of 
the mother's first utterance in Event 5 ( "Hello Sarah ") 
14-5 
Sarah turned to look at her mother for the first time 
for six seconds. 
b. Sarah turned to look at her mother with a 
blank expression, with a slack mouth and a slightly 
furrowed brow (a frown of concentration, doubt or 
disapproval; Photo.37 ). Three seconds later this 
expression changed to a smile (Photo.+ 0), followed by 
a bout of prespeech (Fig. :3). The question remains 
of how to explain the three -second pause between the 
re- establishment of mutual eye -to -face contact and 
Sarah's smile. 
The smile began .83 seconds after the onset of the 
utterance "Boobooboo ". This utterance would appear to 
.be the most likely proximate cause of Sarah's smile. 
In this case Sarah's smile would not be simply a reaction 
to her mother's increased animation - in which case she 
would have smiled sooner - but a specific response to 
her mother's teasing utterance. Indeed, the pause 
between Sarah turning to look at her mother and her 
smile bears a close similarity to Sarah's behaviour in 
Event 1, when it was not until the mother made the joke 
"Oo- oo- oo -oo:" that Sarah smiled at her. 
c. As described on pages 143 -1444, the mother's 
utterance of "Boobooboo" was more aggressive than "Oo- 
oo- oo -oo: ". It is therefore interesting to note that 
the smile Sarah manifested is not as intense in Event 5 
as that in Event 1, and that, although it was associated 
with a brief eyebrow -flash of surprise - an expression 
ritualised as an intimate greeting in many cultures 
(Eibl- Eibesfeldt 1975) - the smile was blended in later 
stages with a frown (see Fig. 3 , Photo.4 -( ). This 
suggests ambivalence in Sarah's reception of her 
mother's welcome; as one would expect from someone who 
was being teased. 
d. These behaviours suggest that, having been'out' 
























































































































smile was a prelude to her reinvolvement. This became 
evident in the bout of prespeech which immediately 
succeeded the smile, 
Event 6: the mother begins to respond to her baby's 
actions in an exaggerated manner, as if enthusiastic to 
be interested in what the baby was 'saying' (doing). 
(Time: 59.1 seconds) 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. During the nine -second period under discussion 
(i.e. between Event 6 and Event 7), the mother's baby - 
talk was louder than during any other part of the 
interaction. One indicator of the gusto with which 
the mother was speaking was the fact that of the five 
utterances comprising the content -grouping coinciding 
with Event 6 (i.e. "Are we going to have a big talk 
about it? Oh yes: Oh, we goin' to have a big talk 
about it Are we? Goin' to have a big talk about 
it ? "), included the two longest (12 syllables) and the 
third equal longest (10 syllables), all other utter- 
ances being 10 (one other example) or less syllables 
long. This content -grouping also contained the three 
longest utterances in overall delivery time (i.e. one 
of 2.54 seconds; two of 2.13 seconds) and the longest 
lasting two- syllable utterance ( "Oh yes: ": 1.50 
seconds) in the seventy- second period under investi- 
gation. Furthermore, this was the only occasion 
during the interaction in which the mother uses the 
adjective "big ". Indeed, analysis of verbal content 
shows that, out of the approximately one and a half 
thousand utterances recorded from this mother during 
her twelve visits to the laboratory, she only twice 
more uses this adjective. During the penultimate 
session she greeted the baby, by then 19 weeks old, 
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with the words: "Look at Mummy's big girl: (laughing) 
Look at Mummy's big girl: ". On three scores therefore, 
the mother's babytalk can be described as enlarged 
beyond what was normal during the interaction as a whole 
(i.e.'exaggerated'): loudness, utterance -length, both 
literal and temporal, and in content, where the 
infant's contribution to the 'talk' is called "big" 
while it would be more accurately described as extremely 
rudimentary. 
b. The mother's face registered three times what 
Ekm4n and Friesen (1975) call 'extreme surprise' during 
Event 6 (Photo. 42). Indeed, the criteria for extreme 
surprise are not only fulfilled by the mother's facial 
expression, they are overfulfilled (i.e. there is some 
suggestion of tension or stretching in the mother's 
mouth -opening). This suggests intentional exaggeration 
of the expression. There was no other surprise - 
expression of this intensity during the interaction. 
Yet, in themselves, the infant's actions were no more 
extraordinary at this point than during the rest of the 
interaction (see below). 
c. The most similar to Event 6 was Event 2: both 
comprising maternal responses to conversational actions 
by the baby. But while in Event 6 the mother remained 
leaning forward while expressing her surprise - in 
Event 2 she smiled and swayed back from the baby - as 
if 'taking her point'. This maintenance of relatively 
close proximity reinforces the impression of intensity 
in the mother's interactive behaviour. 
d. If we go on to ask why the mother might be 
interested in what the baby is 'saying' - two answers 
suggest themselves. The first is that she was simply 
pleased to have her daughter's attention again - after 
a period where her daughter seemed relatively unhappy 












































































































































this response is a natural reaction to compensate for 
Event 4, which was characterised by abnormally reduced 
responsiveness of the mother to her baby, a form of 
reparation (or motivational rebound). Both reasons 
are compatible with the other indications and are given 
further fuel if it is remembered that the mother's 
instructions were to chat with her baby; neither she 
nor the baby had been chatting for a period and the 
mother was, in Event 6, responding to the first signs 
of a renewed desire to communicate on behalf of her 
baby (renewed face -regard, a smile, renewed prespeech 
and gestures: see below). 
The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's behaviour accom- 
panying and following the mother's exaggerated response 
to her are best described as puzzlement and upset. 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. The main evidence that Sarah was puzzled by her 
mother's action in Event 6 is that, having started a 
bout of prespeech (Fig. 2 ), she broke off to peer at 
her mother with drawn -together and lowered brows and 
only ceased frowning when her mother stopped behaving 
in an exaggerated manner (see below; Event 7). The 
breaking -off of her prespeech occurred .71 seconds after 
the onset of Event 6. There followed the longest 
period without prespeech since the start of the inter- 
action (12.5 seconds). 
b. The above was associated with an expression 
characterised by drawn -together and lowered brows (see 
Photo. 46) which was twice briefly modified by raising 
of the inner corners of the brows to suggest sadness 
(see e.g. Photo. 4$; Fig. 3 ). This expression was 
generally accompanied by a mouth with lowered corners 

























































































































and Friesen indicate (1975), this expression can have a 
number of meanings. Clearly, in this context, it was 
not a 'conversational punctuator' because it was not a 
'momentary change'. Neither does it seem likely, 
given her age, that Sarah was angry but 'trying to 
control or conceal any sign of anger'. And, because 
Sarah's gaze appeared to be relatively defocussed - 
wandering between the mother's eyes and her mouth - it 
seems unlikely that Sarah was frowning because she was 
'concentrating or focussing on something intently'. 
The most likely explanation in Ekman and Friesen's 
terms is that Sarah was either sad and serious or sad 
and slightly annoyed. The fact that she was not 
passive during this period, she continued to make hand 
and mouth movements at a relatively high frequency 
(Fig. 2 ) added to the complexity of her behaviour. 
Her expressions continued to change - from angry to sad 
brows and back again twice during the time spanned by 
Event 6. These changes and the fact that she 
ultimately looked away from her mother suggest that 
she was not simply, independently, 'in a serious mood' 
but was actively trying to adapt to something which was 
disturbing her. Her actions seemed to be attempts to 
resolve a conflict. Hence, the description of them as 
'puzzled'. 
c. Altogether, this was the longest period spent 
with continuously lowered brows throughout the inter- 
action. In the end Sarah turned away from the mother 
with a gross trunk movement associated with oral 
grimacing - an action not dissimilar from that described 
as 'rejecting in Event 4. 
Event 7: the mother drops her exaggerated manner and 
asks the baby a question - introducing a new topic of 
conversation. (Time: 68.5 seconds) 
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Justification for This Interpretation 
a. It will be observed from page (03 that, at the 
time in question, there was a transition in verbal 
content from grouping nine to grouping ten: "Are we 
going to have a big talk about it ... Goin' to have a 
big talk about it? You're clever aren't you. You're 
clever ... etc. ". The mother's intonation pattern 
simultaneously changed from a rising, questioning 
intonation - "Goin' to have a big talk about it ?" - to 
a more confiding "You're clever aren't you" - spoken 
relatively quietly, at a lower pitch and with a flatter 
intonation. 
Whereas transitions within content -groupings have 
been considered as more or less unconscious modifica- 
tions in response to particular baby -movements, changes 
of topic are larger -scale and appear to be more delib- 
erate reactions to baby mood -changes (see below). 
However, the content -change in question did also 
incorporate a change in grammatical form - from 
predominantly questioning to predominantly positive 
declarative (excluding one 'tag -question'). 
b. This change of topic was accentuated by a 
change in the angle at which the mother holds her head. 
Previously she looked at Sarah with her head upright or 
inclined slightly to the right but at the onset of 
Event 7, she inclined her head slightly to the left 
(see Photo. 43), also bringing it forward - meaning 
that her proximity was, during this content -grouping, 
closer than at any other point during the interaction 
(11 distance units; see Fig. I ). 
c. The suggestion that the mother drops her 
exaggerated manner in Event 7 is supported by analysis 
of her babytalk on other counts. Loudness of speech 
was reduced. Average length of utterance in syllables 
for the content -grouping in question was reduced to 
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less than the overall average for this interaction 
(i.e. 3.83 vs. 4.74 syllables). And average duration 
of utterance was only slightly greater than the overall 
average (i.e. 32.47 vs. 30.30 frames). Similarly, 
there was a change in topic - no longer was the mother 
concerned with the baby's immediate reaction to her: 
"Are we goin' to have a big talk about it ?" - but talks 
instead of the baby's less transitory, less immediately 
relevant character -qualities: "You're clever aren't you." 
d. The mother did not once express extreme sur- 
prise during Event 7. Her overriding expression was 
more neutral and more expressive of concern (see Photo. 
4.4-). When surprise was expressed it was slight - the 
sclera was no more visible than in a neutral expression, 
neither were the eyelids widely parted (cf. Photos. 42 
and I- ). 
e. Most likely this change on the mother's behalf 
was a reaction to the baby's confusion at the exagger- 
ation of her manner during Event 6. A prelude to this 
is suggested by the mother's (unusual) transition from 
positive statement to question towards the end of Event 
6: "Oh yes. Oh we goin' to have a big talk about it. 
Are we? Goin' to have a big talk about it? You're 
clever aren't you ... eh ". Usually utterances become 
less not more equivocal as a content -grouping 
progresses, i.e. question leads to positive or negative 
declarative. 
This observation suggests that the mother had 
perceived her baby's confusion in Event 6 and that the 
new conversational initiative represented by Event 7 
was calculated as a low -key counter -measure to her 
previous exaggeratedness in Event 6. This suggestion 
was borne out by analysis of the infant's behaviour and 
its temporal relations with the mother's behaviour. 
During content -grouping nine, Sarah peered at her 
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mother with a frown: this expression culminated with a 
movement to look away from her mother (see below). 
One third of a second after this movement the mother 
started to make the first utterance of content -grouping 
ten. 
In the light of Trevarthen et.al.'s (1976) clear 
evidence of quarter- second following by J.C.'s mother, 
from frame -by -frame analysis of film record, it seems 
that this negative movement by Sarah was the proximate 
cause of the change in interactive style in the 
mother's contribution to Event 7. 
f. Another way of looking at Event 7 - which is 
compatible with the above evidence - is that the mother 
had released energy by over -compensating for Event 4 in 
Event 6 and was thus prepared in Event 7 to start 
conversing with greater calmness. 
The Infant's Behaviour: The infant's behaviour 
accompanying and following her mother's introduction of 
a new topic into their conversation can best be des- 
cribed as 'reinvolvement'. 
Justification for This Interpretation 
a. Evidence for this description comes from a 
marked change in Sarah's behaviour after her mother 
dropping her exaggerated manner. Sarah had spent a 
period of 6.92 seconds peering at her mother with a 
frown, at the conclusion of which she turned away. 
One third of a second later the mother changed her 
interactive style: .31 seconds after this, Sarah turned 
to look back at her mother. 
b. Simultaneously, there was a change of facial 
expression. In the first instance Sarah turned back 
to scrutinise her mother's face with an expression of 
concentration. This expression was accentuated by the 
is6 
way in which Sarah leant forwards, towards her mother, 
while making it. As soon as she started prespeech she 
leant back again, as if finished with concentration, 
having found out what she wanted to know. (cf. Photos. 
S( and S1-) This expression differed from that of 
puzzlement in Event 6 in being associated with a con- 
certed visual focus on the mother's mouth, rather than 
a relatively defocussed gaze at the mother's eyes 
(Photo. 50), and, in showing no sign of being blended 
with sadness in the mouth or brows. 
b. The change of brow -expression from concentra- 
tion to surprise is very marked (cf. Photos. Si and 5!). 
Simultaneous with this change, is a change from focus 
on the mother's mouth to a focus on her eyes. The 
fact that 'surprised' brow -raising (in contrast with 
'fearful' brow- raising - in which the brows are also 
drawn together; Photo.34 -) forms a greeting in diverse 
cultures has been mentioned. The fact that the only 
other time such a movement occurred was with a smile at 
the onset of a bout of prespeech (Event 5) and that it 
was also followed here by the onset of prespeech 
(Event 7 + 3.25 seconds) and a smile (Event 7 + 4.25 
seconds; duration 2.92 seconds) supports an interpre- 
tation of greeting and reinvolvement in the interaction. 
3. Experimental Corroboration 
Despite the coherence of the evidence for the above 
conclusions concerning Sarah's sensitivity to the 
significance of her mother's social actions, there is 
no doubt that findings which rest at all upon an 
experimenter's own introspectionsC , to some extent, 
equivocal (Rosenthal 1966). For this reason, in 
accordance with Labov's (1975) "Experimenter Principle ", 
it seemed advisable to seek judgements of the film 






















































































the theoretical issues implied by those judgements. 
This was not easy to do however: one problem is that 
observational techniques and categories used in the 
study of infants are necessarily products of particular 
theoretical perspectives; the other problem being that, 
to train a lay person in the uses of Ekman and Friesen's 
system for coding facial expressions, kinesics, prox- 
emics and interpersonal gaze as cues for describing 
communication would have involved an impossibly large 
investment of time, effort and interest on behalf of 
lay persons, if not the experimenter. Any procedure 
which was designed to circumvent these difficulties 
would simultaneously become a less direct test of the 
experimenter's original judgements. Nevertheless, an 
experiment was conducted to test the validity of the 
above descriptions of Sarah's behaviour as communicative, 
and we are now in a position to discuss it. 
a. Method. Following in the tradition of Frois- 
Wittman (1930), Woodworth (1938), Schlosberg (1941 
1952), Izard (1971), Ekman (1973) and others, it was 
decided to base this experiment on the judgments by 
lay women and men of still photographs taken from the 
film of the seventy- second interaction discussed above. 
Two sets of stimuli were constructed, each containing 
seven items corresponding to the seven events discussed 
above. Items in the first set of stimuli each 
consisted of two photographs of the mother; the first 
taken at the onset of the event in question, the second 
succeeding it by 18 frames (.75 seconds) on the film; 
to which were added transcriptions of what the mother 
said during the three -second period immediatelély 
preceding the onset of that event and also what she 
said in an equal period immediately succeeding 
íE, 
Items in the second set of stimuli consisted of 
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seven photographs in two groups; the upper group containing 
two photographs of Sarah separated by 18 frames on the film, 
the latter of which was taken from the same frame as the 
onset of the event in question, while the lower group cont- 
ained a sequence of five photographs of Sarah, taken at 18- 
frame intervals, the first of which followed the onset of 
the event in question by 18 frames (e.g. Photos.31 -36, 45- 
50, 51 -56 - each with an additional photograph at the end 
of the bottom line). 
Two groups of subjects were tested with these stimuli. 
The first, in what was a trial run, consisted of eleven 
married women, all with child -rearing experience. The 
second group of subjects, in the main experiment, were 
forty -six first -term undergraduate students (of which 
two -thirds were women). Both groups of subjects were 
asked to match the photographic stimuli with verbal desc- 
riptions of the seven events they represented. These verbal 
descriptions were based directly on the descriptions prop- 
osed in the preceding section of this chapter (see Appendix 2). 
The subjects had three separate matching- tasks: 
Expt.(1) The first was to match verbal descriptions of 
the mother's actions with the first set of stimuli 
described above. This task was essentially a test of 
the validity of the experimenter's interpretations of 
the mother's actions discussed above. 
Expt.(2) The second task was to match the same verbal 
descriptions of the mother's actions by the experimenter 
with the second set of stimuli: photographs of the baby's 
behaviour before and after each of the mother's actions. 
This was essentially a test of the subjects' abilities at 
predicting an infant's responses to her mother's actions. 
Expt.(3) The final task was to match verbal descriptions 
of the infant's actions with photographs of the changes 
in the infant's behaviour which they 
i6o 
were supposed to represent. This was a test of the 
it tt ibtU lof the experimenter's interpretations of the 
infant's actions. 
b. Procedure (Main Study). The forty -six subjects 
were tested in four separate groups numbering between 
ten and twelve. For each task the subjects were 
handed their own list of the verbal descriptions 
relevant to the task in hand. These descriptions were 
always in the same order as they occurred in the film: 
(1) to (7). The subjects were told that the list of 
descriptions they had in their hands referred to a 
mother -infant 'conversation' lasting seventy seconds 
and that the experiment was principally a test of their 
ability to tell what the infant was saying to her 
mother. The first task was then introduced as a pre- 
liminary to familiarise them with the experimental 
method. In all three tasks, the photographic stimuli 
were presented simultaneously in varied orders, differ- 
ing from the order in which they occurred on the film, 
and each of the four subject -groups saw the photographs 
in a different, unpredictable order. The stimuli were 
labelled A to G, and the subjects were asked simply to 
mark each item in their list of descriptions with the 
letter of the corresponding photographic stimulus. 
From their comments during their experiment, they all 
felt they had some difficulty in doing this (one 
student did not complete his paper for Task 2). There 
was no time -limit for the completion of the tasks 
although no group took longer than a quarter of an hour 
per task. 
c. Procedure (Trial Run). In the trial run, the 
procedure was slightly different due to the smaller 
sample -size. The eleven mothers were asked to perform 
the same three tasks in the same order with the same 
two sets of seven photographic stimuli. Howev,er, for 
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each task, they judged the stimuli in series, not 
simultaneously, but, having made their first set of 
judgements 'blind', they were given the same stimuli 
again and asked to make new judgements. Furthermore, 
in this trial run the verbal descriptions upon which 
the subjects were basing their judgements were less 
refined than in the main study. As can be seen below, 
the raw data from the two studies were, however, very 
similar. 
d. Results (Expt.(1); Tables 1 and 2). For all the 
experiments, results are presented in tables. These 
show the distributions of judgements made by the 
judges. The experimenter's prediction is that, if his 
interpretations are absolutely unequivocal, judges 
should all be able to identify the photographic stimulus 
to which each interpretation applies. In this case, 
all judgements would fall along the diagonals of the 
tables: the stimulus representing Event 1 photographic- 
ally would be paired with the experimenter's verbal 
description of Event 1, stimulus 2 with description 2 
and so on. 
The results of Experiment 1 show, first, that there 
is no appreciable difference between the number of 
choices which were predicted from the experimenter's 
analyses (underlined integers), and the sum of the 
choices which were not predicted (Main study: 157 vs. 
165 (48.7 %); Trial run: 80 vs. 74 (52.0 %)). However, 
there was a predicted difference for three actions 
taken individually: mothers' action no. 3 - MA3 - 
(Main: 43/3; Trial: /7), MA4 (Main: 12/9; Trial: 13/9) 
and MA6 (Main: 28/18; Trial: 20/2). Furthermore, 
on inspection, it becomes clear that the distribution 
of the unpredicted choices is not unsystematic (Wood- 
worth 1938). For example, if one takes the first MA 
(the mother greets her baby with a joke) its confusion 
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TABLES 5/1 and 5/2: Results of Experiment 1 showing 
how judges paired the experimenter's verbal descrip- 
tions of seven maternal actions with photographic 
stimuli representing those actions 













7 New Topic 
Judgements 
NA MA NA kA NA NA NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 10 4 14 5 3 
19 9 1 3 2 5 7 
1 43 2 
3 1 2 37 2 1 
7 8 14 4 13 
3 7 2 28 6 
3 8 4 12 3 16 
(Predicted judgements underlined) 














7 e Topic 
Judgements 
i 1Ñ 1'Íi kA Ì''!!i kA kA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 4 5 2 1 
2 8 2 9 1 
15 7 
1 2 13 1 4 
4 5 2 1 
1 20 1 
1; 2 1 6 
(Predicted judc,emen ts underlined) 
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with MA4 in the trial -study (the mother turns back to 
her baby without any real interest) may seem inexplic- 
able. But when it is pointed out that the original 
wording of the description of MA4 was "the mother 
greets her baby without any real interest" the confusion 
is seen to be more comprehensible: it is based on 
inability to see the difference between greeting with 
interest and greeting without interest, not on the 
inability to see a difference between greeting and 
unresponsiveness (the wording of this description was 
changed in the main study and errors of this type were 
reduced by half). Thus, it becomes clear that some 
actions are more closely related than others: there is 
a close kinship between MAC and MA5 because both 
constitute greetings, the first after the mother has 
been out of the room; the second after a spell of 
unresponsiveness on behalf of the mother (see above, 
pp.I3I -I4O). There is a relationship between MA5 and 
MA7 because both entail a marked change in interactive 
style which has immediate positive consequences on the 
subsequent course of the interaction (see above, pp. 
11.1f;) There is also a close relationship between MA2 
and MA6 because both are reactions by the mother to the 
onset of a bout of prespeech by the baby, the main 
difference being that the latter is more exaggerated 
than the former. Similarly there is a relationship 
between the two least sociable actions in the sequence: 
MA3 and MA4. 
,Thus one can create three larger categories of 
maternal action: 
(i) greeting /positive adaptation of interactive 
style (MAl; MA5; MA7), 
(ii) responding as if listening (MA2; MA6), and 
(iii) relatively low sociability (MA3; MA4), 
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in which (i) and (ii) are more closely related to each 
other than to (iii), but in which (iii) is more closely 
related to (ii) than to (i). With these categories 
one may illuminate possible regularities inherent in 
the distribution of the choices in Tables 1 and 2 by 
predicting the relative frequencies, not only of 
correct choices but also of incorrect choices in terms 
of rank -orders (see Tables 3 and 4). 
The most outstanding exception to the predicted 
rank -orders of choice -frequencies in the three possible 
categories is the high frequency of interpretations of 
MA2 as 'greeting' in the main study. This is probably 
to be explained by the subject's equating 'mother's 
smile' with 'mother greeting' as the stimulus for MA2 
was the only stimulus in this set incorporating a 
photograph of the mother smiling. 
In both experiments, the average error from that 
predicted was less than a third of that expected by 
chance. Chance would give an average error of .87 
rank -steps; the observed levels were .29 rank -steps for 
the main study and .24 rank -steps in the trial. This 
is the same level of error as found by Schlosberg 
(194 -1) in his study of the judgements of adult facial 
expressions (though he was using a six -step circular 
scale). 
It might appear possible to demonstrate that the 
choices in this part of the experiment are not a matter 
of chance by performing a Friedman two -way analysis of 
variance by ranks on the data in Table 3. If this is 
done, the test shows that there is less than one chance 
in ten thousand that the choices made are independent of 
the relationships between the expressions argued for in 
the preceding section of this chapter (Main study: 
Xt = 20.86, df 2; Trial: Xi = 21.50, df 2) . However, 
to perform any statistical test in this context is to 
tb5 
TABLES 5/3 and 5/4: Results of Experiment 1 showing 
goodness of fit between the ex aerimenter'.s verbal 
descriptions of seven maternal actions an in ependent 
judgements of photographic stimuli representing these 
actions when these actions are put into three cate- 
gories - high, medium and low sociability 
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Category Category Category 
1 Greeting 
2 Listens 
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27 15 4 
14 28 4 
45 0 1 
39 2 5 
34 12 0 
35 11 0 
31 11 4 










Same Related Related 
Category Category Category 




7 New Topic 
11 6 5 
17 5 0 
22 0 0 
15 1 5 
9 6 5 
21 1 0 
8 14 0 
violate one of the principal underlying assumptions of 
such tests: that the variables, the measurements of 
which form the basis on which the test is computed, 
vary independently of each other. This is clearly not 
the case in the studies reported here (nor, incidentally, 
in the studies of Schlos berg 1941 and 1952 - where 
statistical tests were used), as the subjects' choices 
will be a product of comparisons between the seven 
stimuli which could fill each descriptive category. 
Thus, the choice of a stimulus including a smile as the 
representative of a particular category will not be 
based simply on the characteristics of this particular 
stimulus; it will also be affected by the dissimilari- 
ties between this stimulus and the other stimuli. In 
the company of a different set of stimuli, this stimulus 
might be judged quite differently. On the other hand, 
the idea that the availability of comparisons should 
be eliminated from experiments on facial expression is 
not acceptable because these judgements naturally rely 
on comparison; hence the results of such experiments 
would not be a true measure of the subjects' abilities 
to judge the expressions in question. 
One resolution of this dilemma would be to present 
each of the stimuli separately but in a standard 
context, that is, in the company of a standard set of 
stimuli, not connected with the particular stimuli 
under investigation. This solution would not be ideal 
because the stimulus would still not be judged in its 
natural context and there would be endless theoretical 
difficulties in deciding what should comprise the 
standard set of stimuli to accompany each expression 
under test (see Sherman 1927). Nevertheless, this 
experimental design would produce results amenable to 
statistical analysis. 
As the experiments reported here were not designed 
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to conform to the statistical assumption of independent 
variability, statistical testing will not form the basis 
of the interpretation of their results. There are 
certain advantages in the experimental design used in 
these studies over the commonly used one outlined above: 
the first is that, by comparison with photographic 
stimuli of the same face, contamination of judgements 
by variability of idiosyncratic personal styles of 
expression (Ekman and Friesen 1975) is eliminated. 
Secondly, this design, by incorporating a list of 
events, described in the order in which they occurred 
naturally, gave the subjects some idea of the natural 
situation from which the expressions were drawn; 
supplying them with some relevant contextual clues. 
e. Results (Expt.(2)). The results in Tables 5 and 
6 show that subjects found it harder to relate photo- 
graphs of the infant's actions to description of the 
preceding actions of the mother than it was to relate 
the same descriptions to photographs of the mother's 
actions. The level of maximum consensus was 38.8% 
(42.8% for the trial) in Task 2 as against 53.1% 
(57.4% for the trial) in Task 1. Only 25.8% (31.1 %) 
of the choices were as predicted for this task as 
against 48.8% (51.9%) in Task 1. Nonetheless, there 
are interesting contrasts to be drawn between these 
results and those for Task 1. Taken individually, 
certain descriptions of the mother's behaviour make 
more consistent sense to the subjects when confronted 
with photographs of the infant's reactions than they 
did in Task 1, while others make less. 
The clearest case of an increase in consensus is in 
the students' reaction to the description of MA1 (cf. 
Tables 1 and 5). The students also understood MA2 in 
a different light when confronted with photographs of 
prespeech in 1A2 - the second infant action. 
However, in both the trial and the main studies, the 
l(4 
TABLES 5/5 and 5/6: Results of Experiment 2 showing 
how judges paired the experimenter's verbal descrip- 
tions of seven maternal actions with hoto ra hic p q p 
stimuli representing the infant's corresponding actions 
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22 6 1 6 1 9 
4 17 5 1 1 2 15 
9 29 8 
2 6 9 10 17 
9 6 5 1 14 4 6 
3 13 9 1 2 7 10 
5 3 9 4 13 5 5 
(Predicted judgements underlined) 







Infant's MA MA MA MA MA MA MA 








8 4 9 1 
1 10 6 3 1 1 
1 6 10 1 4 
10 9 1 2 
3 12 7 
4 6 6 0 6 
3 2 1 4 9 3 
(Predicted judgements underlined) 
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subjects found it difficult to predict the effect on 
the baby of the mother's exaggerated response in MA6, 
even though they showed in Task 1 that they found the 
description itself one of the easiest to understand in 
terms of the mother's behaviour. 
f. Results (Expt.(3)). The results from experiment 
3 show that subjects found it about as easy to relate 
descriptions of the infant's actions to photographs of 
those actions as they did to relate descriptions of the 
mother's actions to photographs (plus babytalk) in 
experiment 1. For this task the level of maximum 
consensus was 50.6% in the main study and 59.1% in the 
pilot study: 47.8% of the choices were as predicted in 
the main study and 52.6% were as predicted in the pilot 
study. These figures represent a great improvement 
over experiment 2, in which the same photographs were 
judged. The improvement is principally due to a more 
accurate discrimination of the negative expressions of 
the baby (IA3; IA4; IA6) with increased recognition of 
prespeech. 
Although the balance of 'correct' and 'incorrect' 
choices in this task is almost exactly equal, there is 
good evidence, as in experiment 1, that this inaccuracy 
is more apparent than real. Thus, if we take Wood - 
worth's (1938) scale of relatedness for adult facial 
expressions, we can adapt it to the infant facial 
expressions used as stimuli in this experiment, and so 
derive a table for the relative degrees of error 
represented by each 'incorrect' choice in experiment3. 
Woodworth's scale of relatedness is as follows: 
1 Love, Happiness, Mirth 
2 Surprise 
3 Fear, Suffering 




The principal and secondary facial expressions repre- 
sented in the seven stimuli for experiment 3 were as 
follows: 
PRINCIPAL SECONDARY 
STIMULUS PRESPEECH EXPRESSION EXPRESSION 
1 Happiness 
2 Continuous (negative) 
3 Partial Sadness Fear 
4 Fear Anger 
5 Partial Happiness (Anger) 
6 Partial Anger Sadness 
7 Partial Surprise Happiness 
Stimulus 2 is the most difficult to analyse in terms of 
facial expression because it principally represents 
prespeech. It was therefore decided to add a column 
marking the presence or absence of prespeech in each 
stimulus. Only two stimuli were completely devoid of 
prespeech (1 and 4). Events 3 and 5 directly preceded 
or succeeded a bout of prespeech (see Fig. 3 ) while 
IA2, IA6 and IA? definitely overlapped with bouts of 
prespeech. 
The following assumptions are made: 
(i) That the number of 'wrong' choices should be 
directly proportional to the degree of relatedness 
borne by the facial expressions chosen to those 
predicted; 
(ii) That relatedness of infant expressions can be 
judged in terms of Woodworth's (1938) independently 
derived scale for the relatedness of adult expressions; 
(iii) That relatedness is to be judged on Woodworth's 
scale in terms of the principal expressions represented 
in each stimulus except in ambiguous cases where the 
decision must be made in terms of the secondary 
IÎ1 
expressions: a table of predicted relatedness can be 
worked out for the set of choices appropriate to each 
stimulus except stimulus 2. Stimuli were deemed 
related to stimulus 2 primarily in terms of presence or 
absence of prespeech; secondarily, in terms of amount of 
prespeech as shown in Figure 2 ; and, thirdly, in 
terms of principal expression (where stimulus 2 was 
seen as more negative than positive in expression). 
(See Table 7.) 
Stimulus 4 was seen as the least related to others 
in terms of expression in that the most marked change 
it represented was a gross body -movement - a turn away . 
from the mother (see pp.I40 -143 above). For this 
reason stimuli 3 and 6 were seen as more closely related 
to each other than to stimulus 4. 
The average error per choice is .74 rank -steps in 
the main study (Table 8). The error which would be 
produced by chance is 2.26 rank -steps. This compares 
favourably with the degree of accuracy in prediction 
reported in Schlosberg's (1952) much -quoted study. 
Similar results are produced by rank -analysis of the 
trial study (Tables), where the average error per 
choice was .90 rank -steps. 
Friedmann two -way analysis of variance of these 
results would show that there was less than one chance 
in a thousand that these choices did not depend on the 
senses of the facial expressions described by the 
experimenter (but see also pp. 164. 
-16/) 
Nonetheless it is clear that analysis of these 
results by seven ranks is not wholly supported by the 
data, particularly in the trial study, where no scores 
fell in the sixth and seventh ranked cells and where 
there was no overall difference between the second and 
third ranked cells. Similarly, in the main study, the 
t2 










7 Re- involved 
JL'-OGEMLIeTS 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 5 7 2 3 6 4 
2 7 6 3 5 4 1 
3 6 4 2 5 7 1 
4 6 4 2 5 7 1 
5 1 7 2 3 6 4 
6 3 4 2 5 7 1 
7 5 1 2 3 6 4 
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TABLES 5/8 and 5/9: Results of Exieriment 3.showin. the 
ran e requencies o lu'gemen s o i o o.ra. is s imu i 
represen inq seven infant actions as core ared to tr e 
relative frequencies expected from the ex p erimen er s 
descriptions of the same actions 




S 2 Prespeech 
3 Upset 
M 4 Rejects 




Ranks of Expected Judgements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19(1) 9(3) 8(4) 12(2) 0(6) 0(6) 0(6) 
25(1) 12(2) 4(32) 1(5) 0(62) 4(32) 0(62) 
22(1) 20(2) 4(3) 0(52) 0(52) 0(52) 0(52) 
41(1) 3(2) 1(32) 0(53) 0(53) 1(32) 0(53) 
15(2) 17(1) 10(3) 2(4) 0(62) 1(5) 0(64) 
17(2) 21(1) 1(5) 4(3) 3(4) 0(64) 0(64) 
15(2) 18(1) 8(3) 3(4) 2(5) 0(6 4) 0(64) 
10 12 25 231 386 364 42 
(Ranks in brackets) 
TABLE 5/9: Trial Run (N = 22: 2 judgements per judge) 
Infant's 
Event Actions ' 
1 Pleased 15(1) 3(24) 3(24) 1(4) 0(6) 0(6) 0(6) 
S 2 Prespeech 15(1) 0(6) 3(2) 2(34) 2(34) 0(6) 0(6) 
3 Upset 9(2) 11(1) 1(34) 1(34) 0(6) 0(6) 0(6) 
I 
Iii 4 Rejects 20(1) 0(5) 2(2) 0(5) 0(5) 0(5) 0(5) 
U 5 Teased 7(2) 4(3) 11(1) 0(54) 0(54) 0(54) 0(52) 
6 Puzzled 9(2) 11(1) 1(34) 1(34) 0(6) 0(6) 0(6) 
7 Reinvolved 6(24) 8(1) 6(24) 0(6) 2(4) 0(6) 0(6) 
RANK SUMS 112 184 17 29 34 41 41 
(Ranks in brackets) 
Ranks of Expected Judgements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
first and second ranked cells were not clearly distinct, 
nor were the fifth and sixth. But, although analysis 
by five ranks would have been equally applicable to 
these results, this does not affect the basis of the 
relatedness between the expressions which enabled the 
predictions to be made, nor the validity of their 
fulfilment in the results of this experiment. In 
contrast, when the same form of analysis is applied to 
the results in experiment 2, the outcome is equivocal 
(see Tables 10 and 11). In experiment 2, the average 
error per choice was 1.26 rank -steps for the main 
study, and 1.71 rank -steps for the trial study (chance 
level = 2.26). 
g. Discussion. In experiments on the judgement of 
adult facial expressions the usual proportion of cor- 
rectly predicted choices is between 50% and 60% (Argyle 
1969). The average in this experiment (Tasks 1 and 3) 
was almost 50% (51.9% and 48.8 %; 47.8% and 
52.6 %). Ekman (1973) was only able to achieve levels 
of predicted agreement greater than this by selecting 
stimuli representing emotional extremes. There was 
nothing particularly extreme about the interaction from 
which the expressions used as stimuli in this experiment 
were drawn and all but one of the stimuli judged (the 
stimulus for IA1) represented emotional 'blends', which 
Ekman eliminated from his experiment. Three of the 
other stimuli represented blends of happiness (IA2; 
IA5; IA7), four represented elements of anger (IA2; 
IA3; IA5; IA6), and two represented elements of fear 
(IA3 and 1A4). The infant -expressions were therefore 
much more open to confusion than is normal in this type 
of experiment. Furthermore, the range of expressions 
as measured on Woodworth's scale was much smaller than 
is usual in experiments on the judgement of emotions: 
contempt and disgust were not represented at all in 
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TABLES 5/10 and 5/11: Results of Exieriment 2 showin the 
ran e requencies o ju gemen s o lo o r.a ic s imu i 
17reñ1in seven infant actions as com ared to t e 
re ative re'uencies ex ec e rom e ex erimen er s 
descrip ions o he corresponding ma erns ac ions 




S 2 Prespeech 
3 Upset 
M 4 Rejects 




(Ranks in brackets) 
Ranks of Expected Judgements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22(1) 6(32) 9(2) 6(32) 1(52) 1(52) 0(7) 
17(1) 15(2) 5(3) 2(5) 1(62) 4(62) 1(62) 
9(2) B(3) 29(1) 0(52) 0(52) 0(52) 0(52) 
9(3) 17(1) 6(4) 10(2) 0(62) 0(62) 1(5) 
14(1) 9(2) 6(32) 5(5) 6(32) 4(32) 1(7) 
7(4) 9(3) 1(7) 13(1) 2(6) 10(6) 3(5) 
5(4) 13(1) 5(4) 3(7) 9(2) 5(2) 4(6) 
16 152 242 29 352 332 42 




S 2 Prespeech 
3 Upset 
4 Rejects 




(Ranks in brackets) 
Tanks of Expected Judgements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
B(2) 0(6) 1(4) 4(3) 0(6) 9(1) 0(6) 
10(1) 1(5) 6(2) 1(5) 0(7) 1(5) 3(3) 
6(2) 1(42) 10(1) 0(62) 1(42) 4(3) 0(62) 
9(2) 1(4) 10(1) 0(6) 0(6) 2(3) 0(6) 
12(1) 0(52) 7(2) 0(52) 0(5) 0(52) 7(3) 
0(6) 6(2) 6(2) 4(4) 0(6) 6(2) 0(6) 
3(32) 4(2) 3(32) 2(5) 0(7) 9(1) 1(6) 
172 29 152 35 42 20Z 362 
these stimuli. These drawbacks were partly offset by 
the provision of supplementary non -photographic 
material in experiment I - apposite samples of the 
mother's babytalk - and by familiarisation with the 
interactional context from which the stimuli were drawn 
during the course of the experiment by exposure to 
sequential descriptions of both the mother's and the 
infant's interactional behaviour. Experiment 3 was 
also made easier by the provision of seven photographs 
in sequence for each stimulus and by providing an image 
of the infant's whole body, not just her face, so that 
kinesic clues, as well as facial clues, were available 
to the judges. 
Bearing all this in mind, and remembering that 
although many errors were made, they were made in an 
order which could be predicted from a known scale of 
relatedness for adult expressions, it must be concluded 
that the descriptions of the actions of infant and 
mother discussed in the preceding sections of this 
chapter are more likely to be valid than not. These 
descriptions are phrased in terms of the sense of both 
infant's and mother's action. If these actions did 
not have any sense, or if they had senses different 
from the particular senses ascribed to them above, it 
would seem unlikely that the descriptions could be used 
for differentiating the respective expressions from each 
other as successfully as found in this experiment. 
It must be concluded that the infant, Sarah, was 
responding comprehendingly to a psychological sense of 
her mother's actions: this is the most parsimonious 
explanation of the seven coincidences of maternal and 
infant action described in the preceding part of this 
chapter. 
There remains one subsidiary issue to be discussed: 
the significance of the results in experiment 2. What 
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these results suggest is that infant behaviour is not 
particularly predictable; at least, not prima facie and 
not by laywomen and men. This may be partly because 
in our culture we are not well practised in conversing 
with babies, and that, with practice, predictions 
would be more accurate. But, in accepting that 
infants can communicate, we must appreciate that 
communication implies discretion - as do many infant 
actions (see pp. 62 - 65 above) - and so it is unlikely 
in principle that any general equation of a stimulus - 
response variety will ever be applicable to infant 
behaviour. 
With adults, the prediction of action depends on an 
intimate knowledge of the context in which the agent 
finds himself or herself, as well as their previous 
experience, mood, values and idiosyncracies. With our 
present lack of knowledge, we cannot expect a 
qualitative difference between these requirements and 
the requirements necessary to predict what an infant 
will do during an interaction. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that a nine -week old girl 
communicated with her mother - that is, her actions 
only made sense as purposive responses to the actions 
of her mother. If it is felt that this does not 
satisfy the criterion of communication in adult 
conversations then it may be better to say simply that 
Sarah has been shown to interact with her mother. But 
in this interaction she has been shown to have great 
sensitivity to the social significance of her mother's 
actions and thus revealed herself to have a complex 
personality (in the generic sense). Thus she welcomed 
her mother's company and enjoyed her humour, she felt 
upset when ignored in favour of another, she disliked 
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her mother's loss of interest in interacting with her 
and was disconcerted when her mother became over - 
assertive. 
Insofar as this baby was not mentally abnormal, we 
must conclude that there is a faculty for inter - 
subjectivity in the second month of life. 
lq 
Chapter 6: INTERSUBJECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF LIFE 
In the previous chapter, evidence was presented 
showing that a nine -week -old girl had a complex 
sensitivity to actions of her mother. Evidence to be 
reported in the next two chapters suggests that such 
sensitivity is a general characteristic of young babies. 
But, if babies are so sensitive to other people at such 
a young age, in what can their 'development' consist? 
This is the question to be addressed in the present 
chapter. 
Because many psychologists are not aware of infants' 
early intersubjectivity, they view this to be one of 
the products of development. Clearly, in the light of 
the findings presented here, this is an unacceptable 
view. An alternative is the view that the faculty of 
intersubjectivity itself undergoes development during 
infancy. This is the view favoured by Trevarthen, and 
- because Trevarthen is one of the few scientists who 
does acknowledge the presence of intersubjectivity in 
early infancy - it is his hypotheses upon which we shall 
initially concentrate. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Trevarthen reports that 
the first six months of development are characterised 
by three major shifts: a shift from 'autistic' to 
'protoconversational' behaviour at five weeks, a shift 
to an interest in objects at ten weeks, and, at 
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sixteen to twenty weeks, a rekindling of social interest 
through the medium of object- person and person -person 
games. This would predict a high level of interest in 
adults' faces and behaviour from six to ten weeks of 
age followed by a decline and then a recovery of interest 
as person -person games develop during the fifth and 
sixth months. 
These predictions are, in some ways, similar to those 
derived from cognitive theories of schemata formation 
(as put forward by Kagan 1970, Schaffer 1971, Pick Frankel 
and Hess 1975, and others). These theories are put 
forward to explain two well -documented trends in early 
perceptual development: that, with increasing age, infants 
show greater visual interest in increasingly complex 
patterns (Berlyne 1958, Spears 1964, Brennan Ames and 
Moore 1966, Karmel 1969 1974, Greenberg 1971, Greenberg 
and O'Donnell 1972); and that infants show a greater 
interest in novel than in familiar stimuli from around 
the beginning of their second month onwards (Weizmann 
Cohen and Pratt 1971, Greenberg Uzigris and Hunt 1970, 
McCall and Kagan 1 967, Wetherford and Cohen 1 973). The 
explanation is based on an idea originally put forward 
by Hebb (1949) and Hunt (1969): that perceptual development 
in infancy consists in the progressive construction of 
schematic mental representations of the external world 
(schemata) which get increasingly complex with age. It 
predicts that infants will pay most attention to objects 
which are moderately dissimilar frov the things they 
already know (i.e. of which they have already formed 
schemata): stimuli which are very well known or highly 
discrepant from what they have seen before will receive 
relatively little attention. This is called the "discrep- 
ancy hypothesis" and has been most consistently championed 
in recent years by I°IcCall and Kagan (e.g. 1967 1969). 
In the past the discrepancy hypothesis has generally 
been supported by experiments in which infants are made 
familiar with one object - often over a period of weeks 
181 
- then, under controlled conditions, exposed to this 
now familiar object with either one or a sequence of 
novel objects, differing in degree of discrepancy from 
the'original (e.g. Holm 1975). At about four months 
of age, infants are found on a number of measures to 
attend longer (visually) to strangers' faces than they 
do to the faces of their mothers (LaRoche and DesBiolles 
1976, Cohen 1974, Bernard and Ramey 1977, Fitzgerald 
1968). At first sight it seems that this finding can 
be explained by the discrepancy hypothesis: 
"as the schema for a human face i.e. the mother's 
becomes well established, between 2 and 4 months of 
age ... the strange face becomes optimally 
discrepant from that schema" (kagan 1970) 
and so is looked at more. 
So, in line with Trevarthen's predictions, Kagan's 
statements lead one to expect a decline in attention 
to the mother's face between 2 and 4 months of age. 
One would also expect a relative increase in attention 
to strangers' faces over the same period. But the 
discrepancy hypothesis predicts that familiar stimuli 
which are less complex than the mother's face should 
get less attention than her during the 2 to 4 month 
period. Thus if young babies were repeatedly exposed 
to a simplified representation of the human face (a 
smiling face -mask for example), attention to this should 
peak earlier and decline earlier than attention to real 
faces. 
Another set of predictions concerning the development 
of infants' attention to people can be derived from theories 
which explain behaviour as a product of 'arousal' or 
'excitement' (e.g. Stern 1971 1977). Thus if, as Stern 
proposes, infant attention is reduced by both hyper - 
and hypo- arousal, one would expect that, under normal 
conditions , the most arousing stimulus (e.g. a strange 
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adult) would receive most attention and progressively 
less arousing stimuli (e.g. a familiar adult or parent, 
an unfamiliar face -mask, a familiar face -mask) would 
receive decreasing amounts of attention. Alternatively, 
if the baby were already highly aroused, the least 
arousing stimulus (e.g. the familiar face -mask) would 
receive most attention and more arousing stimuli would 
receive progressively less attention. In these terms 
one would not expect stimuli with markedly different 
arousing -properties both to receive large amounts of 
attention or relatively similar stimuli to receive very 
different amounts of attention. 
This chapter reports an experiment to test these 
three different sets of predictions about the development 
of infants' interests in faces during the first six months 
of life. The main experimental study was preceded by 
a pilot study. 
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1. Pilot Study 
a. The aim of this study was to familiarise the 
experimenter with Trevarthen's (1977) methods of 
recording and analysing early social behaviour while 
attempting to tease out the most significant 
questions to be asked about such behaviour during 
the first six months of life. 
b. The subject, Sarah (whom we have already met in 
Chapter 5), was her mother's first child, born by 
caeserian section at full -term, with her mother 
under heavy sedation. Her mother had been working 
as secretary and general organiser of a student 
publishing body until her daughter's delivery. 
(She is now reading for a Bachelor degree in Philos- 
ophy and Literature.) Sarah's father was at the time 
of the study working on a Ph.D. thesis in phenom- 
enology. Both parents come from New Zealand. 
Sarah's mother contacted us when Sarah was 
seven weeks old. Having been told that we were 
interested in early social development and what 
would be expected of her in the longitudinal 
study I was undertaking, she agreed to partic- 
ipate. 
She brought Sarah into the laboratory twelve times 
during the twelve week period in which Sarah aged from 
8 to 20 weeks. The intervals were approximately 
weekly, the two longest being 8 and 11 days, the 
two shortest being 2 and 6 days. 
I S4 
FIGURE 6/1 : Variations in positive regard and smiling at mother 
by Trevarthen and Hubley's (1978) subject, Tracey, 
between eight and twenty weeks of age. 
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FIGURE 6/2 : Variations in positive regard and smiling at mother 
by Sarah between eight and twenty weeks of age, 
including comparisons with positive regard at strangers. 
o 
(Smiling : shaded) 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Age (weeks) 
(Positive regard at strangers : continuous line) 
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c. The procedure was basically that reported in 
Chapter 3. In each session, the baby was secured in 
the baby -chair and her mother was asked to chat with 
her. These sessions produced, on average, four and a 
half minutes of recorded mother- infant interaction (on 
video -tape supplemented by film). On seven of her 
twelve visits, Sarah was also introduced to an adult 
other than her mother, with whom she interacted in the 
same way. And on six visits she was recorded in the 
'reaching' condition described in Chapter 4. 
d. Analysis of the data was conducted first by coding 
Sarah's behaviour in terms of three indices: smiling, 
crying and looking at her mother. Subsequently, more 
detailed analysis was undertaken of selected portions 
of interaction. 
e. The initial analysis revealed marked changes in 
Sarah's social behaviour. At a gross level these 
changes formed a simple pattern. In the early 
sessions (weeks 8 -11), Sarah was interested in and 
happy to interact with her mother: her scores for 
visual regard and smiling were high and she hardly 
cried at all. But from the thirteenth week onwards, 
something seemed to go wrong. In exactly the same 
interactional setting as hitherto, she became fretful. 
She would screw up her face, whimper protestingly and 
arch her back (Photos. 'lb -q7 ). This change 
revealed itself by a marked drop in the amount she 
smiled and looked at her mother, together with increased 
crying. This sort of behaviour continued off and on 
up to the end of the study. But, from the sixteenth 
week a new form of behaviour was observed: although 
Sarah often disregarded and fretted at her mother's 
attempts to interact with her, she would also from time 
to time, derive great amusement from them. This 
development revealed itself in a considerable increase 
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in smiling during these later recording sessions, an 
increase in visual regard and decreased crying. The 
pattern of changes emerges most clearly if smiling is 
plotted against age with the proportion of each inter- 
action for which Sarah looked at her mother without 
crying (i.e. 'positive regard': Fig.2). 
Analysis of Sarah's behaviour with adults other than 
her mother revealed that in only one of these seven 
interactions did Sarah look (without crying) less than 
with her mother. However, her interactions with 
'strangers' gave the impression of being less intense 
and more wary than with her mother; for example, her 
peak- levels of smiling were much greater with her 
mother than with strangers. Overall, the pattern of 
Sarah's behaviour with her mother was not reflected in 
her behaviour with other adults: she would often spend 
a considerable time interacting with a stranger when, 
immediately before, she had more or less ignored her 
mother (Fig.1). 
Analysis of Sarah's reaching behaviour revealed a 
fairly normal development: relatively little interest 
in prehension at the start of the study, a marked 
increase in the fourth month of life but without any 
successful grasps - which only appeared at the end of 
the study (Afrndix 3: Fí 3 ) 
f. More detailed a posteriori analyses of some of 
these recordings are reported elsewhere in this thesis: 
of 'protoconversation' (primary intersubjectivity) in 
Chapter 5 and of negativity in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Aspects are also discussed in Sylvester -Bradley and 
Trevarthen (1978: Appendix 3), particularly a transition 
in the mother's behaviour from 'mirroring' to game - 
playing which was associated with the increase in 
Sarah's interest in her mother at around sixteen weeks. 
The discussion of mirroring has been expanded into 
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Chapter 8 of this thesis. Game -playing is discussed 
below. 
In games such as those occurring in these inter- 
actions, there was close synchronisation of sounds with 
actions. The games had a regular structure which 
lasted several seconds, and this structure was always 
accentuated vocally by the mother, and often by the 
baby too. Thus a phase of assertive action by the 
mother - which often had a vocally stressed beat - was 
inevitably followed by a pause during which the mother 
looked at her baby and smiled, laughed or called out. 
If the baby expressed enjoyment at this point, by happy 
animation or a call, the game would usually be renewed, 
although often in a slightly altered form. 
As an example we will consider a game which took 
place when Sarah was sixteen weeks and four days old. 
This game consisted of five structurally similar bouts 
which together lasted eighteen seconds. The game 
began with Sarah sitting quietly watching her mother, 
but with both hands up to her mouth, sucking her 
fingers. The mother, who had previously been imitat- 
ing Sarah by sucking her own fingers with exaggerated 
sucking- noises, leaned forward saying "Sucking's good 
eh: Eh: Eh: ", flashing her eyebrows at each "Eh; ". 
She then began clicking her tongue aggressively with her 
face held provocatively close to Sarah's face, staring 
intensely with raised eyebrows (Photo. 51 ). After 
three seconds in this posture the mother stopped click- 
ing her tongue, moved her head back for one second, 
saying "Boo:" and then repeated her previous action: 
bringing her head forward and clicking her tongue at 
Sarah (for two seconds). Throughout these preliminary 
stages, Sarah's expression and posture remained un- 
changed. The mother then leaned back again (for one 


























































































































































towards her mother's face with her right hand, 
apparently trying to grab her bottom lip. At this 
action, the mother smiled and opened her mouth, as if 
to bite Sarah's hand. There followed a brief period 
of uncertainty (1.7 seconds) in which the mother made 
as if to close her mouth on Sarah's hand but didn't, 
briefly clicked her tongue while still focussing on 
Sarah's hand, and then opened her mouth widely again. 
Finally, she brought her head forward, closed her mouth 
on Sarah's finger and began to make a quacking -noise, 
not dissimilar to that made by Walt Disney's Donald 
Duck. Almost immediately Sarah began to smile. In 
the process of quacking the mother's mouth rapidly 
opened and closed on Sarah's finger. Meanwhile, the 
mother kept Sarah under close surveillance from the 
corner of her eye (Photo.S$). After one second, the 
mother disengaged, leaned back and smiled briefly 
(.46 seconds) at Sarah, who was still smiling and 
continued to smile more or less intensely for the next 
nine seconds. This was the end of the first bout of 
the game. Five more bouts followed, each having an 
homologous structure to the first bout, although the 
components varied in length. Certain innovations were 
introduced as the gpme progressed: in the second bout, 
the mother introduced a lateral, back - and -forth 
'worrying' motion of the head, as if she were a dog 
with a rat in her mouth, shaking it to death (each head 
movement lasted approximately .2 seconds). Another 
innovation was that, although it was the mother who 
initiated each bout - by opening her mouth and moving 
her head temptingly close to Sarah's hand - Sarah also 
became involved in getting the bout underway, because 
the mother would not begin 'worrying' until Sarah 
attempted to grab her lip. Other developments 
included alterations in the mother's vocalisation 
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during the 'worrying' phase of the game, and Sarah 
mirroring with her own mouth the way the mother opened 
her mouth prior to 'biting' Sarah's hand - suggesting 
close sympathy between the two of them (Photo, -S9), 
On two occasions (Bouts 2 and 3) the mother broke eye - 
contact with Sarah during the 'worrying' phase of the 
game. During Bout 3, Sarah spent the 'worrying' phase 
of the game with her face turned away from her mother, 
although laughing continuously. Table I presents a 
summary of the game and its variations. As can be 
seen from it, there were certain similarities between 
the tongue -clicking preliminaries of the game and the 
game which eventually emerged. 
The game's ending seems to have been more the mother's 
doing than Sarah's. Thus the last bout ended with the 
mother leaning back and saying "You're silly. You're 
silly ". Then, leaning forwards, as if to begin a 
sixth bout of the game, she suddenly appeared undecided 
and began clicking her tongue instead - avoiding 
Sarah's hand just as Sarah snatched at her mouth. The 
period of uncertainty continued and, finally, after 
four more seconds, Sarah dropped her arm and looked 
down at her feet (Photo.60). 
Clearly, when analysing a game like this, one needs 
to know how much practice the infant and mother have 
had at playing this game and others like it. And, 
despite the smallness of the behaviour -sample collected 
during this study, investigation reveals that this game 
does have antecedents. Even during the first recorded 
interaction, the mother was saying (playfully) "I'll 
bite your hand off. Yes I will. Silly Sarah. I'm 
going to bite your little hand off. Yes I am." 
These early utterances appeared to be a response to the 
way in which Sarah gesticulated during these inter- 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It should be said that although this was one of the 
most successful games recorded during the study, this 
mother initiated games as early as her first visit to 
the laboratory. 
g. Conclusions. Both the initial and a posteriori 
analyses generally accorded with Trevarthen's descrip- 
tions of early intersubjective development (the only 
exception was that, with Sarah, person- object games 
did not seem very successful, although the mother 
did try them; Photo.126). A particularly interesting 
finding was that, in a number of sessions, Sarah 
appeared to prefer interacting with a stranger to 
interacting with her mother. This gave rise to the 
hypothesis that these and similar findings reported in 
the literature (Polak et.al. 1964, Fitzgerald 1968, 
Kagan 1970, Trevarthen 1975; see Chapter 7 for discussion) 
might be the product of negativity directed specifically 
towards mothers between the ages of two and five months. 
Owing to the theoretical neglect of negativity in early 
infancy, the confirmation of this hypothesis would 
prove of substantial importance to developmental 
psychology. The next chapter presents a number of 
analyses to test it. 
2. Nain Study 
a. The aims were primarily to examine further Trevarthen's 
general description of early social development but alsò 
to examine the alternative predictions about the devel- 
opment of infant attention derived from the discrepancy 
hypothesis and arousal theory. Four 'stimuli' were 
used: the mother in interaction with t,3 baby, a stranger 
in interaction with the baby, a face -mask with which 
babies had been made familiar in the home and an unfamiliar 
face -mask. 
Predictions from Trevarthen's statements suggest that 
there should be a peak of interest in the mother's face 
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between six and ten weeks of age followed by a decline. 
During this decline or 'relative negativity of motivation 
towards the mother', the stranger should receive more 
attention than the mother. Finally, during the fifth 
and sixth months, there should be a renewal of interest 
in the mother with the emergence of interpersonal games 
(Trevarthen makes no statements concerning the develop- 
ment of attention to face -masks). 
The discrepancy hypothesis would also predict a 
peak of attention to the mother's face at around two 
months of age followed by a decline during which the 
stranger received relatively more attention than the 
mother between two and four months of age. Attention 
to the familiar face -mask should already be at a low 
level by two or three months. The unfamiliar face -mask 
should receive more attention than the familiar face- 
mask from three months onwards - but less than the 
amount given to the mother or the stranger, because it 
is significantly less complex than they are. 
Arousal theory does not make firm predictions as to 
the development of attention. Rather, it predicts that 
stimuli will be attended to in order of their arousing - 
properties - increasingly arousing stimuli receiving 
increasing amounts of attention up to a limit beyond 
which they become progressively more aversive. The 
infants' reactions to particular stimuli will depend 
on his or her immediate 'state', but one would not 
expect similar stimuli to receive very different amounts 
of attention or very different stimuli (e.g. the stranger 
and the familiar face -mask) both to receive large amounts 
of attention. 
b. The subjects for this study were, like barah 
(and 
Trevarthen and Hubley's (1978) subject, Tracey), first- 
born girls. There were five of them (one mother 
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withdrew from the experiment half -way through in order 
to help her husband run their newly- acquired fish and 
chip shop. She was replaced - by Julie and her 
mother). Their mothers were contacted three or four 
weeks after the birth. They were of very different 
backgrounds. Thus: 
(i) Joanna's father was a post office engineer and 
her mother was, before Joanna's birth, a secretary also 
working in the post office. The family's home was a 
Victorian flat in a pleasant middle -class suburb of 
Edinburgh (Comely Bank). The flat was not large but 
was bright and well -kept. Her mother adopted a 
friendly and businesslike attitude to the experiment 
and apparently found little difficulty in organising 
visits to the Psychology Department into her daily 
routine. Her attendance -record was the most regular 
five mother -baby pairs and during recording 
sessions she took a lively interest in what was going 
on. 
Joanna suffered from colic throughout the first six 
months of life. This was clearly trying for the 
mother, not only because it was painful for the child 
but because it caused mess. 
(ii) Angela was born to parents of avowedly 
Christian uprightness. Her father ran an escort 
agency while her mother - of African, but ultimately 
Indo -Asian extraction - had been engaged in hospital 
nursing before the birth. Both parents were older 
than their counterparts in the experiment. 
Angela's mother suffered from an old back injury 
which, for much of Angela's early months, necessitated 
the wearing of an unwieldy and uncomfortable plaster 
corset. She had been told that this injury would 
significantly reduce the likelihood of her bearing a 
let s 
living child and, as a result, Angela's birth was seen 
by the parents as something of a miracle (Angela = 
"little angel "). 
The father, via the office of whom all phone -calls 
to their cavernous, antique- filled Regency flat were 
relayed, adopted a somewhat suspicious attitude to the 
experimenter and the experiment - not infrequently 
suggesting that the experimenter was not doing what he 
had said and apparently feeling that his wife was being 
put to a lot of trouble for no good reason. In 
contrast, the mother was very cooperative. 
Throughout the period of this case -study, the 
parents were looking for a full -time nanny for Angela. 
During Angela's first six months, at least six different 
girls were employed to help look after her. 
(iii) Leigh's father was a fitter and her mother had 
worked in the management of map- marketing before the 
birth. During the period of the study, the family 
moved from a flat in the inner city to a new detached 
residence in a quiet estate in the low- density southern 
suburb of Liberton. There was regular contact between 
Leigh and her maternal grandmother - the only grand- 
mother to attend a recording session. 
Leigh's mother set aside one afternoon of the week 
for her visits to the laboratory. If for any reason 
Leigh could not come on a Wednesday afternoon, she would 
usually not come until a subsequent Wednesday afternoon 
was clear, During the early recording sessions 
Leigh's mother appeared to be rather anxious; as soon 
as Leigh showed the first signs of getting upset, her 
mother began to talk about taking her home rather than 
trying to calm her down. However, during the course 
of the study, the mother's attitude relaxed so that she 
apparently came to view the experiment as a bit of a 
lark - 'being on the tele' - as well as a nuisance. 
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(iv) Jakilene's father was a Corporation bus driver 
but her mother had not had a job recently prior to 
Jakilene's birth. They lived on the third floor of a 
run -down block of Corporation flats among many identical 
run -down blocks of flats in the drab post -war Forth - 
side suburb of PZuirhouse. 
Jakilene's mother clearly enjoyed her free, taxi - 
paid outings to the Psychology Department. Not 
infrequently they were the main event in her week and 
on one occasion she said that she hadn't been out of 
her flat since her previous visit to the laboratory. 
Towards the end of the case -study, she went to hospital 
having been diagnosed as anaemic. Her daughter 
meanwhile had grown from a relatively small neonate 
into a great big bouncing six -month -old - so big that 
her size had drawn comment from her health visitor. 
(Later, the mother whispered conspiratorially to the 
experimenter that she had been feeding her baby four 
times as much baby food as the health visitor had 
recommended - two jars a day instead of one jar every 
two days.) 
Jakilene's father took a great interest in his 
daughter's participation in the experiment and fre- 
quently Jakilene's visits were arranged to coincide 
with her father's coming off shift so that he could 
come and see what was going on. Both parents expressed 
regret when the experiment came to an end. 
(v) Julie came into the study late (at the age of 
ten weeks) as a replacement for another baby. Her 
father was a joiner working in a large construction 
firm, often working well away from Edinburgh. Her 
mother had not recently been in employment. They 
lived with their dog in a tiny flat in the old working - 
class area of Leith. 
Julie's mother often forgot to be in her flat at the 
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times appointed for taxis to pick her up and bring her 
to the laboratory. She often appeared to be pre- 
occupied and was quite difficult to communicate with, 
often using only ambiguous monosyllables during 
conversations. She was not on the telephone and 
frequently, on the experimenter's late morning visits 
to her home, she answered the door in her dressing - 
gown, appearing to have only just got up. 
She was not articulate verbally and her interactions 
with Julie were seldom as animated as those of the 
other mother -baby pairs. She usually sat a long way 
back from her baby and kept her coat and hat on 
throughout recording sessions. 
Because of the practical difficulties in negotiating 
with and motivating her, only nine recording sessions 
were successfully arranged. 
c. Procedure. It was planned to bring each baby into 
the laboratory ten times between the ages of six and 
twenty -six weeks. Due to unforeseen circumstances 
(illnesses and holidays), the intervals between visits 
were not all as regular as had been wished. However, 
only one interval was longer than a month (six weeks) 
and only one baby was recorded on less than ten 
occasions (Table 2). Behaviour was recorded on video- 
tape. 
The aims of the study made it desirable to disting- 
uish between different explanations of anti -social 
behaviour with the mother. These include hyper - 
arousal (Stern 1971) and cognitive over -familiarity 
(Kagan 1970) as well as dislike. For this reason, the 
infants were all recorded in four conditions: 
(i) With their mother: the mother being asked to 
chat with her baby (see Chapter 3 for details); 
TABLE 6/2: Details of recording. sessions 








Infants sessions conditions (seconds) (seconds) (seconds) 
JOANNA 11 40 10412.36 260.31 80.48 
ANGELA 10 39 11359.35 291.27 49.74 
LEIGH 10 35 7875.03 225.00 96.06 
JAKILENE 10 40 9837.17 245.93 82.36 
JULIE 9 34 7716.4 226.95 77.72 
SUIdi Ev 50 188 47200.31 251.07 81.27 
TABLE 6/3: Com arison of rotortions of visual fixation 
in si ereni consi ions eac session summe ranis or 
whole study) 








J&ANNA 24 20 15 21 
ANGELA 27 16 22 25 
LEIGH 23 12 17 18 
JAKILENE 34 21 21 24 
JULIE 18 15 24 23 
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(ii) With a stranger: someone whom the baby had 
never seen, or had only seen briefly before the session, 
was introduced to the baby and asked to sit and chat 
with her for a few minutes. In all but two of the 
fifty instances the strangers were women, the majority 
of whom were experienced in handling babies. 
(iii) With a familiar mask: a three dimensional, 
coloured, 'smiling' face -mask was taken to each baby's 
home when she was four weeks old. This was hung above 
or near the infant's cot. Each mask was fitted with a 
flashing torch -bulb and battery to attract the infant's 
attention, and mothers were instructed to switch on 
this light for at least ten minutes every day when the 
infant was alert. On each visit to the Psychology 
Department, while sitting in the baby- chair, they were 
confronted with an identical mask fitted with an 
identical 'flasher' unit. 
(iv) With an unfamiliar mask: the infants were also 
confronted with one of five unfamiliar three -dimensional 
masks, fitted with the same 'flasher' unit. These 
represented a clown, a pirate, an Indian princess, a 
gypsy and a gangster. The infants saw each of these 
five masks twice, but never with less than a two -month 
gap between exposures. (Experiments on 'one- trial' 
learning suggest that the infants are unlikely to have 
remembered the 'novel' masks for more than a month 
e.g. Cohen and Gelber 1975.) 
Conditions lasted, on average, slightly over four 
minutes (Table 2). The conditions were planned to 
occur in an unpredictable order for each baby - with 
each condition occurring equally often in each of the 
four serial positions. \dhen the babies were at their 
youngest however, they were exposed to their mothers 
first, as their behaviour in this condition was the most 
crucial for the study being undertaken and it was also 
thought important that, to allay their fears, the 
mothers should understand as early as possible the way 
in which the experiment was being conducted. In general, 
the infants appeared to be content in all conditions 
and only occasionally was a session cut short because an 
infant was unhappy: out of the recording of a potential 
two hundred conditions, only twelve had to be cancelled 
and five of these cancellations were caused by failures 
of equipment. In all thirteen hours and six minutes 
of video -sound material were recorded. 
As the order and length of conditions was not 
rigorously controlled, a number of tests were carried 
out to see whether there were 'order' effects or 'time' 
effects. There was however no consistent waning of 
attention with time and the only 'order' effect was a 
tendency for crying to increase as the session pro- 
gressed. This was not significant, however, having a 
probability of occurring by chance of only slightly 
less than one half (Friedmann Two -Way Analysis of 
Variance for all completed sessions in which crying 
occurred: k= 28.18, df = 28 
) 
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d. Analysis of the data focussed primarily on looking 
behaviour. The time of each look at and away from the 
person or mask to which the infants were exposed was 
noted, as were the onset and offset of smiles and 
cries. 
e. Findings. The initial aim of these case -histories 
was to explore social development in the first six 
months of life, and, specifically, to determine if a 
phase of intense social interest (6 -10 weeks) is 
followed by a period during which babies look at and 
want to interact less with people - being more interested 
in objects (11 -16 weeks), after which they become more 
cheerful in interaction through the medium of 
2o 
increasingly elaborate games (17 -30 weeks). 
Findings from the present study which support this 
description are as follows: 
(i) The highest level of positive regard at the 
mother during an interaction was universally seen in 
sessions recorded between the infant's eighth and tenth 
week of life. This was not only true for the five 
girls in the main study, but also for Sarah and Tracey. 
The likelihood of this occurring by chance is very 
small (p= .34 x 10`4). Insofar as looking without 
crying is a measure of social interaction in infancy, 
this confirms that after an early period of relatively 
intense interest in people, there is invariably a 
cooling of interest in chatting with the mother (see 
Fig. 3 ). 
(ii) If the session with the most positive regard is 
taken from the three periods 6 -10 weeks, 11 -16 weeks 
and 17 -26 weeks, the lowest maximum is recorded for the 
middle period in four out of the five babies in this 
study (Angela is the exception, However, 
this was not true of either Sarah or Tracey - for whom 
the lowest maxima were recorded after 16 weeks of age. 
(iii) For six of the seven babies studied, the 
period from 6 -10 weeks included at least one interaction 
with the mother during which there was a relatively 
large amount of smiling (i.e. 19% or more, by time: 
Fig. 4- ; Angela was the exception). 
Findings which do not coincide with Trevarthen's 
description of early development are: 
(i) The lowest amount of positive regard during an 
interaction was only once recorded during the period 
from 11 -16 weeks (i.e. for Julie). The likelihood of 
FIGURE 6/3 : Variations in positive regard at mother by five 
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FIGURE 6/4 : Variations in smiling at mother by five babies 
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this occurring by chance is less than three in a hun- 
dred. Insofar as not looking at a cointeractant 
represents negativity, this goes against Trevarthen's 
observation that the period from 11 -16 weeks is a 
period of "relative negativity of motivation towards 
others" (1979c): other periods contain greater nega- 
tivity. 
(ii) Consistent with this is the finding that for 
all but one of the seven babies the lowest overall 
average of positive regard for all interactions during 
the periods 6 -10, 11 -16 and 17 -26 weeks was during the 
final period, not the middle period (the 
exception is Julie). In other words there was an 
overall waning of attention during the period from one 
to six months. 
(iii) The incidence of smiling and laughter did not 
altogether support Trevarthen's outline of inter - 
subjective development during the period. For instance, 
one baby (Angela) smiled most at her mother during an 
interaction recorded in her fifteenth week of life. 
And although some of the other babies showed a low level 
of smiling during the 11 -16 week period, the lowest 
level was recorded in all five babies during the period 
from 17 -26 weeks (p =.02), not during the preceding 
'period of negativity'. (This was not true for Sarah 
or Tracey - for whom the lowest level was recorded 
during the 11 -16 week period.) 
(iv) Trevarthen's observation that the onset of 
laughter at three months is followed by a period during 
which "elaborate and increasingly ritualised games are 
played with the baby" (1979c) was supported by only 
three out of the five case -histories. One of the 
mothers (Julie's) only played very simple games with 
her daughter - consisting of slight back - and -forth 
movements of the head accompanied by the utterances 
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"Aa -boo: Aa- boo:" (or a variation, such as "Aa -boo- 
boo- boo -boo -boo -boo -boo! ") and the occasional 'rasp- 
berry'. The nearest Angela's mother came to playing 
games with her was one (interrupted) version of 'this 
little piggie went to market' - otherwise she did not 
play games at all. [These observations, like 
Trevarthen and Hubley's (1978), do not necessarily 
apply to interactions outside the recording -studio. 
(v) A more general finding was that, with the 
exception of a universal decline in positive regard 
after ten weeks of age, there was always an exception 
to any summarising statement made about these babies' 
behaviour. In a group numbering only seven, this 
suggests that the trends Trevarthen describes are not 
universally true. 
There were a number of other findings: 
(i) If the figures for all sessions are summed, 
all the babies smiled more at people (their mother and 
strangers) than at the masks. Four of them smiled 
more at their mother than in any other condition (the 
exception was Angela). Four of them smiled more at 
the unfamiliar mask than at the familiar mask (Figs 6: 
the exception was Joanna). 
(ii) There was a decline in overall attention after 
the age of ten weeks. This was true in all five 
babies taken individually (Fig. 6A). It was also true 
of all five babies for each condition taken individually 
(except that Joanna's score with the familiar mask was 
exactly the same before and after ten weeks: Fig.(ob). 
(iii) There was a high level of positive regard (and 
visual attention per se) paid to the masks. On 
average they were looked at more than the people when 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































was true individually of three babies (Angela and Julie 
were the exceptions). 
(iv) On average, least attention of all was paid to 
mothers: this was true individually for four of the 
five babies (the exception was Julie) - although during 
weeks 6 -10 three babies paid most attention to their 
mothers (the exceptions were Joanna and Leigh). 
Particularly surprising was the overall attention paid 
to the familiar mask: this was only slightly less than 
attention paid to the stranger - the most looked -at 
stimulus (Fig.5t). 
(v) There was a great deal of variation between 
individuals. An example is the smiling behaviour of 
Joanna. As noted above, smiling expressions occurred 
most frequently to the mother and the familiar mask was 
generally smiled at least of all. But in Joanna's 
final visit to the laboratory, she smiled and laughed 
more at the familiar mask than she had smiled or 
laughed at her mother or anything else throughout the 
entire study (i.e. 22% of the time). When her mother 
came in to talk to her she smiled much less (i.e. 5% of 
the time). 
3. Discussion 
A number of points are to be drawn from these 
findings 
(i) Insofar as positive regard - and, to a lesser 
extent, smiling - are measures of infants' interest in 
social interaction with their mothers (which in Sarah's 
and Tracey's cases they have been shown to be; see 
Chapter 5 and Trevarthen and Hubley 1978), the period 
from 6 to 10 weeks of age contains the strongest social 
interest between one and six months of age. 
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(ii) In line with predictions from the discrepancy 
hypothesis, the present study did show a decline in 
attention to the mother's face between two and four 
months and a relative increase in attention to the 
stranger's face over the same period so that, for the 
study taken as a whole, more attention was paid to the 
stranger's face than to anything else. But the discrep- 
ancy hypothesis would predict that the trend of atten- 
tion to the familiar mask should be similar to that 
for the mother - but that the mask should get less 
attention overall than the mother's face because it 
is the less complex stimulus. This prediction is dis- 
confirmed by the present study: for example, when the 
proportion of time spent looking in each condition 
for each session is ranked from 1 (large) to 4 (small), 
the sum of ranks for Jakilene and Julie is lowest for 
the familiar mask and highest for the mother (Table 3; 
p.194). This is a paradoxical finding when the 
perceivable differences between masks and people are 
considered: the mothers' faces were not only larger 
than the masks, they were more detailed, they moved, 
they vocalised and they acted contingently upon the 
babies' actions - all of which have been shown to be 
attractive stimulus -properties in experimental studies 
on visual preference 
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(e.g. Carpenter 1974, Haith 1966, Hutt et.al. 1968, 
Watson 1972, Papousek and Papousek 1977). A route out 
of this paradox is suggested by Cohen's (1973) 
important finding that "attention- getting" and 
"attention- holding" are controlled by different pro- 
cesses in infancy. The research which supports the 
discrepancy hypothesis comes from experiments on 
attention -getting, usually considering behaviour 
samples of less than a minute whereas, in this study, 
behaviour was recorded for, on average, four and a half 
minutes. This means that our findings concern the 
attention -holding properties of faces and face -like 
stimuli and cannot be explained by the discrepancy 
hypothesis. 
(iii) Another explanation for the finding that the 
mother's face received on average less attention than 
any other stimulus might be given in terms of arousal. 
But low attention to the mother's face cannot be 
explained as the product of hypo- arousal caused by 
over -familiarity - as this should also affect behaviour 
with the familiar face -mask. Similarly, if it were 
explained as the product of aversion through hyper - 
arousal (Chance 1962), it would be difficult to under- 
stand why the stranger's face received so much 
attention. 
One possibility might be that, for some reason, 
mothers do become uncomfortably arousing stimuli after 
ten weeks of age, as reported in a case -study by Stern 
(1971 1977) for example. But, if this were the 
case, 
one would expect there to be consistent patterns of 
attention for different mother -baby pairs from week to 
week (as found by Stern). This was not found. While 
low attention to the mother was a general phenomenon, 
there was great variation in the amount individual 
mothers were looked at - not only from week to week 
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(Fig. 3 ) but from minute to minute within the same 
interaction (Fig. 7 ). Our findings suggest that the 
changes in the infants' interactive behaviour after ten 
weeks of age must have been self -determined to a large 
extent. 
(iv) From the observations made during this study 
it appears that Trevarthen's statements about the 
importance of games after 16 weeks of age should be 
reassessed. But while games did not play an important 
part in the interactions of two of these mother -baby 
pairs (as recorded in the laboratory), it often seemed 
that games were one of the most successful ways of 
interacting with an otherwisw fractious baby after four 
months of age. For instance Angela, whose mother 
never played games with her in the laboratory, would 
look and smile at a stranger who did play games with 
her. (A detailed example of interactive success 
achieved by game -playing is given on pp. 2q-° -ZS? below.) 
On the other hand, babies were not always amused when 
people tried to play games with them, as is illustrated 
by the following excerpt of maternal babytalk: 
"Aow; Aow: (Laughs) '(Kisses) (Sucks baby's 
fingers) Ber- ber -ber: Ber -ber -ber -ber -ber: 
Ber -ber -ber -ber: Ba- ba- ba -ba: (Sucks baby's 
fingers) Oh no, you don't want that game. What 
game do you want ?" (Sarah: aged 20 weeks). 
What these observations suggest is that babies do 
become more easily involved in games at around four 
months of age than hitherto; but that game -playing is a 
manifestation rather than a cause of their changing 
intersubjective status. Other pointers in this 
direction were that, after four months of age, babies 
quite often smiled and chuckled at their mothers even 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and that one baby spent a large proportion of a session 
recorded at twenty -six weeks smiling and chuckling at 
an inanimate face -mask (see above). This shows that 
games do not cause the emergence of humour and expres- 
sions of enjoyment but rather humour and a capacity for 
enjoyment are manifested in the emergence of games. 
(v) As already noted, the case -histories of the 
seven babies reported in this chapter differed consid- 
erably from each other. Only one generalisation 
concerning developmental trends was true of all seven 
babies. Large individual differences are a common 
feature of infant studies: to take just one example, 
Collis and Schaffer (1975) have presented an analysis 
of the synchronisation of looking patterns in mother - 
infant pairs. But the maximum differences they found 
between behaviour of the same pair in different 
conditions was X 3.84 while the maximum difference 
between different pairs in the same condition was 
X 36.11: Figures such as these suggest that there are 
processes at work more important than those manipulated 
in the experiment (i.e. complexity of stimulus, 
animation of stimulus, etc.). 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter has been addressed to the question of 
how infants develop in their interactions with other 
people, given the existence of an early social sensi- 
tivity. While the success of games gives further 
evidence for this sensitivity, there is nothing in the 
findings to suggest that the development has a 
particularlysocial form during the first six months of 
life. Thus the main finding, that infants' interest 
in their mothers decreases after ten weeks of age, was 
found also to apply in interactions with strangers and 
with face -masks - suggesting that this is not specific 
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to the development of the mother- infant relationship 
but more the product of the infant's intrinsic 
developmental programme. 
Because of the simplicity of the behavioural indices 
used for analysis in the main study, it includes no 
positive evidence of negativity. But, generally, the 
results can be explained by an increase with age in the 
infants' capacities for being active: for example, the 
facts that their visual capacity rapidly develops, 
reaching adult levels of competence at approximately 
four months of age (Haith 1977) and that their ability 
to grasp and control reachable objects also improves 
markedly during this period (White et.al. 1964). 
These developments would naturally increase the 
infants' interest in exploring their surroundings and, 
thus, decrease the amount of attention they paid to 
the experimental stimuli. The relatively low 
proportion of attention paid to mothers would reflect 
a conflict of purposes: the mother, having been 
instructed to entertain her daughter would see the 
baby's increasingly active investigations of the 
surroundings as counter -productive and attempt to 
frustrate them. The baby, thus frustrated, would, 
through innate obstinacy or 'negativity', make more 
persistent attempts to evade her mother's attentions. 
In these terms, the strangers would fare better than 
the mothers because, in the first place, they would 
have'novelty value' and, secondly, because they would 
be less assertive and, therefore, less frustrating than 
the mothers. The masks would fare better simply 
because they 'allowed' the babies to investigate what 
they wanted. 
Such an explanation is compatible with the varia- 
bility in the infants' behaviour - this would simply 
reflect their changes in interest ('moods'). It would 
also explain their enjoyment of games, insofar as these 
permit the infants to become more actively involved 
with, and thus discover more about, their cointeractants' 
behaviour than is possible when adults adopt a more 
mature 'conversational' mode of interaction. 
Due to the simplicity of its analytic basis, the 
present study cannot support the explanation just 
proposed for its findings. For this reason, more 
detailed analyses were undertaken of the video -records 
upon which it is based. These analyses focus particu- 
larly on the question whether or not the decline with 
age of infants' interest in their mothers' faces was 
due to an increase in purposeful 'negativity'. The 
findings are reported in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: NEGATIVITY IN EARLY 
INFANT -MOTHER EXCHANGES 
The previous chapter concluded with an argument that 
the fall in infants' attention to experimental stimuli 
after ten weeks of age might be due to their maturing 
abilities to take an increasingly active interest in 
other aspects of their surroundings. It was suggested 
that the decline in attention might be particularly 
marked with mothers because mothers, in more zealously 
following the experimenter's instruction to 'chat with' 
their babies, would be more likely than strangers (or 
masks) to obstruct their infants' investigations of 
their surroundings - these obstructions leading to 
active negativity on behalf of the babies. Such an 
argument depends not only on the demonstration that 
young infants are capable of negativity. It pre- 
supposes, more generally, that infants are capable of 
purposive action. Both assumptions are important 
theoretically. 
The most influential theories of early negativity 
are derived from psychoanalysis and stress the impor- 
tance of conflict. For example, Spitz suggests that 
infant negativity or 'unpleasure' is the product of 
frustration caused by a conflict between the infant's 
wishes and external circumstances. But he goes on to 
argue that environmental frustration is essential for 
developmental progress because it leads to improved 
'reality- testing': 
"a precondition for setting up reality- testing is 
that objects shall have been lost which once brought 
real satisfaction (Freud 1925) ... It follows that 
to deprive the infant of the effect of unpleasure 
during the first year of life is as harmful as to 
deprive him of the effect of pleasure ... The 
importance of frustration for developmental progress 
cannot be overestimated." (Spitz and Cobliner 
1965) 
A rather different argument is put forward by 
Melanie Klein (1953b). She suggests that infant 
negativity is primarily the product of an internal 
conflict - between the self -destructive 'death' 
instincts and the self -preservative 'life' instincts. 
Although she stresses that negativity is related by the 
infant to his or her environment, she sees it as being 
essentially a defensive projection of innate hate and 
aggressivity which will occur in the early stages of 
infancy whatever the infant's circumstances. 
Despite their differences, both Spitz and Klein see 
the transcendence of negativity as playing a necessary 
part in developmental progress - whether it be achieved 
by more mature reality- testing or by working through 
the 'depressive position' (see Chapter 1). This view 
contrasts markedly with the view put forward by some 
attachment theorists. For example, Ainsworth, Bell 
and Stayton (1974) argue that negative behaviours such 
as fussiness and disobedience are an avoidable conse- 
quence of inappropriate or insensitive mothering 
techniques. In contradiction to Spitz, they argue 
that, while negativity is a consequence of frustration 
by external circumstances, it is developmentally 
retrograde. In a 'good- enough' (Winnicott 1960a) 
environment, negativity will not occur and the infant 
will grow up into a naturally obedient and easy -going 
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child. 
These different theories lead to different predic- 
tions about the occurrence of negativity in infancy. 
Spitz (1957) for example, did not believe that truly 
purposeful negativity could be observed until eight or 
nine months after birth. This view corresponds to 
that held by attachment theorists. As reported in 
Chapter 1, attachment theorists discuss only the 
positive aspects of the neonate's behavioural reper- 
toire; those behaviours which permit him or her to form 
a bond with the mother. Behaviours which might 
disrupt or weaken social relationships are not discussed 
as such until babies are more than six months old and, 
even then, the main interest is in negativity towards 
strangers (e.g. Bowlby 1969, Ainsworth and Wittig 1969, 
Rheingold and Eckerman 1973, Solomon and Decarie 1976). 
Klein (1953a), on the other hand, reports that, in 
accord with her theory, negativity occurs from birth, 
and she offers informal evidence that even very young 
babies will refuse to suck in the feeding situation, 
struggling and screaming in protest against their 
mothers' attentions. 
1. Empirical reports of negativity 
In the light of the theoretical controversies 
surrounding early negativity one might expect it to 
have provided the topic for numerous empirical studies. 
Until recently this was not the case. Nevertheless, 
the literature contains many incidental reports of 
early negativity. iNith respect to the characteristic 
forms of negativity, these reports have a good deal in 
common. Thus Brazelton et.al. (1974) - who report 
that babies as young as one month old naturally 
oscillate between approach and withdrawal during inter- 
actions with their mothers - claim that, during the 
ziq 
negative part of the cycle, babies use four strategies: 
"1. Actively withdrawing from th r mothers - that 
is, increasing the physical distance between the 
stimulus and oneself by changing one's own position, 
for example, arching, turning, shrinking. 
"2. Rejecting it (i.e. the stimulus of the mother's 
face), that is, dealing with it by pushing it away 
with hands and feet while maintaining one's position. 
"3. Decreasing its power to disturb by maintaining 
a presently held position but decreasing sensitivity 
to the stimulus - looking dull, yawning or with- 
drawing into a sleep state. 
"4. Signalling behaviour, for example, fussing or 
crying, which has the initially unplanned effect of 
bringing adults or other caregivers to the infant to 
aid him." 
A larger -scale study by Stechler and Carpenter (1967) 
shows that guided turning -away from the face occurred 
in all fourteen babies they studied between the ages of 
two and six weeks, reaching a peak at two or three 
weeks. They describe these withdrawals of attention 
as having a "dramatic and apparently controlled 
quality ". It took various forms: 
"lowering of the eyes, lids, prolonged closing of 
the eyes, turning the head toward the periphery of 
the target, with each of these behaviours inter- 
spersed with target orientations whose brevity and 
precipitous cessation suggest a check in the stimu- 
lus field which may then result in further avoidance. 
The most extreme behaviour is a turning of the whole 
body so that the head is rotated 80° into the side - 
pillow, often with a rigidly arched back and fussing." 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, similar behaviour was 
reported by Brackbill (1958) in an experiment concerned 
with the instrumental conditioning of smiling. The 
subjects (S) were four -month -olds and the reinforcement 
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consisted of social and body contact with the experi- 
menter (E). Brackbill's first finding was that, after 
the cessation of regular reinforcement, the infants' 
rate of smiling extinguished not to their previous 
operant rate, but to zero. And 
"coincident with the beginning of zero response rate 
was a conspicuous behavioural change: S would no 
longer fixate the discriminative stimulus (E's face). 
Instead, S's head turned to one side and remained 
there - an occurrence that was in distinct contrast 
to S's persistent fixation during conditioning. 
When this occurred, immediately preceding the last 
extinction interval, E propped S's head with rolled 
blankets or other material, making it impossible for 
the infant to turn his head to the left or right 
more than a few degrees. The 'refusal' to fixate 
persisted even under these conditions; S's eyes then 
turned toward the ceiling." 
In another experiment, Polak, Emde and Spitz (1964) 
used the smiling response to indicate the onset of 
depth perception. They discovered that one of the 
ways infants differentiated between a photograph of a 
face and a real face was an "apparently purposeful 
turning away of the eyes and head ". This 
"was a common response to the human face in the -three 
to five months age group. Preliminary data on this 
response suggest a peak of frequency of occurrence 
of turning away in the third and fourth months." 
Their subjects turned away more frequently from the 
real face than from the photograph. 
While varying in detail, these reports suggest that 
negativity is a distinct type of action occurring from 
the earliest stages of infancy. But, despite the 
consensus as to its form, there is some disagreement as 
to how negativity should be interpreted. For example, 
Brazelton et.al. (1974) argue that the behaviours they 
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observed were not so much a product of the quality of 
stimulation presented by the mother - as originally 
suggested by Schneirla (1965) - but of a "basic 
regulatory mechanism ", akin to that which maintains 
homeostasis in physiological parameters such as body 
temperature, allowing infants to maintain some control 
over visual stimulation. Stern (1971 1977) and 
Stechler and Carpenter take a similar view, suggesting 
that gaze aversion and all its accompaniments are 
methods of limiting visual stimulation to manageable 
proportions: 
"it appears that the very young baby has to regulate 
intake or confrontation in relation to his developing 
schemas. The frequent almost surreptitious 
glancing back at the target while holding the head 
averted [cf. 'fractional glances', p.211 below], would 
support the idea that in some way he knows that the 
stimulus is there, that he is drawn to it, but can 
handle it only in small doses." (Stechler and 
Carpenter 1967) 
The use of physiological concepts, such as homeo- 
stasis and arousal, and statements that negative 
behaviours are affected by the quantity but not the 
quality of the visual stimulation to which infants are 
exposed, suggests that early negativity is an automatic 
process which does not involve the infant's purposes. 
This view has been seriously challenged by a series of 
studies which show that infant negativity can be 
experimentally controlled (e.g. Tatam 1974, Brazelton 
et.al. 1975, Tronick et.al. 1979, Murray 1980). 
For example, Murray (1980) has found that, by asking 
mothers to go blank -faced during mother -infant inter- 
actions, two -month -olds are made to stop smiling, avert 
gaze from the mother's face, show facial expressions of 
distress, peculiar grimaces of the mouth, increased 
handling of the clothes, touching the face, sucking the 
2.2Z. 
thumb or fingers, and crying. As reported in Chapter 
1, Murray has also shown that differences emerge from 
comparisons between infants' behaviours when inter- 
acting with their mothers in 'live' closed -circuit 
television and the behaviours of the same infants when 
watching a replay of their mothers' behaviour. In the 
second condition, when - while being visually identical 
- the mothers' behaviours are not coordinated with the 
behaviours of their babies, the babies will more often 
turn away from the TV -image "looking puzzled and 
frowning, making more prolonged grimacing movements, 
touching their clothes and face and yawning more 
often." 
These results show that negativity is related to the 
quality of stimulation to which infants are exposed and 
is not an automatic response to perceptual overload. 
But why do babies find their mothers aversive when the 
normal structure of mother -infant interaction is 
changed? The simplest proposal is that infants have 
an expectation that people will interact with them when 
in a position to do so and that, when this expectation 
is violated, negativity will occur. However, some 
workers claim, on the basis of earlier experimental 
work with non -social stimuli (e.g. Papousek 1969, 
Watson 1972), that these results provide further 
evidence for the existence of "a fundamental cognitive 
response system" which underlies all infant behaviour, 
having as its aim the comprehension and control of all 
environmental stimulation (Papousek 1975, Watson 1977). 
In terms of this hypothesis, pleasure results from 
increased control or comprehension and unpleasure results 
from incomprehension or reduced control over the 
environment. Thus, because the experimental pertur- 
bations of mother -infant interactions have effects 
which are incomprehensible to the baby and thus reduce 
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or eliminate the social efficacy of their behaviours, 
distress results. On the other hand, normal mother - 
infant interaction gives infants pleasure simply 
because it enables them to learn about and thus gain 
control over a fertile source of environmental 
stimulation. 
Murray argues against the view put forward by 
Papousek and Watson on the basis that, if one takes the 
form of infants' expressions into account, their 
negative reactions appear to be "protests or solicita- 
tions for responsiveness ". She also reports that 
there is a marked difference between infants' reactions 
when their mothers go blank -faced and when interaction 
with their mothers is naturally interrupted by the 
entrance of a second adult who engages the mother in 
conversation - distress being much less apparent in the 
latter condition. However, Murray's view is not 
incompatible with Papousek's and Watson's so long as 
one accepts that: (a) it is babies rather than 
'cognitive response systems' who naturally seek to 
increase their understanding and control over the 
environment - expressing distress when their control is 
reduced - and, (b) as argued in Chapter 5, that babies 
have a natural understanding of or sensitivity to 
personal interaction. In these terms, the 'blank - 
faced' behaviour of mothers is more distressing to 
infants than natural interruptions because blank- faced- 
ness is more incomprehensible to infants than is 
interruption. This also means that what Papousek and 
Watson refer to as a 'fundamental cognitive response 
system' should be seen as a psychological formulation 
of what is called 'will' in philosophical circles (e.g. 
the individual's natural endeavour to preserve his or 
her own being and to increase his or her power of self - 
maintenance; Spinoza 1910). Thus, on the basis of 
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experimental work on interruptions of infant -adult 
exchanges, we might conclude that negativity results 
from the frustration of infants' wills. 
While all the evidence reviewed above - with the 
possible exception of Brazelton at.al.'s (1974) - is 
compatible with this conclusion, it has one important 
limitation: it is all experimental evidence. This 
means that we still do not know what role negativity 
plays in normal development. We know that, experi- 
mentally, young infants can be made to express negati- 
vity. But do they express negativity under normal 
circumstances? And, if so, is it of the same sort as 
that produced in experimental circumstances? The 
following section. of this chapter presents some 
detailed examples of naturally- occurring negativity as 
observed in the studies reported in Chapter 6. 
2. Analysis 
a. Interactions potentially including negativity 
on behalf of the baby were initially identified by 
analysis of mothers' babytalk. The categories for 
this analysis have been devised by Lynne Murray (1980) 
in the course of her study of mothers interacting with 
their babies via closed- circuit television. Her pur- 
pose was to discover whether mothers' babytalk showed 
any change when, after interacting with their babies 
'live', they were re -shown a recording of their baby in 
interaction with them. Her rubric (with slight 
modifications) is as follows: 
(1) Avoiding: the mother states explicitly that 
the baby is not interacting with her or is interacting 
with her negatively; 
e.g. "You're ignoring me again ", 
"You're fed up with me ". 
1.25 
(2a) Attending elsewhere: explicit statements about 
the infant's attention having been focussed on 
something other than the mother and to the exclusion of 
interaction with her or questions to verify whether or 
not this is the case. (2a utterances are often 
similar to those in I except employing a question form.) 
e.g. "Are you not speaking to Mummy ? ", 
"You're too interested in your fists ". 
(2b) Implied 2a: the infant's attention is presumed 
to be on something or person other than the mother and 
therefore, by implication, not on the mother. 
e.g. "I think you're looking at your fingers ", 
"Come on, look at me ", 
"What do you see ? ". 
(3) Negative mood: the mother feels the infant is 
in a state or mood or preoccupied in a way which is 
interfering with positive interaction or asks whether 
this is the case. 
e.g. "Are you fed up with this game ? ", 
"It's too hot ? ", 
"Oh, you're being a wee bit sick again ", 
"Are you uncomfortable ? ". 
(4) Explanations: utterances which implied that 
the mother knew that the baby's overall evaluation of 
her was negative or suggested other general reasons 
which would make the infant's negative behaviour 
'natural'. 
e.g. "I'm a bad mother ", 
"You're gonna tell me what a grim life you have ?" 
"You'll probably be happier on your own ". 
Judgements were made as far as possible without refer- 
ence to context, by turning off the video -picture and 
listening to the sound only, so that results might be 
reproducible. 
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Utterances such as "Are you ?" in the sequence: 
"You're gonna have a grizzle. Are you? You're gonna 
have a grizzle ", were not coded as 'rejected' (Cat.3) 
because their meaning could not be coded independently 
of their context. In the same way comments such as 
"Have you not got any stories for your Mummy ?" were 
excluded from the analysis because logically one may 
communicate positively without doing it by telling 
stories - even though, in effect, such comments seemed 
almost interchangeable with comments like: "Are you not 
going to talk to your Mummy ?" 
(Inter- observer reliability was calculated for all 
five categories, using the formula given in Chapter 3: 
all scores were over .85 except Category 4 (.74)). 
In Murray's study, her categories showed a distinct 
and statistically significant difference in the mothers' 
babytalk when talking to their baby via television and 
when talking to a recording of their baby. Mothers 
made more comments indicating that they felt their 
babies were not communicating with them in the latter 
condition than in the former condition. As the babies 
were not and could not be communicating with them in 
the latter condition, Murray's finding suggests that 
her categories of maternal speech are valid as 
indicators of failure of infant response. 
In this study, it was decided to focus initially on 
Category 1 comments, as these were the clearest evidence 
for negativity. However, as shown in Tables 1 -6, only 
two of the mothers made this type of comment (Sarah's 
and Joanna's). All the interactions in which they 
occurred were analysed, but, so that our sample should 
not be unduly limited, some other examples were also 
sought in interactions during which the mother (or 
stranger) received significantly less attention than the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































b. In all, sixteen interactions potentially 
including negativity were analysed in detail. In the 
course of these analyses a number of different patterns 
of movement were identified as expressions of 
negativity. These were: 
(i) Gaze aversion; when the baby spent a dis- 
proportionately short time during an interaction 
looking at her mother. This might be of two types - 
passive and active. Passive gaze aversion was when a 
baby spent a disproportionately long time staring at 
nothing in particular - a simple object or an area of 
the floor. Active gaze aversion was when the baby 
showed a disproportionately high visual interest in her 
surroundings, looking at everything but the mother. 
(ii) A hunched posture; this was often associated 
with passive gaze aversion, where the baby would look 
at the floor, her own feet, her clothes or hands for 
long periods of time (self- regard) - looking at her 
mother only briefly or from under her eyebrows. 
(iii) Active resistance to adult's coercion; this 
was often combined with (ii): when an adult attempted 
to coerce the child to make eye- contact, there would be 
a very visible attempt on the part of the child to 
resist it. (Hutt and Ounsted found similar behaviour 
in autistic children; 1970.) 
(iv) Fractional glances; these are also described 
by Hutt and Ounsted in autistic children, who they 
found to collect visual information by means of 
peripheral vision, but also by "paranoid, darting 
looks ": glances which usually last a fraction of a 
second only, which begin a fraction of a second after 
the co- interactant has looked away from the baby and 
end a fraction of a second after the other has begun to 
look back at her. 
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(v) Protesting vocalisations; usually of rela- 
tively low intensity (i.e. not continuous and not loud) 
and suggesting frustration in that a simple change of 
stimulus makes them cease. These appear homologous 
with the vocalisations in ten -month -olds described by 
Zelazo et.al. (1975) which they found to be a product 
of boredom as opposed to excitement. 
(vi) Facial expressions; typically babies would 
adopt a fixed, 'blank', non - smiling expression if not 
crying. When crying they would not infrequently 
protrude their lower lip in an expression commonly 
described as a 'pout' or 'pet]ip' by Edinburgh mothers 
and used by them as an indication of 'temper' as opposed 
to a genuine grievance (see Photo. íol). Occasionally 
this 'pet lip' expression would occur without crying - 
associated with an angry or otherwise 'blank' face. 
(cf. Ekman and Friesen 1975, Eibl -Eibesfeldt 1975.) 
(vii) Trunk movements; including threshing and 
struggling movements and back -arching, as reported by 
Schaffer and Emerson (1964b), Thoman (1975), Brazelton 
et.al. (1974) and Trevarthen (1978). 
(viii) Biting; one instance of apparently intentional 
biting was recorded, when the baby (Angela) moved her 
mouth towards the mother's thumb', the mother let her 
take it in and the baby bit it. Melanie Klein would 
probably view this as a symbolic attack on the bad 
breast (oral aggression); but, however one views it, it 
certainly proved painful for the mother: "There we are. 
Are you having a look around? Ouch:: (Self- conscious 
laugh) You nearly bit my finger:" (Angela aged 22) 
weeks) 
(ix) Comparisons; whether or not an action was an 
instance of negativity was often determined by comparing 
it with the infant's behaviour in the conditions 















































































































































































These various behavioural characteristics were found 
to be combined in various ways to constitute 
negativity. Four examples are given below. 
3. Examples 
(i) Angela (aged 23 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. Angela spent only 6% of this 
interaction looking at her mother. For 94% of the 
time she adopted a fixed hunched -up posture, looking at 
her feet or the floor directly below them (Photo. 422. ). 
While Angela did not cry, she did make frequent 
'frustrated' whining grunts. She did not smile at 
all. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
Angela looked at her mother only nine times during this 
four and a half minute interaction. Two of these 
looks were 'fractional glances' (e.g. Photos. (oS -Vi ). 
Five of the remaining seven looks were concealed by 
the fact that, as Angela was so hunched forward, her 
eye- movements were almost invisible from where the 
mother was sitting - to such an extent that the mother 
tried bending down to look into Angela's face (see 
Photo. (03 ). When she did look at her mother, her 
looks were shot up from under her eyebrows and were 
very brief (average length (x) = .9 seconds). 
The mother tried a number of tactics to attract 
Angela's attention to her face. One was to bring her 
face down to Angela's level, as mentioned above. 
Another was to snap her fingers on a level with her own 
face (Photo.(04). A third was to remove the woollen 
boot at which she thought Angela was looking (Photo. GS ). 




PHOTOS. 65 -67 : A 'fractional glance' by Angela 
(Example 3i). 
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Let's take them off. Let's take them off. There. 
Yes." The fourth was actively to force Angela's head 
back so that they were face -to -face. Angela ignored 
or resisted all these attempts. 
Angela's most obviously active refusal of her 
mother's overtures was in her struggle to avoid having 
her head lifted up to look at her mother. Her mother 
attempted this three times. Only once, the first 
time, was it at all 'successful' - in the sense that 
Angela did briefly look at her mother, although she 
almost immediately looked away (after 1.1 seconds) 
arching her back as she did so (see Photo.( ). The 
second struggle lasted 5.5 seconds, and even though the 
mother did manage to get Angela's head to an upright 
position, Angela hooded her eyes so that no eye- contact 
was made (Photo. 10). Babytalk: "Angela. Mummy's 
goin' - . Hello darling. There. Now you sit up 
properly. Be a good girl. What is the matter ?" etc. 
Interestingly Angela did look at her mother during 
this struggle but only while her mother was looking 
away (duration = .3 seconds). The third attempt was 
equally unsuccessful in that Angela immediately re- 
adopted her hunched position after her mother's 
attention, 
Contrast with other conditions. It seems unlikely 
that Angela's behaviour with her mother was simply a 
product of boredom with the experimental situation 
because the second greatest amount of attention was 
given in the final condition - to the familiar face - 
mask (FM). Furthermore, the mother was the only 
stimulus Angela did not smile at. 
Nonetheless, it might still be thought possible that 
Angela was just more interested in her surroundings 
when with her mother than in the other conditions; 







PHOTOS. 68 -70 : Mother's attempts to gain Angela's attention - by 
removing a woollen boot(68) and by coercion(69 -70) 
(Example 3i). 
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she would not otherwise have had to explore visually 
the room in which she was sitting. But, in fact, 
Angela looked around the room much more in the other 
three conditions than she did when with her mother. 
When visual fixations of entities other than the 
stimulus -object, her feet and the floor are summed 
(e.g. the mirror, pictures on the wall), it is found 
that such fixations were made much more frequently in 
the three non -mother conditions (i.e. between 7.3 and 
10.4 times per minute) than during the interaction with 
her mother (i.e. 1.3 times per minute). And although 
Angela sometimes adopted a hunched posture in the non - 
mother conditions, she did so for much less than with 
her mother (M = 94 %, S = 49 %, FM = 14%, UM = 36 %). 
Thus it cannot be argued that Angela had not sufficient 
postural control to right herself from a hunched 
position. 
As soon as the experimenter entered the room at the 
end of the interaction with the mother, Angela sat up 
and looked at him and, subsequently, the familiar face - 
mask which replaced her mother (Photos. 1( -13 ). She 
also ceased her frequent 'frustrated' vocalisations 
when her mother left the room. Having vocalised so 
much that there were no more than fifteen seconds of 
continuous silence during the interaction with her 
mother, Angela vocalised only twice in the 208 seconds 
after her mother had left the room. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: Unfamiliar face -mask 
(UM: 347 seconds), Stranger (S: 280 seconds), Mother 
(M: 288 seconds), Familiar mask (FM: 295 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: UM (26 %), S (33 %), 
M (6ó), FM (28%). 
Proportions of smiling: UM (0.4%) , S (0.2%) , M (0 %) , 
FM (0.9%). 
Proportions of crying: none throughout recording session. 
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PHOTOS. 71 -73 : Transformation in Angela's posture and attention on 
the experimenter's entrance to the recording- studio 
(71) and the substitution of the mother by a 
familiar face -mask (Example 3i). 
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Conclusion 
Angela's frustration during this recording session was 
particularly marked when she was with her mother. 
Although it is not easy to tell why this was it is 
interesting to note that Angela was very sensitive to 
changes in the 'normal course of events'. Thus her 
interest was immediately re- awakened when the experi- 
menter interrupted her 'interaction' with her mother to 
replace her with a face -mask. Similarly, of the nine 
looks Angela did direct at her mother, seven were made 
immediately after maternal actions which contrasted 
with the normal run of conversational maternal beha- 
viour (i.e. leaving and entering the room, bending down 
to look for a Kleenex, saying "Ouch:" after Angela had 
bitten her (see p. 234- above), bending down to wipe 
Angela's mouth and (twice) during the struggles caused 
by her mother's attempts to coerce visual contact). 
This suggests mother tried to do 
something which differed from the usual run of 
'conversational' interaction - such as play a game - 
she might have been more successful in gaining Angela's 
attention (see Example (ii)). 
(ii) Leigh (aged 20 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. In the first 100 seconds of 
this interaction, Leigh spent 8.1 seconds looking at 
her mother while the mother spent 90.1 seconds looking 
at Leigh. During this period Leigh did not smile at 
all. However, when the interaction is taken as a 
whole, Leigh spent 24.6% of the time looking at her 
mother. Leigh cried for 26% of the interaction taken 
as a whole. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. In 
the first 100 seconds of Leigh's interaction with her 
mother she spent only 20.33% of the time in a hunched 
2LV, 
posture (e.g. looking at her hand; Photo.-74 -); the rest 
of the time she was very active visually, making 86 
fixations of stimuli other than her mother during this 
period (i.e. 51.6 per minute, 40 times more than Angela 
in Example (i)). All but one of Leigh's fixations of 
her mother were under one second long (x = .7 seconds 
long), whereas Leigh's other fixations were, on average, 
longer than one second (x = 1.1 seconds). This is in 
contrast to the second portion of the interaction, 
when Leigh's looks at her mother averaged 2.1 seconds 
in length as opposed to her other fixations, which 
averaged 1.5 seconds in length. In other words, if 
length of fixation can be taken as a measure of interest, 
Leigh appeared to be positively disinterested in her 
mother relative to other things for the initial 100 
seconds of the interaction. Of course, it might be 
argued that this was not surprising as Leigh had only 
just entered the room in which she was sitting, whereas 
she had been with her mother more or less non -stop 
throughout the day - making her mother relatively 
uninteresting to look at. But this suggestion seems 
unlikely to be true in view of the facts that Leigh 
looked at the offered stimuli for a considerably 
greater proportion of the first 100 seconds of all her 
other visits to the laboratory (i.e. never less than 
24.9% and, on average, 61.2% when starting with her 
mother) and that Leigh's level of interest in things 
other than her mother appeared to increase rather than 
decrease after the initial 100 seconds of the inter- 
action, as measured by average length of fixation (i.e. 
R increased from 1.1 seconds to 1.5 seconds). 
During this early period, Leigh disregarded her . 
mother's attempts to enforce eye -contact by bringing 
her face very close to Leigh's (Photo. 1S). It might 




































































































































much more at her mother during the latter part of their 
interaction (i.e. 36.4% vs. 8.1 %). But this increased 
looking was almost exclusively associated with the 
playing of games - as was all Leigh's smiling. 
A 'fractional glance' came towards the end of the 
initial 100 seconds. Up to this point, Leigh had 
adopted without exception a 'blank' facial expression 
while looking at her mother and around the room but 
with some suggestion of lowered lip- corners ('sadness'; 
see Appendix I , Photo.1& ). However, after 85 seconds 
she began to arch her back and vocalise negatively with 
an 'angry' cry -face (Photo. 77). There were 
two bursts of this behaviour within ten seconds, for 
the second of which Leigh looked at her mother (for 
1.23, i.e. the longest look during the first 100 seconds). 
Then after 94 seconds, she simultaneously looked away 
from her mother at the right wall and stopped crying. 
The mother, who had been saying "Tell me stories." 
(Leigh begins crying) "Eh -eh: Eh -eh: Eh: ", turned 
to follow Leigh's gaze, saying "What's that ? ". Almost 
immediately, Leigh turned back from the wall to look at 
her mother (Photo.? ). As soon as her mother began 
to look back at Leigh, Leigh turned away to the wall 
again (Photos.-S0). This 'fractional glance' may 
have been caused by Leigh's surprise at seeing her 
mother's head move or by a wish to take advantage of an 
opportunity to look at the mother while the mother was 
looking away. But, in its context, both interpreta- 
tions support the idea that Leigh was not eager to make 
sustained eye -to -eye contact with her mother during the 
initial period of this interaction. This is most 
clearly borne out by the fact that seeing her mother's 
head turn back towards her did not lead to prolonged 




PHOTOS. 78 -80 : A 'fractional glance' by Leigh (Example 
3ii). 
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Contrast with other conditions. The most interesting 
contrast during this recording session was during her 
interaction with her mother; between her behaviour 
before and after the first 100 seconds. Thus her 
behaviour in the other three conditions was, in many 
respects, less positive than with her mother. This 
was particularly true when comparisons were made with 
the portion of the mother -infant interaction after the 
initial 100 seconds. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: M (272 seconds), 
FM (278 seconds), S (331 seconds), UM (91 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: 
. S (21.1%), UM 07.3%).
M (25 %), FM (49.6%), 
Proportions of smiling: M (14 %) , FM (0%) , S (1.8%), 
UM (0%). 
Proportions of crying: M (9.5%), FM (0 %) , S (0.6%) , 
UM (63 %). 
Conclusion. The most important finding represented by 
this analysis is the difference between Leigh's 
negativity and Angela's, as described in the previous 
example. Leigh made no protesting vocalisations and 
was very active visually, whereas Angela was obdurately 
passive. Yet both interactions gave the impression 
that the infants were acting negatively with respect to 
their mothers. 
The main question raised by this example is why 
Leigh behaved negatively towards her mother during the 
first 100 seconds with her mother but then began 
behaving much more positively. As mentioned above, 
this transformation was associated with the playing of 
games. Example (iii) illustrates in greater detail 
the way that games may transform infant negativity into 
a positive mood (cf. Chapter 6, pp. W -19) . 
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(iii) Leigh (aged 18 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This interaction included 
the greatest proportion of smiling recorded in any 
single condition throughout the case -study (27.9%). 
But this was associated with three fractional glances, 
with concealed 'under the eyebrows' looks (Photo.82), 
with back -arching, with resistance of an attempt by the 
mother to force Leigh into a position in which Leigh 
would look at her face (Photo, 81) and with 
protesting 'frustrated' vocalisations. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
These two sets of behaviours were clearly segregated. 
Their segregation is well reflected in the different 
lengths of Leigh's looks at her mother. She looked at 
her mother twenty -two times: thirteen of these looks 
were less than one second long, six were between one 
and five seconds long and three were over thirteen 
seconds long. The four longest looks (i.e. 4.6, 13.9, 
14.7 17.3 seconds) were all associated with the playing 
of games. They all began within two seconds of the 
mother starting a game, and they all finished only 
after the mother had finished playing the game and 
resumed normal conversation. In each case, their onset 
was followed by smiling within between one and six 
seconds, whereas only one of the shorter looks was 
associated with smiling (this was a fractional glance, 
0.4 seconds long, made three seconds after the mother 
had interrupted a game to clean up Leigh's mouth. The 
smile ended 0.1 seconds after the beginning of the look 
(Photo$,83-85). In fact, there were only four instances 
of smiling - coinciding with the four longest looks. 
The mother only initiated a game on four separate 
occasions during this interaction - and each of these 
coincided with a long look and smile from Leigh. In 
each case the game consisted of a repeated sequence of 
82 
PHOTO. $1 : Mother's attempt to coerce Leigh to interact with her. 





PHOTOS. 8 -85 : A 'fractional lance b Lei,h (Exam le iii). 
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of actions and nonsensical noises, beginning with the 
mother making a gargling noise, with five or six 
narrowly separated stresses. Having made this noise 
one or two times, she would repeat it with more 
dramatic gestures - shaking her head from side to side 
and bringing her face close up to Leigh's. Finally 
she began to sway right away from Leigh at the start of 
each bout, throwing her head back to look up at the 
ceiling and breaking eye- contact. At the end of each 
bout, marked by one noise -action cycle, she would pause 
in a normal conversational position and smile at Leigh 
(see Photos. SG -8' ; cf. Chapter6 , pp. *I - . 
Contrast with other conditions. Once again, the main 
contrast to be made in this recording session was that 
made during Leigh's interaction with her mother. In 
most respects this interaction was the most positive of 
the four recorded during the session. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: M (149 seconds), 
FM (277 seconds), UM (183 seconds), S (218 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: M (46.4 %), 
FM (41.1 %), UM (12.8 %), S (62.5 %). 
Proportions of smiling: M (27.9 %), FM (0 %), UM (0 %), 
S (12.6 %). 
Conclusion. This analysis makes it clear that 
negativity is not simply associated with 'the mother', 
but with a particular form of interaction with her. 
As soon as games were substituted for conversation, 
Leigh became happy to interact with her mother - and as 
soon as games ceased, she became disgruntled. The 
final example develops a corollary of this point; 








































































































(iv) Joanna (aged 16 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. In this interaction a 
stranger received much less visual attention than did 
the mother, who preceded her (i.e. M (69.4 , S (17.8 %), 
UM (47.3 %), FM (39.5 %)). She did not smile at the 
stranger at all and for the most part of their 
'interaction', adopted a sulky, impassive facial 
expression with a slight pout, down- turned lip- corners 
and looking somewhat below the stranger's face (Photo. 
qo). 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
Joanna's attention appeared to be attracted by the 
pattern on the stranger's dress. But as soon as the 
stranger transferred her attention to the dress, Joanna 
made a fractional glance (Photos. CIO-cll.). 
Contrast with other conditions. The transition from 
mother to stranger, at the start of the stranger - 
interaction, was marked by a drop in smiling as well as 
looking. Joanna had smiled for 18.4% of the inter- 
action with her mother. Interestingly, only 1.6% of 
her smiling was associated with the playing of games 
(5.2% of her looking). She therefore looked happily 
at her mother during simple 'conversational' babytalk - 
unlike Leigh and Angela in the previous examples. The 
stranger- interaction was the only condition during 
which Joanna did not smile. 
During interaction with her mother, looks at the 
mother averaged 7.1 seconds in length as against 2.1 
seconds with the unfamiliar person (6.1 seconds with 
the unfamiliar face -mask), while looks at objects 
other than the mother averaged only 1.6 seconds with 
the mother as against 2.9 seconds with the stranger 
(and 1.5 seconds with the unfamiliar face -mask). 
This 
suggests that Joanna was more interested in her mother 




PHOTOS. 90 -92 : A 'fractional glance' by Joanna (Example 3iv). 
-159- 
whereas, during the intervening condition with the 
stranger, this balance was reversed. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: M (327 seconds), 
S (334 seconds), UM (287 seconds), FM (351 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: M (69.2%), S (17.8%) , 
UM (47.3%) , FM (39.5 %) . 
Proportions of smiling: M (18.4 %), S (0%), UM (0.9 %), 
FM (0.3%). 
Proportions of crying: M (0 %), S (0 %), UM (0 %), 
FM (4.2 %). 
Conclusion. This example underlines the fact that it 
is not just mothers who get rejected. It also shows 
that it is not just strangers who receive a relatively 
large amount of attention during normal 'conversational' 
interactions (cf. Example (i)) - mothers may also be 
treated in this way. 
4. Discussion 
These examples illustrate that the behavioural con- 
stitution of negativity is not uniform although its 
elements are drawn from a delimited class of behaviours. 
They also bear out the conclusion that negativity is 
related to the quality of stimulation to which infants 
are exposed. Thus, in all four examples, it appeared 
that infants were only rejecting one aspect of their 
situation, because, when this aspect changed, negativity 
ceased. This is compatible with the conclusion that 
negativity is the result of the frustration of infants' 
wills. Nevertheless, what infants will seems to be 
very variable. Thus sometimes they are content 
simply to be talked to by mothers and at other 
times they only want to play games. Sometimes they 
are happier with their mothers and sometimes they 
appear to want to talk to strangers. Sometimes they 
prefer looking at people and sometimes they prefer 
masks. Thus, while in form infant negativity appears 
to be purposive - particularly in infants' active 
resistance to their mothers' physical coercion - it is 
difficult to detect the structure of their purposes. 
This difficulty is partly a product of the small and 
miscellaneous sample of examples considered so far. 
Therefore, before drawing any conclusions, we will go 
on to consider some further examples. 
5. Further Examples 
a. As reported on pages 2.24 -VA , maternal babytalk 
was used to locate potential examples of negativity in 
the data collected during the study reported in Chapter 
6. Sixteen such instances were submitted to detailed 
analysis. 
It was found that three sorts of relationship could 
be distinguished between negativity and explicit 
maternal comments referring to negativity: 
(i) Comments which occurred during interactions 
which were uniformly negative in terms of the infant's 
behaviour. In these cases there appeared to be no 
proximate cause for the comments in question; they came 
out merely in the course of discussing the continued 
negativity of the baby. 
(ii) These comments came in more positive inter- 
actions, all of which included some smiling and a 
relatively high level of positive regard (over 80% in 
some cases). These comments always had a proximate 
cause; namely, that the baby's behaviour in the pre- 
ceding seconds had suggested a declining interest in 
the mother. 
(iii) Unlike the previous types of comment, there 
were a few occasions on which explicit accusations of 
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negativity were not justified by subsequent analysis of 
the infant's behaviour - occurring during a period of 
positive interaction by the baby. 
The analyses relevant to the concerns of this 
chapter are those of the first and second types. As 
will be seen, these analyses incorporate descriptions 
of relevant portions of the mother's babytalk. 
Analyses of type (iii) will be discussed in the next 
chapter, which concerns the developmental significance 
of babytalk. 
b. Examples of comments made during continued 
negativity 
(i) Joanna (aged 6 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This interaction was peculiar 
in having the lowest amount of attention bestowed by any 
baby on any mother throughout the thesis -study. None 
of Joanna's five brief smiles coincided with looks at 
the mother. Towards the end of the interaction, 
Joanna began to cry. 
Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the comments 
made by Joanna's mother suggested that her daughter was 
not communicating with her or communicating only 
negatively (36.256: the highest proportion recorded 
during the thesis -study; see TablesI -6). The two 
category 1 comments ( "You're not interested in your 
Mummy's voice at all ", "You're not interested at all ") 
were made 153 and 213 seconds after the beginning of the 
interaction. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
Joanna only looked at her mother twice, both times 
after her mother had manhandled her head into a 'looking' 
position. Within three and a half seconds of each 
manhandling operation, Joanna again looked away from 
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her mother. For the remainder of the interaction, 
Joanna looked to the left of her mother's face, up at 
the ceiling- lights, at the wall, or at the camera. 
She also occasionally scanned the floor - though never 
adopting a hunched posture. Fixations of objects 
other than the mother were, on average, twice as long 
as fixations of the mother (x(M) _ 2.7 seconds; 
R(0) = 5.7 seconds). 
Contrast with other conditions. In the next condition, 
with a stranger (S), Joanna became increasingly dis- 
tressed. During the first 159 seconds of this inter- 
action she looked at her partner only 5.3% of the time, 
cried for 11.5% of the time and was sick. She was 
then removed from the baby -chair and comforted. On 
her return she looked at the stranger for 27.5% of the 
remaining 123 seconds and cried for 19.2% of that time. 
She became increasingly drowsy and in the third 
condition (with the familiar face -mask (FM)) she 
neither looked at the stimulus nor cried and, finally, 
after 84 seconds, fell asleep. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: M (274 seconds), 
S (283 seconds), FM (84 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: M (2 %), S (15%), 
FM (0%) . 
Proportions of smiling: M (3 %), S (0 %), FM (0 %). 
Proportions of crying: M (1 %), S(15 %), FM (0 %). 
Conclusion. Joanna's lack of interest in interaction 
with her mother appears to have been the product of a 
greater interest in objects in her surroundings - as 
evinced by her smiling at and relatively long fixations 
of these objects. Towards the end of the M condition, 
the effects of disinterest were probably compounded by 
the effects of intestinal pain - as evinced by Joanna's 
subsequent sickness. 
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(ii) Joanna (aged 12 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This interaction began 
happily, with Joanna smiling for more than half of the 
first 30 seconds. But it was interrupted after 67 
seconds because Joanna was crying in a manner suggesting 
that she had wind. She was taken out of the baby - 
chair and patted on the back until she burped and then 
replaced in the chair. As it turned out, she cried 
more after this break than before it (, seconds vs. 
seconds), smiled less (7.0 seconds vs. 16.5 
seconds) and, proportionately, looked less (31.5% vs. 
73.0%). 
While being frequent, Joanna's crying was not 
continuous after the break. It came in bursts, in 
between which she would appear content. These bursts 
averaged 3.4 seconds in duration (s.d. = 3.1 seconds) 
and were separated by pauses with an average length of 
8 seconds (s.d. 13 seconds). Joanna did not cry for 
more than 11 seconds at any one time. 
In the mother's babytalk, four explanations for 
Joanna's behaviour were put forward after the break. 
The first was that Joanna was suffering from intestinal 
pain: 
"What is it? And is your tummy all bad? Oh dear: 
Oh dear:" 
But, as Joanna's crying continued, this comment was 
followed by an expression of the view: 
"There's nothing much wrong with you. There isn't. 
There is not. There is not. There is not. Now 
Now: Now -now: You're just crying for the sake of 
crying aren't you." 
This led on to the explanation that Joanna was 'being 
2:6o 
bad': 
"You're not gonna be good? You're not gonna be 
good? Hello. What is it? What's wrong with 
you? You're being bad, aren't you. Aren't you? 
Aren't you? You are." 
Finally she proposed the explanation: 
"What is it? You're not interested in your Mummy 
CCat.1 comment]. Are you not interested in your 
Mummy? Are you not? Are you not interested in 
your Mummy? No ? ", etc. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. In 
the forty seconds prior to the Category 1 utterance 
quoted above, Joanna made thirty -seven visual fixations 
of objects other than her mother and nine of her mother 
- of which one was a fractional glance. While the 
average length of her looks at objects other than her 
mother was greater than fixations of her mother 
(x(M) = .63; x(0) _ .92), their brevity suggests that 
she was not taking a real interest in anything she 
looked at. Further analysis of the interaction 
supported this view - suggesting that Joanna's beha- 
viour was less the product of selectiveness than of 
ambivalence; that is, "the co- existence of contradic- 
tory impulses towards the same object" (Rycroft 1972). 
Thus there was a dramatic 96- second sequence of brief 
looks (n = 16; x = .7 seconds; s.d. = .2) interspersed 
with brief cries (n = 7; x = 1.9 seconds; s.d. = .9) in 
which it appeared that Joanna was alternately attracted 
by and upset by interaction with her mother. This 
sequence was followed by a sequence in which slightly 
longer cries were interspersed with smiles at the 
mother. At one point the transition from cry to smile 
was so immediate that the mother commented: "You don't 
know whether to laugh or cry, do you ? ". 
Contrast with other conditions. Joanna had not cried 
at all in the conditions recorded before the inter- 
action with her mother (UM and S), had looked more and, 
with S, smiled more. She looked more in the final 
condition (FM) than with her mother but continued to 
cry in similar short bursts for a similar proportion of 
the interaction (M(post- break) = 31.1 %, FM = 31.2%; 
FM x(cry) = 2.5 seconds, s.d.(cry) = 2.2 seconds, 
R(pause) = 5.5 seconds, s.d.(pause) = 5.1 seconds). 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: UM (292 seconds), 
S (305 seconds), M (276 seconds), FM (263 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: UM (79%), S (71%), 
M (42 %) , FM (77%). 
Proportions of smiling: UM (0.3%) , S (15 %) , M (8 %) , 
FM (0 %). 
Proportions of crying: UM (0%) , S (0%), M (25 %) , 
FM (31%). 
Conclusion. It seems that the negative behaviour in 
this example was not all directed at the mother - thus 
crying continued at almost exactly the same rate in the 
following condition with the familiar face -mask. In 
this case, one might argue that Joanna's negativity was 
either due to internal discomfort or frustration with 
sitting in the baby- chair. However, this argument 
makes it difficult to explain why Joanna looked nearly 
twice as much in the final condition as she did with 
her mother. The fine detail of her behaviour with her 
mother suggests that it manifested ambivalence. 
(There was no evidence of ambivalence in the final 
condition, i.e. no cry /smile transitions and much 
longer looks: x(M) = 2.8 seconds, s.d. = 3.9 seconds; 
R(FM) = 5.8 seconds, s.d. = 7.8 seconds.) 
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(iii) Joanna (aged 21 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. Joanna cried for all but 
eighteen seconds of this ninety -two second interaction. 
She only looked at her mother for 21% of the time they 
were together and sat for the most part in a hunched 
position. 
By the end of the interaction, the mother had 
concluded that Joanna's crying was the manifestation of 
'temper': 
"Eh? You're not even gonna look at me? You're 
just not talking to me. Now listen, that's temper. 
That's just sheer temper: That's temper you:" 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
The interaction included one attempt by the mother to 
make Joanna 'more comfortable' by forcing her to sit 
back in a face -to -face position. Joanna resisted the 
attempt (Photos.q3 -'t5 ). Joanna stopped crying 
almost as soon as she was removed from the baby- chair. 
Contrast with other conditions. M was the final 
condition in this recording session. Joanna had 
started crying in the previous condition (with S). 
However, she looked and smiled much more in this condi- 
tion than with M - as she did in the FM and UM 
conditions. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: UM (267 seconds), 
FM (222 seconds), S (220 seconds), M (92 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: UM (62 %), FM (57 %), 
S (71 %), M (21 %). 
Proportions of smiling: UM (2 %), FM (3 %), S (8 %), 
M (1%). 
Proportions of crying: UM (0 %), FM (0 %), S (30 %), 
M (80 %). 





PHOTOS. 93 -95 s Joanna resists an attempt by her mother to coerce 
her attention (Example 5biv). 
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at the end of the condition and as it continued to 
increase in the final condition with the mother, 
Joanna's negativity might be interpreted as the product 
of growing frustration with being strapped into the 
baby- chair. If this were the case, the mother's 
interpretation of Joanna as expressing 'temper' would 
be correct insofar as Joanna was annoyed with her 
mother for not immediately removing her from the baby - 
chair. The fact that Joanna calmed down as soon as 
she was removed from the chair gives support to this 
interpretation. 
(iv) Sarah (aged 13 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. Sarah cried for 39% of this 
interaction - the highest percentage for any session 
involving Sarah - and only looked at her mother without 
crying for 33% of the time. She smiled once (1.1% of 
the interaction). 
Her mother's first Category 1 comment ( "You're not 
going to have a chat today ") was made after Sarah had 
been crying non -stop for twelve seconds. This crying 
was assoxiated with a pout, elements of an angry face 
and back -arching (see Photos. q6 and Q1 ; Appendix I ). 
Her crying was generally discontinuous and gave the 
impression that Sarah was frustrated. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
None: Sarah's frustration seemed to increase steadily 
until her mother's place was taken by a stranger. 
Contrast with other conditions. The most convincing 
evidence that Sarah was not simply 'in a state' came 
from the complete change in her behaviour when con- 
fronted with an unfamiliar adult (Photos. %) - qq ). 
During their subsequent interaction, Sarah did not cry 
at all and looked at her partner for 67% of the time 
they were together. 

















































































































































































in between two interactions with her mother. Not 
surprisingly, when the mother came into the room to 
begin her second interaction with Sarah - having been 
observing her behaviour with the stranger from another 
room - she commented: 
"It's just me you don't want to talk to, isn't 
it ?" 
As can be seen from her babytalk during this second 
interaction (Appendix Çì), Sarah continued to ignore and 
cry at her mother, as she had in the first interaction. 
The mother comments on both Sarah's negativity and her 
selectiveness: 
"I'm not the person you grump to ... Do I only get 
the grizzle side? ... You're not going to chat 
to me today ... You're iving me the cold 
shoulder ... You're giving me the cold shoulder." 
Unfortunately, the visual record of this second 
interaction was on video -tape, which, for reasons of 
departmental finance, had to be used for other 
recordings before the analysis for this chapter could 
be undertaken. A detailed analysis of it cannot be 
given therefore. 
Conclusion. The cessation of Sarah's crying with the 
stranger and its renewal on her mother's return - 
reflected in the mother's babytalk (see Appendix 5í) - 
suggests that it was directed specifically at her and 
was not simply a product of frustration with the 
recording conditions. 
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c. Examples of comments which were made on the 
occasion of particular instances of negativity rather 
than during protracted spells of negativity. 
(i) Joanna (aged 15 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This recording session 
included two interactions with the mother. Two 
Category 1 comments were made during the second mother - 
infant interaction. 
Joanna cried considerably less during this inter- 
action than she had in the previous two conditions, and 
smiled more. However, she spent less than 13% of the 
interaction looking at her mother. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
The two Category 1 comments were made after Joanna had 
turned away from her mother, beginning to cry, but then 
focussed on an unfamiliar adult standing by the door of 
the recording studio, and immediately stopped crying 
(Photos. (00 -(03) : 
"Are you going to talk to me? Are you? Are you 
going to talk to me? (Joanna begins to turn away) 
You're going to start crying again aren't you. 
(Joanna begins to cry) Yes. Yes. (Joanna sees 
the stranger and stops crying) See - there's 
someone to look at Hello. (Joanna smiles at 
the stranger) Oh, you're fed up with your Mummy 
aren't ou: You're 'ust fed u. with our Mumm 
now aren t you. 
During this interaction ; oanna spent more than twice 
as much time looking at the stranger than at her mother 
(32.7% vs. 12.7%), her looks at the stranger were, on 
average, considerably longer than those at the mother 
(x(M) = 2.0 seconds, s.d. = 1.4 seconds, n = 18; 
R(S) = 10.0 seconds, s.d. = 13.7 seconds, n = 9), and 
she smiled for a higher proportion of the time she was 





















































































































































































cried, proportionately, twice as much at her mother as 
at the stranger (22% (M) vs. 11% (S)). 
Contrast with other conditions. Joanna cried a lot 
during this visit to the laboratory. But her mother 
and the experimenter agreed that her crying was not 
due to any physical suffering. This impression was 
reinforced by Joanna's behaviour in the third condition 
(UM: pirate). At two points, this condition was 
broken by the mother going into the recording studio to 
discover why Joanna was distressed (for 62 and 25 
seconds respectively). On both occasions, Joanna 
stopped crying as soon as she saw her mother and, within 
three seconds, smiled at her (e.g. Photos.(03A -105). In 
the 30 seconds before the first break, Joanna cried for 
94% of the time. In the first 30 seconds of the break 
she did not cry at all and smiled for 9 seconds, having 
not smiled at all with the face -mask. Indeed, she 
only cried once during this break (1.1 %) - despite 
spending 6.8 seconds looking at the face -mask. This 
showed that the face -mask only elicited crying under 
certain circumstances. 
Joanna spent 73.4 -% of this break looking at her 
mother. As soon as she saw that her mother had left 
the room she started crying again. She cried for 87% 
of the next 23 seconds - looking at the mask for 56.6% 
of the time. Then her mother returned - whereupon her 
behaviour was again transformed (32% smiling, 73% 
looking at mother, 0% crying). Her mother's second 
exit was followed by renewed crying (Photos.tO( -IOq). 
The next condition (FM) contained almost continuous 
crying and was interrupted after 69 seconds by the 
mother's attempt to comfort Joanna. It was this 
attempt which led to the second mother- infant inter- 




PHOTOS. 103A -105 : Transformation in Joanna's expressions, whilst 
in the presence of an unfamiliar face -mask, on 
seeing her mother standing by the door of the 












































































































































































































Order and lengths of conditions: M (323 seconds), 
S (341 seconds), UM (206 seconds), FM (69 seconds), 
M (277 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: M (68 %), S (50%), 
UM (66 %), FM (78 %), M (13 %). 
Proportions of smiling: M (6%) , S (1 %) , UM (0 %) , 
FM (0 %), M (3%). 
Proportions of crying: M (0 %), S (12 %), UM (54 %), 
FM (87 %), M (22 %). 
Conclusion. Taken in conjunction with her behaviour 
in the third condition (UM), Joanna's behaviour in the 
second mother -infant interaction suggested that she was 
crying because she wished to be taken out of the baby - 
chair. On both these occasions, her positive beha- 
viour was directed at someone standing by the door and, 
usually, people didn't appear at the door unless they 
were going to attend to her needs. Thus, on both 
occasions, it appeared that she stopped crying and 
started smiling in anticipation of being picked up. 
This impression was supported by the frustrated sound 
of her cries - the fact that they were generally of 
low intensity and discontinuous. It was also supported 
by the observation that, on the two occasions when 
preparations were made to take her out of the chair 
during the final interaction (i.e. when the waist -band 
was undone) she stopped crying - only to restart when 
it was refastened. As the mother's babytalk shows, by 
the end of the second mother -infant interaction Joanna 
was looking from face to face, crying at stranger, 
mother and experimenter alike - as if she had 'given up 
hope' of anyone liberating her: 
"(as Joanna cried at the experimenter) No, he's not 
going to help you. (as Joanna cried at the stranger) 
No, nobody's going to help you." 
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(ii) Joanna (aged 26 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. During this interaction 
Joanna smiled at her mother at least once every 50 
seconds for a total of 5.5% of the time, but looked for 
only 15.6% of the time. While she did not cry, she 
did make frequent protesting vocalisations (i.e. 
vocalisations in conjunction with elements of an angry 
facial expression; Photo. 110 , Appendix! ). For 41% of 
the time, she adopted a fixed hunched posture (Photo.111). 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
Joanna's mother made four Category 1 comments during 
this interaction. The first came after a period of 13 
seconds during which Joanna did not look at her mother, 
but made ten fixations on either side of her - so that 
she twice swept her gaze 'across' her mother. Her 
mother's babytalk ran: 
"Yes, you're too busy looking round aren't you. 
You're not - you're just not interested in what 
I'm saying." 
The second Category 1 comment came after a period 
during which the mother had captured Joanna's attention 
by holding up her hand in Joanna's line of vision and 
waving her fingers. Joanna was fascinated by this, 
looking at the fingers 100;ó of the time and making no 
vocal protests (Photo. 112), Immediately after 
this episode, Joanna looked at her mother briefly (1.7 
seconds) and smiled. She then re- adopted her hunched 
posture. Babytalk: 
"(mother begins moving fingers) You got to catch 
it. Come on. Come on. Come on. Come on then. 
(mother stops moving fingers) (Joanna looks at her 
smiling) What do you say? What were you saying? 
(Joanna hunches and stops smiling) What were you 
saying then, eh? You're not telling me any stories 
- you just prefer talking to your masks." 
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PHOTOS. 110 -112 : Joanna's expressions of negativity, contrasted 
with her interest in her mother's fingers (Example 5cii). 
27S 
The mother successfully entertained Joanna with 
finger -movements on five separate occasions (i.e. all 
with 100% visual attention from Joanna and with only 
two vocal protests: 4% of the protest in 12% of the 
time). The third Category 1 comment came 17 seconds 
after the second finger- moving episode. Immediately 
after the mother lowered her fingers - at which Joanna 
had been looking and smiling - Joanna lowered her gaze 
from the mother and stopped smiling. After two 
seconds, the mother attempted to get Joanna to look at 
her face by lowering it into Joanna's line of vision, 
but Joanna avoided visual contact by lowering her own 
gaze (Photos.112A- (1+}) . In the next 12 seconds, Joanna 
made five protesting vocalisations. But her interest 
suddenly rekindled when the mother began to scratch the 
side of her (the mother's) nose (Photos. ((S -(17). In 
the next 2.6 seconds neither baby nor mother made a 
sound. Then the mother made the comment: 
"(Joanna protesting, looking down) What's the 
matter? What's the matter? (the mother begins 
to scratch her nose, Joanna looks up) You'd much 
rather play with something than I talk to you, 
wouldn't you." 
The fourth Category 1 comment came after a series of 
protests by Joanna had been followed by Joanna looking 
well away from her mother (at the TV camera) and 
putting her thumb in her mouth - at which point her 
face relaxed from an angry grimace to impassivity 
(Photos.li$ -fl ). Her mother's babytalk ran: 
"(Joanna protesting) Come on: Oh dear: (Joanna 
puts her thumb in her mouth) Oh dear. Is that 
thumb awful good? You're not gonna talk to me any 





PHOTOS. 112A -114 : Joanna's response to her mother's attempt to 





PHOTOS. 115 -117 : Joanna's response to her mother scratching the side 
of her(the mother's) nose (Example 5cii). 
ilß 
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PHOTOS. 118 -119 : Joanna relaxes from the negativity associated with 
interacting with her mother to impassivity, assoc- 
iated with thumb -sucking (Example 5cii). 
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Contrast with other conditions. Joanna's looks at her 
mother were shorter on average than those at the three 
other stimuli (x(M) = 1.7 seconds, i(S) = 2.5 seconds, 
R(FM) = 6.4 seconds, x(UM) = 2.3 seconds). The great- 
est visual attention and smiling was in the first 
condition, with the familiar face -mask. Indeed, this 
condition contained more smiling than any other 
condition recorded with Joanna. Joanna made no vocal 
protests when with the face -masks and fewer when with 
the stranger than when with her mother (19 vs. 50). 
Also, the ratio of the lengths of her looks at things 
other than the stimulus -object was less favourable with 
the mother than in any other condition (M = 1.6, 
S = 1.2, FM = 0.2, UM = 1.0). 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: FM (293 seconds), 
UM (310 seconds), M (373 seconds), S (287 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: FM (54%) , UM (25 %) , 
M (16 %) , S (16 %) . 
Proportions of smiling: FM (23%), UM (7 %), M (6 %), 
S (5%). 
Proportions of crying: FM (0%) , UM (0%) , M (0 %) , 
S (1 %) . 
Conclusion. There is ample evidence that the cause of 
negativity in this mother - infant interaction was 
Joanna's dislike of 'pure' conversation. Thus all 
four Category 1 utterances were made shortly after 
Joanna had behaved in a way suggesting preference for 
something other than adult -infant interaction per se. 
Similarly, in the final condition, the stranger 
'entertained' Joanna very successfully by giving her a 
bunch of keys to play with. Joanna was fascinated by 
the keys, vocalising protestingly only four times 
during the time she had them (i.e. 21% of the protests 
in 61% of the time). 
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(iii) Sarah (aged 18 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This interaction included 
some smiling (9%), 35% looking at mother and 5% crying. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
This interaction incorporated five 'rejected' comments 
by the mother. The first came 12.4 seconds after the 
beginning of the interaction. As the mother came into 
the recording chamber, Sarah greeted her with a look 
lasting 3.5 seconds. She then turned away from her 
mother and began to scan the rest of her environment, 
making four fixations and scanning once across her 
mother, finally adopting a 'hunched' position (Photos. 
(2P - (tif ) . This behaviour was accompanied by the 
mother saying: 
"Hello darling. Are you gonna chew you little 
dress? Are you gonna chew your little dress? 
(Sarah looks away) Are you? Hello darling. 
Hello. Sarah. Sarah. Hello Sarah. Are you 
gonna look round the room? (Sarah hunches) 
You're not gonna look at me." 
Sarah continued to avoid her mother's attempts to 
attract her attention by blowing a raspberry and 
bringing her face close up to Sarah's (Photo.12S). 
The next three 'rejected' comments came in a 15- 
second period, 24 seconds after the first comment. 
The first came after a spell lasting 6.7 seconds, 
during which the mother had entertained Sarah by 
playing with a minute toy panda. After this Sarah 
looked at the mother for 2.7 seconds, smiling briefly. 
Then, looking away and back twice in the next two 
seconds, she finally looked away again for a longer 
period. Three seconds after this more decisive turn - 
away, the mother, having clicked her tongue as if to 


























































































PHOTOS. 124 -126 : Sarah hunches and ignores her mother's attempts 
to amuse her (Example 5ciii). 
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"You're a little dancing bear. You're a little 
dancing -.(Sarah looks away twice) (mother 
clicks tongue) (Sarah does not react) You're 
not gonna talk to Mummy. 
Two seconds later, Sarah looked back at her mother for 
3.2 seconds and smiled: 
"Sarah. Hello. Hello. (Sarah looks back) 
Hello." 
But then Sarah looked away again. A third of a second 
later the mother made a second comment: 
"Hello. (Sarah looks away) You're not gonna 
talk to Mummy." 
This period of disregard lasted ten seconds; four 
seconds after its start, Sarah adopted a hunched 
posture. Once again the mother tried clicking her 
longue to attract Sarah's attention but, failing, she 
made a third comment ( "You're not gonna talk to 
Mummy "). Shortly after this, Sarah looked back at her 
mother for eight seconds and smiled. 
The fifth and final Category I comment came 37 
seconds after the fourth. It was preceded by a long 
period - 27 seconds - during which Sarah sat hunched, 
looking at the floor which, in turn, was preceded by a 
fractional glance. This long period of disregard was 
followed by a brief (0.5 seconds) look at the mother, 
a further 4.3 seconds hunched but looking at the toy 
panda, a final look (2 seconds) at her mother and then 
a further long period (22 seconds) of inattention to 
her mother's face. It was one and a half seconds 
after the beginning of this long, resumed 'hunch' that 
the mother made her comment: 
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"Hello. Hello Sarah. Hello. (27 second period 
of 'hunching' ends) You don't know what you're 
gonna do today do you? No. No. (22 second 
period of hunching begins) Poppet. You're not 
gonna look at Plummy." 
Sarah continued to disregard her mother, despite the 
latter's attempt to attract her attention with the toy 
panda (Photo.il(o) and by clicking her tongue. 
Contrast with other conditions. While Sarah spent 
only 35% of the interaction with her mother looking at 
her mother's face, she spent 68% of the following 
condition looking at an unfamiliar adult's face. 
Conclusion. It seems that, in the light of Sarah's 
smiles at her mother and low level of complaint, she 
did not feel frustrated with her mother per se. 
Similarly, Sarah's subsequent behaviour with a stranger 
suggests that the negativity during this mother -infant 
interaction was not due to a dislike of interaction per 
se. We must therefore conclude that her negativity 
was a product of specific dislike of 'conversational' 
interaction with her mother. 
(iv) Sarah (aged 20 weeks) 
Although the one 'rejected' comment made during this 
interaction is off the remaining record (i.e. "You're 
going to look at anything else other than me "), the 
three and a half minutes of interaction which do remain 
(106 seconds with the mother; 83 seconds with an 
unfamiliar adult) give a good idea of the quality of 
the interaction - including a very striking change in 
Sarah's behaviour with her mother to that with the 
stranger. 
Contrast between conditions. Sarah spent only 22% of 
the (recorded) interaction with her mother looking at 
her without crying (as opposed to 96% with the 
stranger). She smiled only twice (x = 1.41 seconds) 
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for 2.7% of the interaction, whereas she smiled eleven 
times at the stranger (x = 3.25 seconds; total = 33.73% 
of the interaction) - in an interaction immediately 
following that with her mother. With her mother she 
made twenty -three protesting cries. But as soon as 
the stranger came in and started interacting with her, 
she made no more cries. 
Comment. Interestingly, the success of the inter- 
action with the stranger was connected with the 
stranger's insistence on playing an imitation -game with 
Sarah - attempting to get Sarah to imitate repeated 
tongue protrusions. Much of Sarah's looking and 
smiling was at the antics of the stranger's mouth. 
Similarly, the two times that Sarah smiled at her 
mother coincided with her mother playing a tongue - 
clicking game with her (cf. Leigh, pp.22 -2.). 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
While the foregoing analyses are far from exhaustive, 
they do enable us to address a number of the points 
that were made about infant negativity in our survey of 
the literature. 
In the first place, we can reject Spitz's explicit 
assumption that negativity does not occur in the first 
six months of life under normal circumstances. We can 
also reject Spitz's equation of negativity with a 
simple behavioural pattern akin to rooting (i.e. 
lateral gaze- aversion). It occurs earlier and in a 
much more complex fashion than he supposes. 
A second point is that, in all the examples reviewed 
above, negativity appeared to be specific to particular 
circumstances. In other words, negativity does appear 
to be related to the quality of stimulation to which 
infants are exposed. This finding runs counter to the 
arguments put forward by Klein, Brazelton et.al., 
Stechler and Carpenter and Stern. On the other hand, 
the lability of the infants' reactions to very similar 
circumstances - sometimes accepting games and sometimes 
rejecting them, being interested in finger- movement but 
not tongue -clicking or vice versa - suggests that 
negativity has a significant 'internal component'. 
But, in the light of this lability, the internal 
component of negativity should not be conceived in 
terms of stable physiological processes such as 
'instincts' or 'basic regulatory mechanisms'. It 
seems better to conclude in psychological terms - that 
infants have varying interests or desires. 
Hurray's findings suggest that negativity is 
primarily a product of the frustration of infants' 
interest in face -to -face interaction, and constitutes 
a 'solicitation for responsiveness'. In this case, 
negativity would be primarily a social phenomenon (i.e. 
caused, and therefore relieved, by social circum- 
stances). The findings reported here show that this 
is not always the case. Negativity may be caused by 
both social and asocial circumstances: frustration with 
the purely conversational interaction (e.g. Example 
3(i)) or frustration with being strapped into the baby - 
chair (e.g. Example 5c(i)). Similarly, it may be 
expressed in the presence of other people or in their 
absence (e.g. Example 5c(i)). 
The fact that negativity can be caused by both 
social and asocial circumstances suggests that it 
should not be viewed simply as a protest to others. 
Given the sensitivity of human beings to their fellows, 
negativity will often constitute a protest to others. 
But one sometimes observes circumstances by which an 
infant is frustrated but which are subsequently changed 
by non -social means to facilitate the fulfilment of the 
infant's desire. For example, infants sometimes 
z81 
protest when the sun is in their eyes, but they are 
relieved just as effectively by a cloud which obscures 
the sun as by a person who moves their pram. In this 
sense their negativity should not be seen so much as a 
social protest, but more as a 'protest against the 
universe'. Negativity is only seen as social by 
adults because it is comprehensible to adults. 
We may conclude, as we concluded our survey of the 
literature at the start of this chapter, that negativity 
is caused by the frustration of the infant's purposes 
by external conditions. The principal remaining question 
concerns the nature and development of infants' purposes. 
we have already remarked that infants' purposes appear 
to be very varied. However, if all the twelve analyses 
discussed in this chapter are considered, we may note 
that negativity was only observed after ten weeks of age 
or before seven weeks of age, an observation which accords 
with Trevarthen's (1979c) descriptions of early development 
and with the concluding suggestions in Chapter 6. In 
other words, it seems likely that the general decline in 
infant attention to all experimental stimuli during the 
10 -28 week period reported in that chapter was a product of 
a general increase in the infants' ability to investigate 
and act on their surroundings. This would incorporate a 
decline of interest in purely conversational social inter- 
action - in which infants play a relatively passive role - 
and an increase of interest in games where their role 
can be more self -determined (active). Negativity is a 
product of this development because, in the elaboration 
of more varied and more complex purposes, infants will 
become increasingly aware of frustrations caused by 
external circumstances. Put another way, negativity can 
be seen as the product of ignorance - of an inability to 
derive satisfaction from present circumstances. 
Whether it is developmentally beneficial or detrimental 
depends on whether or not it leads to new understanding. 
Perhaps this is what John Keats (1970) meant when he 
said that it is the quality of negative capability: 
"that is when man is capable of being in 
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any 
irritable reaching after fact and reason" 
which goes to form a 'man of achievement'. Negativity 
is a two -edged sword: it simultaneously bears testimony 
to the fact that the natural tendency of human beings 
is to increase their power of self -determination and to 
the fact that this tendency can be overcome by external 
forces. The essence of negative capability - and thus 
one of the secrets of development - would be to have 
confidence in one's nature whilst acknowledging that one 
is (temporarily) in adversity. 
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Chapter 8: SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE EARLY MONTHS: 
ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE 
In previous chapters we have discussed both the 
positive tendencies of young infants - to relate to 
other persons and to explore their surroundings - and 
ways in which these tendencies may be frustrated. As 
it stands, our discussion might appear to stress 
constitutional factors in development whilst ignoring 
the influence of society. In many respects this is a 
false impression. The tendency of infants to explore 
and learn about the world into which they are born, 
when combined with their social sensitivity, will 
naturally lead them to become more and more involved 
with the persons with whom they deal and, thus, with 
society. This is essentially a positive process, 
leading to the active acquisition of increasingly 
elaborate social skills, amongst which the use of 
language is pre -eminent. The process is two -way, 
however: the more children become involved in society 
and the more their knowledge becomes social knowledge, 
the more their behaviour is determined by society, the 
more their actions come under social influence. While 
it is recognised that infants are unlikely to be aware 
of social influence as social influence during the 
first six months of life, this chapter suggests that a 
complex form of social influence is operative during 
this period. 
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1. Babytalk Analysis 
The hypothesis that society influences babies during 
the first six months of life is a conclusion drawn from 
the analysis of the relationship between maternal baby - 
talk and the infant behaviours to which it refers. As 
reported in the previous chapter, mothers made three 
types of explicit attributions of negativity to their 
daughters during interactions. Two of these types 
were justified. But sometimes mothers made comments 
attributing negativity to their daughters during 
positive interactions. It is this third type of 
comment which gives a hint as to the means by which 
society influences babies during the first six months 
of life. Four examples follow. Recording procedures, 
subjects and methods of analysis are the same as those 
described in Chapter 7. 
Examples: 
(i) Joanna (aged 10 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This was an interaction in 
which Joanna looked at her mother for 81% of the time 
and smiled for 19.9% of the time. There was no 
crying. Thus the interaction was, generally, a 
positive one. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
After 186 seconds of the interaction, the mother made a 
Category 1 comment. It came at the end of the 
following sequence: 
"Just going to sit there and be sick all day are 
you? Are you just going to sit there and be sick 
all day? Are you? What do you see round there? 
What do you see round there? Oh, you're having a 
wee look round now. You're having a wee look 
round - . You've got fed up with your. Mummy." 
This sequence began after a long spell of attention 
by Joanna to her mother (29 seconds) which culminated 
in Joanna being sick - something that her mother had 
been predicting: 
"Look; You'll make yourself sick. (Joanna had 
been holding her left hand in her mouth) (Her 
mother removes it) You'll just make yourself sick. 
Aha. (in response to a little vocalisation by 
Joanna) See, there - you bring up that wee bit 
there (as Joanna brings up a little sick). There 
you go: Tt: - (intake of breath by mother) 
Come on then (as she begins vigorously to clean up 
Joanna's face and clothes). Just gonna sit there 
and be sick all day are you ? ", etc. 
But as her mother began to wipe Joanna's face, Joanna 
broke gaze, She looked back for 
2.6 seconds at the end of the wiping up operations, but 
finally broke gaze again to the right (for 9.5 seconds) 
- at which point the mother said twice "What do you see 
round there ? ". Joanna then swung her attention across 
her mother to the left -hand side of the room. Her 
mother's comment was "Oh, you're having a wee look 
round now ". At this point, Joanna looked back at her 
mother. It was half a second after mutual gaze was 
re- established that Joanna's mother began to say 
"You're having a wee look round now - You've got fed up 
with your Mummy". One tenth of a second before the 
end of this second utterance, Joanna began to smile. 
She continued to look at her mother for an unbroken 
spell of 48.5 seconds - during which she smiled four 
times (total = 14.2 seconds) - the longest single spell 
of attention during the whole interaction. Two tenths 
of a second after Joanna began to smile at her, the 
mother also began to smile. Her babytalk continued 
"No? You're not fed up with your Mummy yet ". 
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Contrast with other conditions. This interaction 
formed the first condition of the session. In sub- 
sequent conditions she looked at the stranger for 98.5% 
of the time - the highest proportion of attention 
recorded during any condition throughout the thesis - 
study - but smiled less than with her mother (i.e. 
19.9% vs. 3.1 %). She also looked a lot at the face - 
masks, but, with them, did not smile at all. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: M (290 seconds), 
S (339 seconds), UM (147 seconds), FM (269 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: M (81.5ió) , S (98.5ió) , 
UM (82.4jó) , FM (85.2%) . 
Proportions of smiling: M (19.9 %), S (3.1%), UM (0 %), 
FI'I (0 %). 
Proportions of crying: none during the recording 
session. 
Conclusion. This example demonstrates clearly the 
hypothetical nature of mothers' babytalk. In this 
instance, the mother's hypothesis - that the baby was 
"fed up" with her - was disconfirmed by Joanna's 
subsequent smiling and attention, and the proposition 
was not repeated. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
that, for this mother, Joanna's "having a wee look 
round" leads on 'naturally' to the idea that Joanna is 
fed up with her. It might equally well have led on to 
the idea that the baby was planning an utterance, for 
example, or comparing the colour of the walls. 
Indeed, four of the mothers in this study never made an 
utterance of the type "You've got fed up with your 
Mummy ", even though their babies looked away from them 
as often, and in some cases much more often, than 
Joanna did. The evidence suggests that, in this 
interaction, the baby was particularly interested in 
and happy to look at her mother (e.g. average look at 
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mother = 15.8 seconds, average look at other things = 
1.8 seconds). 
One interesting possibility is that the mother's 
inappropriate attribution of negativity had something 
to do with her daughter's sickness during the inter- 
action. As already noted (11.V4), Joanna was a 
colicky baby during her early months, and was frequent- 
ly sick during recording sessions. There is some 
evidence that the mother saw this sickness as directed 
at her. For example Joanna was sick near the begin- 
ning of an interaction recorded at 18 weeks. Her 
mother's babytalk runs: 
"... Are you going to tell me a story? Hey: Are 
you going to tell me a story? Come on. (Joanna 
is sick) Oh: (sounding piqued) Joanna: I'm 
sure you do that on purpose when I appear: (pause 
while the mother, looking disgusted, wipes up the 
sick) Come on then... ", etc. 
This is an interesting example of the well- documented 
Western tendency to see 'physical' illness as having 
'psychological' status (Sontag 1979), which, coinci- 
dentally, conforms to the semantic am';iguity in the 
expression "fed up ". 
(ii) Joanna (aged 16 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. As a whole, this interaction 
was a positive one (looking 69.2 %, smiling 18.4 %). 
There was no crying. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
Prior to the comment in question, Joanna had spent a 
continuous spell of 39.2 seconds looking at her mother, 
a period of which she smiled for 9.3 seconds. The 
comment was made 1.3 seconds after Joanna broke this 
spell of gaze. Joanna looked back after two more 
seconds and, of the next minute, she looked at her 
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mother for 55 seconds and smiled seven times for a 
total of 8.7 seconds - the first time only 8 seconds 
after she looked away. Thus the Category 1 comment 
was made during a brief lapse in what appears to be a 
very positive spell of interaction. 
While it might seem that the mother's comment 
"You're not going to tell me anything" was elicited by 
the brief break in Joanna's gaze and smiling at her 
mother, subsequent comments suggest that it was a 
reference to Joanna's quietness. The mother appeared 
to equate 'talking' or 'telling her' with Joanna's 
vocalisations. Thus, even after Joanna turned back to 
her and started smiling, she continued to make such 
comments as "Are you not going to talk to me ?" and 
"Not even going to say a thing to me ? ". Joanna's next 
vocalisation transforms the tone of her mother's 
b abyt alk : 
"What is it? Have - . (Joanna vocalises) What? 
What? What are you telling me? Tell - 
(Joanna vocalises again) Oh: Is it big things? 
Are you telling me big stories? Are you? Are 
you telling me awful big stories? Are you really? 
Tell me then:" 
Contrast with other conditions. The other conditions in 
this recording session have already been discussed in 
the previous chapter (Example 3(ii)), because, in the 
condition immediately following Joanna's interaction 
with her mother, she mainfested negativity towards an 
unfamiliar adult. Only a synopsis will be repeated 
here. 
Synopsis: 
Order and lengths of conditions: M (327 seconds), 
S (334 seconds), UM (287 seconds), FM (351 seconds). 
Proportions of visual attention: M (69.2 %), S (17.8 %), 
UM (47.3 %) , FM (39.5%) . 
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Proportions of smiling: M (18.4 %), S (0 %), UM (0.9 %), 
FM (0.3 %). 
Proportions of crying: M (0 %), S (0 %), UM (0 %), 
FM (4.2 %). 
Conclusion. By her own standards, the mother's 
Category 1 comment was not inappropriate in this inter- 
action; it referred to Joanna's quietness. However, 
her restriction of the reference of the words 'talk' 
and 'tell' to vocal behaviour is an interesting one. 
Earlier in the study she had appeared perfectly happy 
to chat with Joanna by responding to gaze, happy facial 
expressions and gesticulations. This suggests a 
'tightening up' of the mother's criteria of infant 
communication during this recording session. 
(iii) Sarah (aged 8 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. This interaction included 
the highest proportion of visual attention recorded 
during the case study (94.3 %) and a high proportion of 
smiling (18.2 %). There was no crying. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
The mother made two Category 1 comments towards the end 
of this long (426 seconds) interaction. At the 
beginning of the interaction Sarah had been rather 
impassive, blinking a lot - possibly as a result of 
the photo -floods directed at her (N.B. these inter- 
actions were recorded on film as well as video -tape, 
unlike the later case studies - and film requires more 
light than video -tape). However, after four minutes, 
Sarah began to perk up. Her new mood culminated in a 
remarkable episode of interaction, involving minute 
'imitations' by Sarah of her mother's mouth movements. 
This episode was initiated by Sarah flashing her eye- 
brows at her mother after eight seconds of close 
attention to the mother's face (an element of greeting; 
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see Photo.%27, Appendix 1). 0.8 seconds later, Sarah 
began to smile and 0.3 seconds after this the mother 
reciprocated the eyebrow flash, (Ph,,tc. 123). 
Half a second later Sarah smiled again and then, 
after another half second, her mother smiled. 0.2 
seconds later, Sarah began a short burst of prespeech 
(Photo. 111) . Two -thirds of a second later, after 
Sarah had begun smiling again, the mother flashed her 
eyebrows a second time and said "Hhho yea: ". A second 
later, Sarah began another burst of prespeech. One and 
a half seconds after this, the mother began to say, in 
what appeared to be an imitation of Sarah's prespeech 
movements, "Howowowowo: ". Sarah, her attention still 
fixed on her mother's face, began to imitate her 
mother's lip -configuration (Photos.130 -(33). She then 
opened her mouth slightly wider than the mother's. 
Immediately the mother opened her own mouth very wide 
(Photo.(a -). At this point, Sarah closed her mouth, 
watching her mother's mouth with furrowed brows 
(concentration; Appendix 1). The mother held this 
open -mouth position for a period of two and a quarter 
seconds - towards the end of which Sarah opened her own 
mouth, imitating for a second time her mother's lip - 
configuration (Photos.l35-(36). It was two -thirds of 
a second after Sarah opening her mouth that the mother 
began to attribute negativity to her: 
"Oh: Tt: Are you very bored ? Are you very 
bored ? ", 
apparently interpreting Sarah's imitative movement as a 
yawn. But it was clearly not a yawn - there was no 
intake of breath, the mouth shape was less extreme than 
that of a yawn and it was associated with visual 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mother was making her comments, Sarah began to smile at 
her and then to gesticulate (Photo. ¡37). But 
the mother continued to remark that Sarah was bored with 
her, making three ostentatious mock yawns and saying: 
"Are you very bored? Cheeky thing. Are you? 
Hello. (mock yawns) ". 
At this point, however, Sarah's brow furrowed and, after 
39 seconds of continuous visual attention, she turned 
away from her mother (Photo.138). As if this were a 
confirmation of her previous suspicions, the mother 
immediately remarked: 
"Tt: Are you very bored? You're very bored with 
Mummy's face really aren't you. Eh? You're 
bored with Mummy's face really. Yes. I don't 
blame you. I don't blame you. There must be 
more interesting things." 
Contrast with other conditions. The only other 
condition recorded during this session was with a 
reaching stimulus (see Chapter 4). This received 
close visual attention from Sarah (78 %), but no smiling 
or crying (duration: 213 seconds). 
Conclusion. This is a particularly interesting inter- 
action because the mother's Category 1 utterances 
clearly have their root in a misinterpretation of 
Sarah's behaviour. Sarah was accused of being bored 
with her mother's face during a period in which she was 
paying the closest attention to it. Indeed, Sarah's 
subsequent gaze aversion may have been due to the 
marked decrease of coordination between the mother's 
behaviours and Sarah's behaviours after the mother's 
first suspicion of negativity (cf. Photos.12A -136 and 
t 1 -t' ). This would accord with the findings of 
Murray reported in the previous chapter (pp.2 -14). 
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A possible explanation of this transformation in the 
mother's behaviour is that - after six minutes of 
talking - it was she, not her daughter, who was bored 
with the interaction. In accord with this explanation 
is the drop in her facial animation after Sarah's 
'yawn' and the observation that, one second after 
Sarah's gaze- aversion, the mother also broke gaze to 
look in the mirror - apparently attempting to see what 
the experimenter was doing in the room behind her. If 
this explanation is correct, this example is an early 
illustration of what Zinner and Shapiro (1972) call 
'defensive delineations'. Zinner and Shapiro deal 
exclusively with the family dynamics of 'problem' 
adolescents. They provide evidence that 
"within the realm of parental behaviour are acts 
and statements which communicate to the adolescent 
his parents' image of him ". 
These acts are called 'delineations'. 'Defensive 
delineations' are the 
"expression of parental defensive organisation and, 
as such, the parent is strongly motivated to sustain 
these perceptions of the adolescent, regardless of 
the adolescent's behaviour which might otherwise 
alter the parental image ". 
(iv) Sarah (aged 11 weeks) 
Evidence for negativity. During this 277- second 
interaction, Sarah looked at her mother for 93% of the 
time and smiled 5% of the time. She also cried for 
17% of the time - but all her crying came after the 
three Category 1 comments under discussion. 
Evidence for selectiveness during the interaction. 
Sarah looked at her mother continuously from the 
beginning of the interaction until after the mother 
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had made the second of her Category 1 comments (i.e. 
for 49 seconds). Almost simultaneously with the onset 
of the first comment, Sarah began to smile - her fifth 
smile during the interaction. Yet, three seconds 
later, the mother repeated her statement that Sarah was 
not "talking" to her: 
"You're not going to have a talk with me today. 
(Sarah smiling) Hey. Sarah. Hello. 0- wo -wo. 
You're not going to have a talk to me today." 
One and a half seconds after these comments, Sarah 
looked down at her hand. Her mother's babytalk 
continued: 
"Do you not? (Sarah looks down) Aw- ba- ba- ba -ba. 
Ba. Ba. Not going to have a talk to me today." 
Contrast with other conditions. Sarah was also 
recorded in interaction with an unfamiliar adult during 
this session. She looked at this stranger - without 
crying - slightly less than at her mother (i.e. 
positive regard: M (87.5 %), S (81%)). 
Conclusion. As in Example (ii), it appears that the 
mother's Category 1 comments referred to her daughter's 
lack of vocal behaviour during the early part of this 
interaction. In this light, it is significant that, 
after saying "Not going to talk to me today ", the 
mother's commentary continued: "Just gonna sit quietly. 
Are you ? ". Possibly this variety of Category 1 
comment reflects a commonly -held belief that young 
infants cannot communicate until they start to make 
differentiated vocalisations. Alternatively, it is 
possible that, as is usually the case at this age 
(Lenneberg et.al. 1965), Sarah had begun to make more 
frequent positive vocalisations in the home and her 
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mother simply wanted her to demonstrate her develop- 
mental progress to those in the Psychology Department. 
But, in either case - and as in Example (ii) - this 
example suggests a narrowing of the mother's criteria 
for what it is for a baby to 'talk'. But, as shown in 
Tables 7/1-7421 this narrowing only manifested itself 
as Category 1 comments in the babytalk of the mothers 
of Sarah and Joanna. 
2. Discussion 
These analyses show that mothers' responses to their 
infants are not always justified. But, more 
importantly, they suggest that the way in which mothers 
construe their infants' actions is both selective and 
systematic. It seems that each mother has a limited 
range of baby- related ideas in her head and it is these 
which determine the 'themes' of her babytalk - the 
range of purposes she attributes, or misattributes, to 
her child's behaviour (Table 1). But it is not only 
the mothers' babytalk which has these themes; their 
babytalk is systematically related to their behaviour. 
For instance, in Example (iii), Sarah's mother not only 
attributed boredom to her daughter verbally, but, 
simultaneously, began to act as if Sarah were bored 
with her. While infants are insensitive to the verbal 
content of babytalk, they are not insensitive to 
changes in the sense of their non -verbal behaviour 
(Chapter 5). And, as suggested by extension of Zinner 
and Shapiro's concept of 'defensive delineation', 
systematic changes such as those illustrated by Example 
(iii) may be the means by which infants begin to sense 
their parents' images of them. 
3. Mirroring 
This suggestion gives rise to the notion that the 
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TABLE 8/1: scores for the use of different adjectives 
by different smothers whilst interacting with their 
daughters 
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indicates use; F = frequent use (30+ uses). 
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reactions of others are, in certain respects, a 'mirror' 
held up to the baby, reflecting an image of self which 
he might appraise in much the same way as he would 
appraise another person directly. The notion of 
'mirroring' goes back at least as far as the 18th 
century (Smith 1759; see McCall 1977). Thus Cooley 
(1902) called the 'social' self the reflected or 
"looking- glass" self. Cooley's ideas have gone on to 
play an important part within the tradition of social 
behaviourism (Mead 1934, Goffmanrt1957, Berger and 
Luckmann 1967). A more recent Afofmulation is that by 
Lacan (1949). 
Lacan's conception of 'the mirror stage' in social 
development originated from an observation by Kohler. 
Kohler observed that, from the age of six months 
onwards human babies can recognise their image in a 
mirror. What is more, (unlike chimpanzees) human 
babies appear to be fascinated by this image; their 
recognition, 
"far from exhausting itself, as in the case of the 
monkey, once the image has been mastered and found 
empty, immediately rebounds in the case of the 
child in a series of gestures in which he experi- 
ences in play the relation between the movements 
assumed in the image and the reflected environment, 
and between this virtual complex and the reality it 
reduplicates - the child's own body, and the persons 
and things around him ". 
Lacan represents the mirror stage as the child's 
first form of identification. Like Freud, he does not 
see the child's development as influenced by social 
factors until the point at which the Oedipus complex 
comes into operation. Thus, for him, the mirror stage 
is essentially an asocial phenomenon: 
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"the important point is that this Cprimordial 
identification] situates the agency of the ego, 
before its social determination, ... " (1949; my 
emphasis). 
Recently, in accord with Klein's revision of Freud's 
theory of early development, Winnicott (1967) has 
revised Lacan's formulation to suggest that: 
"in individual emotional development the precursor 
of the mirror is the mother's face" (his italics). 
Thus Winnicott suggests that mirroring is a social 
phenomenon which begins at birth. For him, the first 
representation of the baby's 'self' is to be found in 
his or her mother's face, because, when a mother is 
looking at her baby, 
"what she looks like is related to what she sees 
there" (his emphasis). 
But, while mothers do often imitate their babies' 
expressions (Trevarthen 1974 1977, Kaye 1979), they 
are not always doing so. Winnicott suggests that, if 
these lapses become predictable, they begin to 
constitute a form of "relative maternal failure ". In 
Lacan's terms, these 'failures' are akin to the 
physical distortions intrinsic to mirror -images, in 
which the infant's body appears to him 
"in a contrasting size that fixes it in a symmetry 
which inverts it - in contrast with the turbulent 
movements which the subject feels are dominating 
him" (Lacan 1949). 
Thus Winnicott writes that, when a mother's face 
reflects her own moods rather than her baby's moods, 
the babies 
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"study the object [i.e. the mother's facet, and do 
all that is possible to see in the object some 
meaning that ought to be there if only it could be 
felt. Some babies, tantalised by this type of 
relative maternal failure, study the maternal visage 
in an attempt to predict the mother's mood, just 
exactly as we all study the weather ... Immediately 
beyond this in the direction of pathology is 
predictability, which is precarious, and which 
strains the baby to the limits of his or her 
capacity to allow for events. This brings a threat 
of chaos, and the baby will organise withdrawal, or 
will not look except to perceive [i.e. as opposed to 
apperceive), as a defence" (my emphasis). 
In 1978, Sylvester -Bradley and Trevarthen suggested 
that the notion of mirroring might be extended to 
include both the mother's non -verbal behaviour and her 
babytalk (Appendix 3). In the light of the analyses 
of babytalk reported in this and the previous chapter 
we can make this a firmer proposal. We can agree with 
Lacan that mirroring plays an important role in early 
development, and we can agree with Winnicott that 
mirroring is a social not a physical phenomenon. But 
our examples show that mirroring does not just involve 
the mother's face, it involves her ideas as well. In 
this sense, the mother's facial expressions are not 
simply facial expressions, they are signs - tokens for 
something else. Therefore we must conclude that mirroring 
is not just a social phenomenon, it is also an ideo- 
logical phenomenon. 
4. Theoretical Repercussions 
If pursued, the argument that mirroring is an ideo- 
logical phenomenon has many theoretical repercussions. 
Thus, in the first place, it might suggest that 'unjust- 
ified' mirroring of the baby's actions is ideologically 
inspired whereas 'justified' mirroring is more a product 
of the parent's 'natural' interpersonal sensitivity. 
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Such a dichotomy would be mistaken however, for ideology 
and interpersonal sensitivity are often combined in 
adult -infant interactions. An example is the case when, 
during a face -to -face interaction, Angela's mother 
crooned "Who's Mummy's pretty girl ?" on seeing Angela 
smile. Clearly this utterance was, in interpersonal 
terms, an expression of the mother's sympathy with her 
baby. But the utterance was also 'ideological' in the 
sense that it is intimately related to Western ideas 
about womanhood and possession - the idea that babies 
'belong' to their (biological) parents, the importance 
of prettiness for a woman's well -being and the pleasure 
that a woman is supposed to derive from affirmations 
that she 'is' pretty. Thus one must conclude that any 
adult response to a baby potentially has both inter- 
personal and ideological determinants and that this will 
be true of both 'justified' and 'unjustified' responses; 
for instance, in Example (iii), Sarah's mother was not 
only misinterpreting her daughter's behaviour in desc- 
ribing it as 'bored', she was also expressing her own 
boredom. 
This conclusion suggests that any adequate account 
of social influence in early interactions should, in 
contrast to Cooley Lacan and Wimnicott, draw a distinction 
between the effects on babies of adults' actions as 
self- expressions and the effects on babies of adults' 
actions as 'mirrored' reflections of the babies' actions. 
This need not mean that babies sometimes perceive others' 
actions as reflections of their own actions and, at 
other times, perceive them as self -expressions - 
interaction may simultaneously lead to the acquisition 
of ideologically- inspired social knowledge. 
These suggestions have an important bearing on Marxist 
theories of consciousness. For example, it seems likely 
that mirroring is one means by which infants are initiated 
into what is called by Marxists 'behavioural ideology' 
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(Volosinov 1976). This, in turn, suggests that baby - 
talk is a precursor of 'inner speech' (cf. Vygotsky 
1962). But our argument also suggests an important 
addition to Marx's claim that consciousness is "from 
the very beginning a social product" (Marx and Engels 
1970). This is often taken.to mean that the contents 
of consciousness are wholly a product of social condit- 
ioning. But our argument suggests that there is an 
aspect of consciousness which is present from soon after 
birth and which is responsible for the immediacy and 
richness of responses between infants and adults, an 
aspect of consciousness which predetermines socially - 
produced consciousness and the 'mirroring' which gives 
rise to it. This conclusion by no means undermines 
all Marx's statements - such as that an adequate 
scientific method must: 
"set out from real active men, and on the 
basis of their real life -process, demonstrate 
the development of the ideological reflexes 
and echoes of this life -process" (op.cit.) 
- so long as one accepts that 'the life -process' 
incorporates its own form of consciousness or awareness. 
Marx himself did accept this, at least in his early 
writings: 
"Consciousness is at first consciousness 
concerning the immediate sensuous environment 
and consciousness of the limited connection 
with other persons and things outside the 
individual who is growing self- conscious" 
(op.cit.; his emphasis) 
But, unfortunately for the development of socialism, 
Marx did not consider that this primordial form of 
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consciousness warranted theoretical attention and, since 
1860, it has been consistently neglected by Marx and 
Marxists alike. 
The proposition that there are two aspects of human 
consciousness, a 'given' aspect and an asp::.'.+; 'which is the 
product of social influence, does not only apply to 
Marxist theory. It also concerns a central issue in 
psychoanalysis: namely, the origins of the unconscious. 
For Freud the unconscious was engendered in the 
resolution of the Oedipus complex. Thus the pre - 
Oedipal child is held to desire exclusive possession 
of or union with the mother. But, during the Oedipal 
phase, this desire is recognised to be dysfunctional. 
Instead, the child looks to gain vicarious satisfaction 
by identification with his father or her mother: the social 
role of the same -sex parent comes to symbolise fulfil- 
ment of the child's original (sexual) desire for the 
mother. It is the misrecognition of the same -sex 
parent's desire as the child's own desire - combined 
with the repression of the child's true desire - which 
is held to constitute the unconscious. 
As Lacan points out, the identification which 
resolves the Oedipus complex bears a formal similarity 
to identification in 'the mirror stage': the playing 
of a (social) role comes to take the place of the 
child's immediate experience and feelings: 
"the insertion of the subject into the symbolic 
order underlying the social organisation by the 
Oedipus is simultaneous with a division between 
the I of existence and the I of meaning" 
(summarised by Lemaire 1977). 
In the light of our findings and discussion, we can 
suggest that what Lacan refers to as the 'I of 
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existence' is the immediate sensuous awareness we have 
of our own acts and the world about us, while what he 
refers to as the 'I of meaning' is the form of 
consciousness constituted by our identifications with 
what we are mirrored as by others. In this case, 
'the unconscious' is formed by identification with 
other people's images of us insofar as this 
identification excludes or represses our natural 
awareness of our own and others' acts as self - 
expressions. 
In semiological terms, this conclusion suggests that 
the 'social' self may become a-myth. As Barthes (1973) writes, 
the principle of myth is that "it transforms history 
into nature ". Thus, just as a magazine cover 
featuring the picture of a negro saluting a French 
flag makes the life -history of the negro irrelevant, 
so our socially -produced 'self- identity' takes the 
place of - alienates us from - the real actions and 
events which gave rise to it: 
"In passing from history to nature, myth acts 
economically: it abolishes the complexity of human 
acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it 
does away with all dialectics, with any going back 
beyond what is immediately visible, it organises a 
world which is without contradictions because it 
is without depth ..." (1973: 143) 
Thus, insofar as one feels that and acts as if one 
is what one is appraised as by others - insofar as one 
sees one's 'social' self as one's only self (I am clever, 
I am kind, I am stupid, I am ugly) - one is 'misrecog- 
nising' one's history as one's nature because one fails 
to recognise the historical determinations of the way one 
is behaving. Under these conditions, one's unconscious 
would represent a record of the reasons one had lost 
awareness of one's own and others' acts as self - 
expressions; it would be these which were elicited by 
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free -association during the course of psychotherapy. 
But this means that the unconscious must also 'contain' 
evidence that one has such an awareness to be lost. 
In fact, in a negative way, its existence is that 
evidence. 
It is this fundamental, positive aspect of the 
unconscious which psychoanalysts such as Freud and 
Lacan overlook. Freud (1930) believed that the social 
repression of one's 'instinctive' feelings was a 
necessary precondition for civilization. Lacan (1953) 
goes one step further, stating that "the unconscious 
is the discourse of the other" and thereby apparently 
denying the aspect of the unconscious which bears 
testimony to the historical occurrence of a genuine 
discourse, even in a repressed form. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Lacan's position is closely 
related to that represented by the tradition of social 
behaviourism. For example, Goffman (1957) reaches the 
conclusion that 
"in analysing the self, we are drawn from its 
possessor, from the person who will profit or 
lose most by it, for he and his body merely 
provide the peg on which something of collab- 
orative manufacture will be hung for a time. 
And the means for producing and maintaining selves 
do not reside inside the peg; in fact these means 
are often bolted down in social establishments ". 
For Goffman, individuals are merely the performers of 
externally- supplied roles, and all their psychobiological 
predispositions to social relationship "seem to arise 
out of intimate interaction with the contingencies of 
staging performances ". 
Our argument suggests that the views of Goffman, 
Lacan and Freud are mistaken. Thus, they ignore the 
primordial sensitivity to others which the logic of 
their argument implies (e.g.'the discourse of the other' 
implies a primordial self which is capable of discourse), 
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and which can be shown to exist as early as the second 
month of life (Chapter 5). Perhaps as a consequence of 
this neglect, their views seem unduly pessimistic: they 
seem to deny the existence of the genuinely spontaneous 
creative awareness which leads to love of our fellows 
and understanding of the world as well as the virtue 
which consists in what Winnicott calls "the experience 
of aliveness ", and which he sees as the fundamental 
sub -stratum of the human psyche (Winnicott 1960b 1971). 
5. Conclusion 
Finally, we must return to our data. As argued in 
the foregoing section, it is important to recognise 
that mirroring is not only an ideological phenomenon. 
This recognition leads us to develop the usual theo- 
retical conceptions of social influence. In the first 
place we must admit that, insofar as the way adults 
interact with infants is determined by categorical 
delineations of them as well as by the interpersonal 
significance of their complex and immensely variable 
interactive displays, then these delineations, by the 
processes of identification described by Lacan (1949), 
provide the basis for the construction of a 'social self' - 
a set of social roles based on the assimilation of 
others' images of one's own actions. As Winnicott (1960b 
1967) suggests, unjustified reflections of one's actions 
may, by means of identification with them, lead to the 
construction of a'false' social self. But to suggest 
that socially -derived knowledge is always false would 
clearly be a misrepresentation of our data. Thus, of 
Category 1 comments recorded during this study, the 
majority were seen to be justified by subsequent analysis 
of the infants' behaviour to which they referred (Chapter 
7). Even the most obvious exception (Example (iii)) was 
preceded by a long period during which the mother dem- 
onstrated the closest sensitivity to the subtleties of 
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her daughter's interactive display (Photos.128 -135). 
Thus the contribution of the concept of mirroring to 
our understanding of the developmental effects of early 
social influence is less to suggest that others' actions 
form the basis for the construction of a 'false' social 
self - contrasting with the 'true' given self of natural 
awareness (as suggested by Winnicott 1960b) - than to 
suggest that social development has two aspects: an 
'active' aspect in which baby and adult meet and interact 
with eachother as self -expressive agents and a'passive' 
aspect by which these interactions lead to the assim- 
ilation of ideologically- structured social knowledge. 
Clearly, in the first instance, interactions may be 
either positive (warm, facilitating) or negative 
(unsupportive, debilitating). But social knowledge 
may also play both positive and negative roles in devel- 
opment. Thus, to 'misrecognise' social definitions of 
self as absolute or natural is to repress one's awareness 
of self and others as self- expressive agents. Alter- 
natively, socially- derived self -knowledge will often 
contribute to the success and controllability of one's 
social interactions: for example, awareness of one's 
social definition as 'stupid', 'clever', 'pretty', 
'black', 'fat' or 'ugly' may enable one to take steps 
to overcome the interactive handicaps with which such 
labels are likely to endow one. In this way, 
mirroring may lead to an increase in the individual's 
social skills and thus, his or her powers of self - 
determination. 
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Chapter 9: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter sets the findings of the study in a 
theoretical perspective derived from the philosophy of 
Baruch Spinoza. The perspective is described in order 
to reconcile by the simplest possible means the various 
insights contained in what has so far been discussed. 
1. Summary of findings 
The empirical data incorporated in this thesis 
have been produced from the fine -grain analysis 
of audio -visual recordings of infants interacting 
with adults and a limited range of other stimuli 
under naturalistic laboratory conditions. The 
aim of the study as a whole was to investigate 
the development of infants as social beings during 
the first six months of life. 
The empirical part of the study was prefaced by an 
experiment comparing two -month -olds' behaviour with 
their mothers and with a graspable ball. Results 
showed that there are statistically significant 
differences in the behaviour that young infants direct 
towards people and the behaviour they direct towards 
things. These differences were not categorical 
however and it seemed that the results were confused by 
the fact that some infants were in a sociable mood - 
manifested by prespeech behaviour, smiling and eyebrow - 
raising - which lasted throughout both the experimental 
conditions. This finding, together with the inter- 
pretive ambiguity of all purposive behaviour, suggested 
that the question whether or not young infants are 
socially sensitive could only be answered by the 
analysis of recordings of infants interacting with 
others (a) when the infants were in a sociable mood and 
(b) when the analytic method was of sufficient observa- 
tional and interpretive exactitude to draw unambiguous 
conclusions about the psychological sense of the 
infants' behaviour. 
An analysis of this sort was reported in Chapter 5. 
It produced conclusive evidence of a two -month -old's 
sensitivity to the interpersonal significance of 
spontaneous actions by her mother. This baby was 
shown to welcome her mother's company and to enjoy her 
humour, she felt upset when ignored in favour of 
another, she disliked her mother's loss of interest in 
interacting with her, was pleased when this interest 
was renewed and was disconcerted when her mother became 
over -assertive. These descriptions were supported 
with detailed descriptive evidence. A supplementary 
experimental study showed that, on the basis of these 
descriptions, naive independent judges reliably coded 
the infant's behaviour according to a predictable 
pattern. This constituted additional evidence for the 
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existence of a comprehensible and complex social 
sensitivity to other persons in the first two months of 
life. 
Having shown the existence of interpersonal sensi- 
tivity in young infants, the major study of the thesis 
concentrated on its development. Results reported in 
Chapter 6 show that this sensitivity does not 
necessarily result in harmonious interactions during 
the first six months of life. After a peak of social 
interest - or, in terms of Chapter 4 - after the 
prevalence of a predominantly social mood between six 
and ten weeks of age, recording sessions showed a 
decline of interest in conversational interactions with 
both mothers and strangers as well as in looking at 
familiar and unfamiliar face -masks. This decline was 
particularly marked with mothers. On the other hand, 
babies generally smiled and laughed at their mothers 
more than in other conditions. Whereas these findings 
cannot be explained by the usual theories of infant 
attention (i.e. the discrepancy hypothesis and arousal 
theory), they are all consistent with the idea that 
infants derive pleasure from increasing their control 
over and understanding of their surroundings. This 
would explain their enjoyment in game -playing - where 
adults make their actions more obviously predictable to 
babies; their greater pleasure (i.e. smiling) in 
interacting with their mothers than with other stimuli 
- because they have greater familiarity with and 
therefore understanding of their mothers (N.B. only 
Angela smiled less at her mother than in other 
conditions and she was primarily looked after by 
nannies; see p.14); their general decline of interest 
in all stimuli with age - as their visual and motor 
systems mature, giving them a wider range of interests 
and powers, and the particularly marked decline of 
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interest to mothers - because mothers, in more 
zealously following up the experimenter's instructions 
to 'chat with' their daughters, would tend to frustrate 
the natural broadening of the infants' interests in the 
external world, and the infants, thus frustrated, would, 
through innate obstinacy or 'negativity', make more 
persistent attempts to evade their attentions than 
in the other conditions. This last proposition led 
on to a special study of negativity in early infant - 
adult exchanges (Chapter 7). After detailed analysis 
of interactions including persistent refusals or 
shutting out of contact with others, it was concluded 
that negativity was indeed a reaction to the frustration 
of the infant's will - their powers of self- determination 
or 'lack of self -knowledge'. The early occurrence of 
such behaviour contradicted views promulgated by many 
theorists, including attachment theorists and psycho- 
analysts such as Rene Spitz. Interestingly, some of the 
behaviours which manifest early negativity are closely 
related to those which manifest childhood autism (e.g. 
Hutt and Ounsted 1970). 
Finally a number of systematic misinterpretations by 
mothers of their infants' behaviours were discussed. 
These were shown to constitute an early form of 
delineation or distorted reflection of the infants' 
behaviours which, by means of the processes of 
identification discussed by Lacan (1949) and Winnicott 
(1967), suggests the mechanism for an important form 
of social influence on development in early infancy; 
namely, 'mirroring'. 
Taken together these findings show that young infants 
are social beings in the sense that they are capable of 
interacting with others although they may be unaware 
of the specific conventions of the society in which 
they live. This conclusion contrasts with that put 
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forward by theorists such as Schaffer (1977b) and Kaye 
(1977) who claim that, while infants are born with basic 
physiological predispositions to dyadic interaction, 
they are not capable of genuinely interpersonal exchanges 
until the end of the first year. The findings of this 
study also contrast with the views put forward by both 
psychoanalysts such as Klein (1953b) and attachment theor- 
ists, who argue that babies form a bond to their 
mothers on the basis of unitary 'instincts' or simple 
reflex -like behaviour patterns which promote proximity 
to the mother. We have seen that early infant -adult 
interactions are highly variable in behavioural constit- 
ution, incorporating a wide range of positive and negative 
contributions from the baby. On the other hand, this 
study generally supports the claims made by Trevarthen 
that there is a precocious social expressivity and sens- 
itivity to other persons in early infancy which is most 
evident, in the first six months, before ten weeks of 
age. It also supports Trevarthen's claim that there is 
an increase in negativity between ten and twenty -eight 
weeks of age. However, it does not seem that the playing 
of person -person games and object -person games is 
paramount in the resolution of young infants' negativity - 
negativity may have a wide range of causes. Nevertheless, 
the demonstration that young infants have a precocious 
interactive competence is important for theories of 
language acquisition and socialisation in which the 
existence of a form of 'intersubjectivity' is often 
assumed without empirical verification (e.g. Ryan 1974, 
Newson 1979). But a much more extensive study than that 
reported here would be needed to know whether it is 
possible to distinguish different mental attitudes of 
"assertion, seeking for information, wishing to have 
others perform certain acts etc." which Nacnamara (1972) 
suggests to underlie the development of different types 
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of speech act. And while we have suggested one means 
by which infants may become subject to social influence 
(i.e. mirroring), we are still ignorant as to how one 
might distinguish the different roles played by direct 
person -to- person interaction and by identification in 
social development. 
In view of the diversity of theoretical significances 
attaching to the work reported in this thesis, an 
attempt has been made to derive a more all- embracing 
perspective from the psychological philosophy of 
Spinoza. 
2. The psychological basis of Spinoza's philosophy 
Spinoza's most important work, "Ethics" (1910), is 
prefaced by the description of a metaphysical system: 
"Concerning God ". This is followed by two psycholo- 
gical sections: "Concerning the nature and origin of 
the mind" and "Concerning the nature and origin of the 
emotions ". The last two sections describe the conse 
quences of this psychology for everyday life and are 
entitled, respectively, "Of human servitude, or the 
strength of the emotions" and "Concerning the power 
of the intellect, or human freedom ". 
As has been remarked by many commentators, Spinoza's 
psychology closely resembles Freud's theory of the 
mind (e.g. Hampshire 1951). But, while according 
with the type of psychical causality invoked by 
Freud to explain his empirical discoveries, Spinoza's 
theory resolves the paradox at the heart of 
psychoanalytic theory; namely, its inability to explain 
the dynamics by which analysands are 'cured'. This 
paradox is very obvious in analysts' attempts to 
explicate their methods of treatment. 
Freud (1912) tells us that the psychoanalytic method 
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depends on one fundamental principle: that the analyst 
"must adjust himself to the patient, as a telephone 
receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone 
... so his unconscious is able, from the 
derivatives of the unconscious which are communi- 
cated to him, to reconstruct that unconscious which 
has determined the patient's free associations ". 
Thus the psychoanalytic method depends primarily on a 
simple belief that there is something 'behind' what 
patients say in the analytic situation, something which 
Freud called 'the unconscious'. All Freud's theoreti- 
cal writings concern the behavioural significance of 
the role played by the unconscious in the workings of 
the human mind. Yet - and here is the paradox - when 
Freud came to discuss the success of interpretations 
made during analysis, it appeared that this was not a 
theoretical matter. The criteria of analytic success 
cannot be theoretically determined; they are found to 
depend ultimately on the reactions of the analysand. 
Thus a psychoanalyst might try a number of inter- 
pretations of a dream -image before coming up with the 
right one: 
"no damage is done if, for once in a way, we make a 
mistake and offer the patient a wrong construction 
as the probable historical truth. A waste of time 
is., of course, involved, and anyone who does nothing 
but present the patient with false combinations will 
neither create a very good impression on him nor 
carry the treatment very far; but a single mistake 
of the sort can do no harm. What in fact occurs in 
such an event is rather that the patient remains as 
though he were untouched by what has been said and 
reacts to it with neither a 'Yes' nor a 'No'. This 
may possibly mean no more than that his reaction is 
postponed; but if nothing further develops we may 
conclude that we have made a mistake and we shall 
admit as much to the patient at some suitable 
opportunity without sacrificing any of our 
authority." (Freud 1937a) 
Thus no theoretical 'read -out' of a dream - or any 
other psychical event - is possible. As Freud writes 
in "Die Traumdeutung": 
"my procedure is not so convenient as the popular 
decoding method which translates any given piece of 
a dream's content by a fixed key. I, on the 
contrary, am prepared to find that the pieces of 
content may conceal a different meaning when it 
occurs in various people or in various contexts." 
(1900: 179) 
In the final analysis, this dependence on the 
cooperation of the patient means that, if the patient 
refuses to accept an interpretation which the analyst 
'knows' theoretically to be true, the treatment must 
grind to a halt. For Freud, this was often the case, 
particularly when he insisted on the existence of 
castration -anxiety in men and penis -envy in women 
(Freud 1937b). 
Freud's inability to account for his dependence on 
patients' responses in practising psychoanalysis 
points to two deficiencies in his theory. The first 
concerns his dogmatic insistence on the importance of 
infantile sexuality in human development: this was the 
usual 'sticking -point' in his patients' progress 
towards a cure. But secondly, and more radically, it 
seems that psychoanaly UC theory must seriously under- 
estimate the importance of self -will or motivation in 
the operation of the human mind. 
Will is one of the bases of Spinoza's psychology. 
His metaphysics led him to believe that 
"the endeavour wherewith each thing endeavours to 
persist in its own being is nothing other than the 
actual essence of that thing" (1910, Part III; 
prop.7), 
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and that, when this endeavour has reference to the 
mind, it is called will. (When it has reference to 
both the mind and the body, it is called either desire 
or appetite, depending whether we are conscious of it 
or not.) 
The other bases of Spinoza's psychology are, first, 
his conception of emotion and, secondly, his conception 
of freedom. By emotion, he understood 
"the modifications of the body by which the power of 
action in the body is increased or diminished, aided 
or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of 
these modifications" (1910, Part III; def.3). 
Thus there is no distinction between thought and 
emotion. Every modification of the body involves a 
modification of ideas in the mind and vice versa, or, 
as John Macmurray (1937) puts it, reason is a form of 
emotion and emotion is a form of reason. 
For Spinoza, freedom is life according to the 
dictates of reason. He summarises what he means by 
'the dictates of reason' as follows: 
"Since reason postulates nothing against nature, it 
postulates, therefore, that each man should love 
himself, and seek what is useful to him ... and 
desire whatever leads man truly to a greater state 
of perfection, and, finally, that each one should 
endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him 
lies ... Again, as virtue is nothing else than to 
act according to the laws of one's own nature, and 
no -one endeavours to preserve his being save 
according to the laws of his own nature, it follows 
hence, firstly, that the basis of virtue is the 
endeavour to preserve one's own being, and that 
happiness consists in this, that man can preserve 
his own being ... " 
In other words, virtue, happiness and freedom all flow 
from accordance with one's own nature insofar as one's 
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nature 'preserves its own being' or, is self - 
determining. (This formulation differs from commonly 
held conceptions of 'free will'. 'Freedom of the 
will' does not mean that the will becomes an 'uncaused 
cause': it refers to a state of physical and mental 
being which is the necessary product of living in 
accordance with one's will. Thus, while the activity 
of the will may correspond to an experience which we 
call 'freedom', this experience and the operation of 
the will is no less causally determined than any other 
experience or mental activity.) 
Spinoza's conception of freedom leads him to make a 
distinction between active and passive emotions (or 
actions and passions). We act or are active when 
something takes place in us or outside of us which is 
clearly a product of our nature. On the other hand, 
we suffer or are passive when something takes place in 
us or follows from our nature of which we are only the 
partial cause. This distinction leads on to a series 
of propositions concerning the importance of under- 
standing in human development: because modifications 
of ideas and of the body always correspond, it follows 
that actions, which reflect one's nature, will 
incorporate ideas which reflect one's nature. But, 
as ideas which reflect nature are true ideas, increased 
freedom depends on the acquisition of true or adequate 
ideas. It is in this sense which freedom is life 
according to the dictates of reason. On the other 
hand, passiveness or servitude is to be explained by 
the possession of inadequate 'received' ideas which are 
not members if the self -generating series constituting 
one's mind, but are the products, at least in part, of 
external causes. For this reason, one's ordinary 
hates and loves, desires and aversions, succeed each 
other without any internal logical connection between 
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the ideas connected with them. 
Spinoza's psychology suggests that Freud's paradoxical 
dependence on his patients' reactions for therapeutic 
success reflects his neglect of the importance of 
Spinoza's equation between mental well -being and 
self- determination. This suggestion leads on to the 
proposition that the difference between the unconscious 
and the conscious is not 'structural' but personal or 
moral. Repression, sublimation, inversion, splitting, 
idealisation and their like are not impersonal 
'mechanisms' but genuinely personal activities, the 
purpose of which is to maintain a distinction between 
self -determination and the consequences of passivity. 
Spinoza's philosophy, and the writings of many 
moralists (Huxley 1945), stress that the maintenance of 
such a distinction is not always psychologically 
necessary, provided that one is prepared to take on 
the arduous task of what Aldous Huxley (1923) concludes 
would be "living in an unheard of manner ", that is, of 
accepting as true and acting on propositions such as 
those which make up Spinoza's "Ethics ". Such a task 
would be arduous because it would lead one to 'oppose 
external forces which frustrate one's own and others' 
powers of self -determination - both in close personal 
relationships and in society at large. 
3. The theoretical significance of the findings 
,Je are now in a position to discuss the contribution 
which Spinozan psychology can make to the understanding 
of the findings reported in this thesis. 
a. The development of 'active emotion'. The findings 
in this thesis support the view that young infants 
manifest a natural tendency to maintain and increase 
their powers of self- determination. Thus we have seen 
how, from an early period of high social interest 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6), infants became progressively 
more selective about what they attended to and about 
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how they interacted with what they attended to (Chapter 7). 
This progress is most obviously manifested by the early 
incidence of negativity: infants not only have means to 
shut out contact with unwanted entities but actively 
use these means when in conditions which frustrate 
their interests from the third month of life onwards. 
At first sight, it might be thought that negativity 
was essentially counter -productive so far as social 
development id concerned, tending to reduce inter- 
personal exchange, to lead to separateness and to cause 
sadness, guilt and depression in others. In the light 
of the analyses presented in Chapter 7 however, it 
seems that negativity is not necessarily unproductive 
so far as either infants or their caretakers are 
concerned. In the first place, to treat negativity 
as a personal comment directed specifically at oneself 
is to misunderstand it. Negativity appears to be a 
product of the infants' inability to act in the way 
they want to or to maintain their will in the face of 
frustrating external circumstances. Understood as such, 
it should provoke active attempts to discover and facil- 
itate the fulfilment of the infant's purposes whenever 
these are compatible with the caretaker's own purposes. 
If the caretaker's attempts are successful, negativity 
will have productive consequences for the infant as 
well as the caretaker. But, as all caretakers know, 
discovering what will comfort an unhappy baby is often 
a very difficult task. ihile this thesis confirms 
that babies can be cheered up by specific caretaker - 
interventions, - such as the initiation of game -playing - 
it remains to be seen whether developmental psycholo- 
gists can subdivide negativity into a number of 
genuinely different taxonomic 'types', each with specific 
diagnostic features and specific means of resolution. 
Spinoza was what is known as a 'logical monist'. 
This means that he believed the division between 'mind' 
and 'body' - or between 'psychology' and 'physiology' 
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- merely to reflect two ways of conceiving what is in 
fact the same substance, namely, human being. While 
this is only one amongst a number of possible under- 
standings of the mind -body distinction, it shows that 
there need be no contradiction in claiming, as in 
Chapter 6, that, in the early months, the development 
of active emotion is the same thing as the increasing 
power and differentiation of the infant's developing 
visual and motor systems: these 'two' developments may be 
just different attributes of the same growth -process. 
Thus, infants do 'psychologically' develop a wide range 
of interests during the early months, both in different 
sorts of interaction with persons and in the investigation 
and manipulation of their non -social surroundings. 
But these developments must also have 'physiological' 
attributes, with corresponding developments in the 
brain and central nervous system. 
In the study reported in Chapters 6 and 7, the infants' 
interests first appeared to be in relatively passive 
interactions with their environments but, with age, 
infants become increasingly interested in the active 
control of what is going on around them. This develop- 
ment is exemplified in the social sphere by their 
growing pleasure in games. It is exemplified in the 
non -social sphere by visual investigation of their 
surroundings, by the development of directed reaching, 
grasping and sucking of objects, as well as by experi- 
ments showing the apparently spontaneous interest infants 
take in acting so as to solve abstract contingency 
problems (see p.23 above; Papousek 1969, Matson 1972) . 
b. Intersub,-jectivity. Spinoza argues that the 
essence of human nature is self -maintenance and that 
individual development consists in the increase of the 
power of self -determination or 'active emotion'. But 
self -determination appears in his writings to be an 
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essentially asocial phenomenon. How then are we to 
account for evidence that there is a complex social 
sensitivity in the first two months of life (Chapter 5)? 
While Spinoza stated - in what seems, at first sight, 
an apotheosis of selfishness - that a free man is one 
who loves himself, seeks what is most useful to himself 
and preserves his own being, he went on to remark that 
we can never bring it about that we need nothing 
outside ourselves for our preservation, and that in 
order to live we need have no commerce with things 
which are without us. If, moreover, we looked at 
our minds, our intellect would be more imperfect if 
the mind were alone and understood nothing save 
itself. Many things are therefore without us which 
are very useful to us, and therefore much to be 
desired. Of these, none can be considered more 
excellent than those which agree with our nature. 
For (to give an example) if two individuals of the 
same nature were to combine, they would form one 
individual twicw as strong as either individual: 
there is nothing more useful to man than man ... 
From which it follows that men who are governed by 
reason, that is, men who, under the guidance of 
reason, seek what is useful to themselves, desire 
nothing for themselves which they do not also desire 
for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, 
faithful, and honourable." (my emphasis) 
What this statement suggests in the context of this 
thesis is that the infant's tendency towards self - 
determination will necessarily lead the infant into 
increasing involvement with other human beings. This 
is because, in the first instance, individual human 
beings have only finite powers. This means that, if 
individuals join up with others of the same nature as 
themselves, their powers will be multiplied. Thus, 
the logic of self -development implies increasing the 
depth and extent of one's combinations with others. In 
this light, infants' early interest in social interaction 
is a necessary product of their tendency towards self - 
determination. But Spinoza's argument does not only 
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apply to humans; it applies to all living beings. Thus 
we may assume that, throughout the evolutionary history 
of the human species, there has been a consistent pressure 
towards combination with others which has led to the 
endowment of infants with a range of specifically social 
skills which underlie the precocious social expressivity 
and ,ensitivity to other persons described in this 
thesis. It is these evolutionarily- endowed social skills 
which would constitute what Trevarthen calls a 'faculty 
for intersubjectivity'. 
c. The development of 'passive emotion', It might 
appear that, given the natural tendency for infants 
to increase their capacity for active emotion - and 
thus their freedom and happiness - that, by adulthood, 
human life should be extraordinarily pleasant. The 
fact that this is not always the case reflects the 
fact that human beings are unable to control all the 
external influences to which they are subjected. This 
is particularly the case in childhood, when individuals' 
powers are particularly limited. It is also a necessary 
consequence of individuals' involvement with other 
people, insofar as other people cannot always be sensi- 
tive to others' needs. In fact, because the human world 
is mainly a social world, the main source of external 
influence on individuals' behaviour is likely to be 
social. 
In Chapter 8 it was suggested that an early source 
of external influence is incorporated in the 'mirroring' 
behaviour of others, insofar as this behaviour reflects 
socio- ideological forces rather than direct self -expression. 
While it was not found possible to draw a distinction 
between these two different aspects of early infant - 
adult interactions on observational grounds, Spinoza's 
psychology would suggest that, when able actively to 
pursue their own interests, infants will perceive and 
act on others' actions as self -expressions but, when 
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'passive' or unable to pursue their own interests, 
others' actions cannot constitute support for the 
infants' actions and will thus come to constitute 
only reflections of the infants' current (passive) 
attitudes to the world. Thus if, under these circum- 
stances, and as proposed by Cooley and Lacan, children 
begin to assimilate and identify with the images which 
are most consistently projected onto them then, in 
being externally determined, their behaviour will 
become progressively more the product of ideas which 
are not wholly determined by their own natures, being also 
the product of society. But while, in Winnicott's (1960b) 
terms, ideologically inspired mirroring may, if inaccurate, 
lead to the assumption of a 'false' self - with path- 
ological consequences - Spinoza's theory would suggest 
that social definitions may play a positive as well as a 
negative role in self -development. They will play a 
negative role insofar as they are taken as absolute and 
allowed to determine individuals' actions. But the 
social knowledge derived from mirroring may also provide 
the basis for increased understanding of others' reactions 
to oneself and thus for the development of increasing 
skills for the fulfilment of one's purposes in the 
social world. 
d. Conclusion. This thesis has been concerned with 
the nature of early social development. The conclusion 
to be drawn from it is that the development of young 
infants as social beings is but one aspect of the all- 
embracing process of their development towards greater 
self -determination as persons. But it follows from 
our argument that, if this process is to be fruitful, 
its most important outcome will be the development of 
a richer and more consistent communion with others. 
Nevertheless, while development will, to a large extent, 
depend on the development of social skills and the 
acquisition of social understandings, these will only 
be valuable in the same way as all skills and knowledge 
are valuable, that is, insofar as they facilitate indi- 
viduals' desire to attain and preserve as great a state 
of perfection as is possible for human beings. 
4. Imrlications for future research 
The increasing scientific interest in early infancy 
which has characterised the past decade of research on 
human development has revealed an unsuspected psycho- 
logical precocity. As we begin to understand infants, 
we begin to understand that there is a large measure 
of unity in their being and our own. And, although 
we understand little, what we do understand suggests 
that we must relinquish old methods of research if our 
knowledge is to increase. 
The findings of this study have been based on the 
rejection of the usual experimental method of research 
- which produces normative statements about development 
- in favour of the a posteriori, forensic analysis of 
audio -visually recorded data. The most important 
advantage of the forensic method over the experimental 
method is that it allows us, as scientists, to place 
the highest meaning on what we observe. This should 
mean that a whole new range of questions about develop- 
ment can be answered by empirical research. The 
answers offered in this thesis are few and, as with all 
psychological 'answers', necessarily tentative. Yet 
they do open up a number of avenues for further 
investigation. 
First, let us take negativity. have seen that 
negativity is an important feature in early infant - 
adult exchanges and that it is sometimes susceptible 
to 'cure' by specific interventions on behalf of care- 
takers. But we do not know why certain interventions 
are sometimes successful and, at other times, unsuccessful. 
It is possible that further research would show that 
early negativity can be split into a number of sub- 
categories - for example, of 'fearful' negativity, 
based on infants' incomprehension of environmental 
changes (as in Lynne Murray's experiments; see also 
IA4 in Chapter 5), and of 'aggressive' negativity based 
on infants' frustration with the current state of their 
environment (as described in the examples presented in 
Chapter 7). Such a demonstration would not only be 
of theoretical interest, bearing for example on the 
genesis of emotion. It might also prove of practical 
assistance to those actively engaged in the round -the- 
clock task of looking after young babies. 
There is also more research needed on the positive 
aspect of infants' interactions with others. In this 
thesis we have presented one analysis of a section of 
one interaction between a nine- week -old and her mother. 
This showed close sympathy and a range of interactive 
responses by the baby. Further examples of this sort, 
from the behaviour of other babies and with babies of 
different ages,would throw light on the important 
problem of distinguishing the effects of 'temperament' 
from the effects of 'mood' on studies of and issues 
in the development of the psyche. The significances 
of 'moods' or 'changes of interest' in determining 
infant behaviour were touched upon in the discussion 
of the findings reported in Chapter 6 (see pp.2M- 
21t and Fig.6 /7) as well as in discussing the variable 
effectiveness of different 'cures' for negativity in 
Chapter 7. Further analyses along the lines of that 
presented in Chapter 5 might lead to an extension of 
the taxonomy of negativities, posited in the foregoing 
paragraph, into a more general taxonomy of both positive 
and negative states of mind in infancy. If this were 
possible, different temperaments might come to be 
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distinguished in terms of different 'dominant' moods 
or of characteristic constellations of moods. Alter- 
natively, it might be found that the concept of 'mood' 
so oversimplifies the variability of infants' behaviours 
that a more dynamic interpretation is required - for 
example, in terms of the logistics of the particular 
interpersonal transaction which provides the context 
for the behaviours being observed. 
This sort of analysis might lead on to a more general 
project. It has been assumed throughout this thesis 
that the complex social sensitivities of young infants 
are only possible if infants see others as constit- 
uting,in some sense, 'goal- directed' or 'purposive' 
agents. Only on this assumption do the everyday 
interpersonal terms which have been shown reliably 
to describe infant behaviour (pp.156 -177) 
make sense. The meaning 
of the word 'purposive' has been defined deliberately 
loosely (p.61): no attempt has been made to investi- 
gate to what extent infants understand others' purposes 
and intentions. Yet social development must partly 
consist in the understanding of more and more complex 
intentions by the child. Longitudinal series of analyses, 
such as the analysis reported in Chapter 5, might begin to 
throw light on how this aspect of social understanding 
develops. 
Two further issues arise from Chapter 8. The first 
concerns normal development. It has been argued in 
Chapter 8 that infants are immersed in ideology by 
means of the assimilation of systematic constructions 
of their actions by adults during face -to -face inter- 
actions. This hypothesis would predict that, in early 
infant -adult interactions, there should be specific 
sets of ideologically- inspired responses to babies' 
actions which correspond to dominant attitudes in the 
prevailing culture and differ between cultures - with 
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respect to sex -roles or the significance of personal 
possessions and private property, for example. The 
mirroring- hypothesis might thus give rise to a series 
of longitudinal studies designed to illuminate the 
behavioural basis for the internalisation of specific 
cultural attitudes. Clearly, if this could not be 
done parsimoniously, the mirroring -hypothesis would have 
to be abandoned in favour of simpler explanations for 
the acquisition of social knowledge (parental instruction, 
for example). 
The second issue arising from Chapter 8 concerns 
pathology. As shown in Chapter 8, not all parental 
delineations of babies' behaviours are 'justified'. And 
as argued there, 'unjustified' reactions to babies' 
behaviours will be the reflection of particular forms 
of parental self -expression. One might suggest there- 
fore, that the forms of self -expression which correspond 
to unjustified interpretations of infants' actions 
must all, for some reason, exclude the parent's sym- 
pathy with the infant. If this is the case, one would 
predict that abnormal states of mind, such as post- 
partum depression, would be associated with a high level 
of inaccurate mirroring of babies' behaviours by the 
sufferer. One would also predict that children who 
were subjected to continued distortions in their care- 
taker's interpretations of their behaviours would, more 
frequently than other children, develop a pathologically 
'false' sense of self, as suggested by Winnicott (1960b 
1967). This aspect of the mirroring- hypothesis could 
be tested by long -term case -analyses of 'at risk' infant - 
caretaker pairs. If supported, it would provide an 
important addition to our understanding of the genesis 
of pathologies as well as providing a valuable 
theoretical link between psychoanalytic theories of 
ego- formation and the more empirically -based traditions 
of developmental psychology. 
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Appendix 1: EKMAN AND FRIESEN'S (1975) 
DESCRIPTIONS OF SIX PRIMARY FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 
1. Surprise: distinctive clues 
" -The brows are raised, so that they are curved and 
high. 
-The skin below the brow is stretched. 
-Horizontal wrinkles go across the forehead. 
-The eyelids are opened; the upper lid is raised 
and the lower lid drawn down; the white of the eye 
(the sclera) shows above the iris, and often below 
as well. 
-The jaw drops open so that the lips and teeth are 
parted, but there is no tension or stretching of 
the mouth." 
2. Fear: distinctive clues 
" -The brows are raised and drawn together. 
-The wrinkles in the forehead are in the center, 
not across the entire forehead. 
-The upper eyelid is raised, exposing sclera, and 
the lower eyelid is tensed and drawn up. 
-The mouth is open and the lips are either tensed 
slightly and drawn back or stretched and drawn back." 
3. Disgust: distinctive clues 
" -The upper lip is raised. 
-The lower lip is also raised and pushed up to the 
upper lip, or is lowered and slightly protruding. 
-The nose is wrinkled. 
-The cheeks are raised. 
-Lines show below the lower lid, and the lid 
is 
pushed up but not tense. 
-The brow is lowered, lowering the upper 
lid." 
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4. Anger: distinctive clues 
" -The brows are lowered and drawn together. 
-Vertical lines appear between the brows. 
-The lower lid is tensed and may or may not be 
raised. 
-The upper lid is tensed and may or may not be 
lowered by the action of the brow. 
-The eyes have a hard stare and may have a bulging 
appearance. 
-The lips are in either of two basic postitions: 
pressed firmly together, with the corners straight 
or down; or open, tensed in a squarish shape as if 
shouting. 
-The nostrils may be dilated, but this is not 
essential to the anger facial expression and may 
also occur in sadness. 
-There is ambiguity unless anger is registered in 
all three facial areas." 
5. Happiness: distinctive clues 
"- Corners of lips are drawn back and up. 
-The mouth may or may not be parted, with teeth 
exposed or not. 
-A wrinkle (the naso- labial fold) runs down from 
the nose to the outer edge beyond the lip corners. 
-The cheeks are raised. 
-The lower eyelid shows wrinkles below it, and may 
be raised but not tense. 
-Crow's -feet wrinkles go outward from the outer 
corners of the eyes." 
6. Sadness: distinctive clues 
" -The inner corners of the eyebrows are drawn up. 
-The skin below the eyebrows is triangulated with 
the inner corner up. 
-The upper eyelid inner corner is raised. 
-The corners of the lips are down or the lip is 
trembling." 
For further details see Ekman and Friesen (1975 1978). 
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Appendix 2: SAMPLES OF DESCRIPTIONS USED IN 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3: COPY OF A PAPER 
BY SYLVESTER- BRADLEY AND TREVARTHEN (1978) 
"Babytalk as an Adaptation to the Infant's 
Communication" 
published in N. Waterson and C. Snow (Eds.) 
The Development of Communication, London: 
Wiley; pp.75 -92 
Plate 1 is Photos. 121 -138 . 
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Baby Talk as an Adaptation to the 
Infant's Communication 
B. Sylvester- Bradley and C.Trevarthen 
This paper is a discussion of films and 
video -tapes taken of one baby girl, Sarah, between 
the ages of 8 and 20 weeks, with her caucasian, primi- 
parous, middle -class mother. At approximately weekly 
intervals the mother visited our laboratory where she 
was asked to chat with Sarah while we filmed from an- 
other room. Twelve sessions yielded, on average, 
4 minutes 39 seconds of film (see Trevarthen 1977, 
for procedural details). 
With this small corpus of data we wish to 
illustrate the necessary preconditions for discussing 
a mother's baby talk as an adaptation to her infant's 
communication. Two subsidiary issues are involved: 
first, the ways in which the mother's baby talk changes 
in relation to her infant's behaviour, and secondly, in 
what sense these changes constitute adaptations to a 
growing communication. 
*This research was supported by an M.R.C. 
Studentship and S.S.R.C. Grant No.HR 2263 'Prespeech 
in Communication of Infants with Adults'. 
75 
76 
CHANGES OF BABY TALK IN RELATION TO THE INFANT'S 
BEHAVIOUR 
We observed striking changes in both Sarah's 
behaviour and her mother's baby talk. In the first 
few weeks of the study both mother and child interacted 
with animation, Sarah displaying many of the behaviours 
we associate with sociability (e.g., smiling and eye - 
contact). By 14 weeks, however, the mother - infant inter- 
action no longer seemed so successful. As noted in some 
other studies (e.g., Polak, Emde and Spitz, 1964), there 
was a marked decline in the proportion of each session 
for which Sarah would look positively (without crying) 
at her mother, and there was also a marked decline in 
the proportion of time Sarah spent smiling (see Figure 1). 
However, as in Ambrose's (1963) study, these drops in 
our indicators of interactional success were followed 
at around 17 weeks by second peaks. (N.B. These indi- 
cators are not homogeneous. For example, the final 
decline in eye- contact to the level found at 18, 19 and 
20 weeks, differs from the first decline at 12, 13 and 
14 weeks in that it represents less Sarah's purely 
looking away from her mother, e.g., just to stare at 
the floor, the ceiling or her hands, than looking away 
to examine the rest of the room.) 
Here we have a conspicuous change in Sarah's 
behaviour, and it is clear in our analysis that her 
mother's baby talk showed a concurrent change. Although 
we do not want to claim any direct causal relations 
between the indices we happen to have measured, it is 
true to say that, as Sarah began to grow less sociable, 
there was an increase in the verbal density of her 
mother's baby talk (syllables /sec. of Standard English), 
and, furthermore, it was only when the baby talk showed 
a definite decrease in density that Sarah's positive 
regard and smiling recovered. These changes in verbal 
density were also associated with an overall increase 
in the proportion of utterances which were contentless. 
Our use of the terms 'verbal', 'non -verbal' 
and 'contentless' is as follows. An utterance is deemed 
verbal if it is made up of Standard English words, 
otherwise it is deemed non -verbal. An utterance is re- 
gistered as contentless when the verbal information it 
might convey is subordinated to the effect of its con- 
stituent physical sounds. Thus non -verbal utterances, 
such as imitations of Sarah's babbles, are automatical- 
ly contentless, but verbal utterances are only content - 
less when their stressing and intonation undergo a 
marked alteration, as in verses, chants or songs (cf. 
Snow, 1975). This means that the approximately in- 
verse relationship between changes in verbal density 
and changes in the proportion per session of content - 
less utterances shown in Figure 2 is by no means a 
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density at the end of our study is at least partly due 
to an increase in those utterances which are verbal but 
contentless (i.e., 14.8% of contentless utterances are 
verbal up to 15 weeks whereas from 16 to 20 weeks, the 
proportion is 38.6%). 
We will discuss the significance of these va- 
rious changes of the mother's baby talk and her infant's 
behaviour in the last section, after we have outlined the 
philosophical basis for our approach to them as communi- 
cative. 
THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING OUR RESEARCH INTO MOTHER - 
INFANT COMMUNICATION 
It is difficult to judge if and when infant 
behaviour is communicative. This problem stems from 
the traditional idea that communication is fundamental- 
ly a process of 'knowing' or 'getting to know' in which 
one entity, the knower or subject, gains awareness of 
another, the thing known or object; an idea which 
leads to the more general problem of whether or not we 
can know other minds. To the empiricist, who accepts 
(irrationally, in Hume's view) that external objects 
can be known, the idea that 'behind' the appearance of 
some such objects (people) there hides a knowing sub- 
ject (an essence or Being) is irrational and Romantic. 
Thus, in psychological treatments of communication, the 
behaviouristic empiricist approach permits no analysis 
of behaviour as meaningful and directly opposes the 
more Romantic, psychoanalytic approach in which it is 
contended that all behaviour is meaningful. The limited 
practical use of both approaches for the scientific 
study of communication is rooted in the subject- object 
dualism. 
To dispose of this philosophic opposition 
between subject and object is a primary prerequisite for 
the study of communication. The resolution has been 
achieved in philosophy by placing the opposition in the 
living context of what we will call a 'field': 'immediate 
flux of life', James (1904), the 'practical human sense 
activity' of Marx (1845), or Wittgenstein's (1958) 
'forms of life'. The ideas of 'subjectivity' and 'con- 
sciousness', the terms 'subject' and 'object', have 
ceased to be dignified with epistemological primacy in 
human research. They are the products of a philosophi- 
cal language and no language can be superimposed on the 
field of social life, something which embraces and is 
infinitely more subtle than language itself. As do all 
words, philosophical jargon has value but only insofar 
as there are forms of social life in which it plays a 
useful part. It follows that an understanding of social 
affairs is the precondition for an understanding of 
language and indeed, of philosophy, rather than 
vice 
versa! Any understanding of social life must originate 
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in a knowledge of other minds which is taken for granted 
as inherent in the society of men. Thus, any student of 
social affairs must acknowledge from the start, both 
a priori, methodologically and in fact, observationally, 
that man is endowed with an intuitive understanding of 
his fellows. The main problem facing us in this approach 
to the study of social behaviour is the status of the 
individual. If we argue, with Macmurray (1961), that 
the original form of knowledge is knowledge of others, 
how can we come to know ourselves? As Nietzsche con- 
cludes, this is the question we are least able to answer 
('Jeder ist sich selber der Fernste', Nietzsche, 1887, 
sect. 33S). 
What we are saying is that the sense of 'com- 
munication' will be discovered in terms of the nature 
and articulation of what now appears as a field of 
social forms. The investigation of this field is dif- 
ficult because of the investigator's participation in 
it - implicating him in polarizing the field, however 
hard he does or does not try to detach himself as an 
observer. Thus, to analyse social relations as if 
they were divided from oneself is to adopt an uncriti- 
cal position. But as yet, no way has been found to 
analyze them usefully as a part of one's personal life. 
This difficulty dogs the study of mothers and infants 
even where it is least apparent. For illustration, we 
will examine the 'pragmatic' approach to the study of 
mother - infant communication taken by those psycholo- 
gists who accept the philosophy of, among others, 
Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Searle and Grice (e.g., 
Bruner, 1975; Shotter, 1975). 
As an example we will take one of Grice's 
(1957) criteria for meaningful communication, that 
'the speaker must intend to produce a certain effect 
in his listener'. This criterion poses the problem of 
establishing the infant's intention. For instance, 
Sarah's mother often commented on her daughter's be- 
haviour around 14 weeks as if it were a rejection (e.g., 
Are you just gonna ignore me ?, You've got the pip with 
me, haven't you ?) which was directed specifically at 
her (e.g., It's )ust me you don't want to talk to, 
isn't it ?), particularly as the decrease in Sarah's 
sociability was less noticeable when she was with other 
adults (cf. Fitzgerald, 1968; and Caldwell, 1965, in 
Schaffer, 1971, who found similar strange preferences 
at 3 months). But did Sarah intend to reject her 
mother? We cannot ask her as we would ask an adult, 
and to posit a non -verbal procedure for the verifica- 
tion of intention is to accept that actions embody in- 
tentions in the absence of any conscious acknowledge- 
ment, a position akin to Freud's notion of 'uncon- 
scious ideas' and subject to the problems of Roman - 
ticisim (see below). 
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Nevertheless, Bruner (1975) in his paper 
'The Ontogenesis of Speech Acts', outlines just this 
sort of procedure. He asserts that intentional be- 
haviour has measurable features which can be used for 
'inferring that children "have" intentions'; for 
example, 'anticipation of an outcome of an act', 'a 
stop -order defined by an end -state', 'appropriate 
means for the achievement of an end -state', and so on. 
In this vein, we might argue that, because Sarah's re- 
jection was active (she would refuse her mother's 
attentions despite her mother's repeated attempts to 
re- establish contact, e.g., calling out Hello:, Sarah!, 
etc., putting her head in Sarah's line of regard, and 
even tugging Sarah's head round to face her), it was 
intended. But such a designation of the 'end- state' of 
Sarah's behaviour as a rejection must still ultimately 
depend on the more or less covert assumption of an 
ideal form of communication within which some logic 
of human relationship is supposedly working, a form 
conceptualized in psychoanalysis, for instance, as 
culminating in the 'prise de conscience' or 'passage 
into the Full Word' (Lacan, 1956). 
If the analysis were to stop at this point, 
with the use of criteria, its conclusions would at 
best be condemned to relativity; they would be less 
the product of real discoveries in the field of social 
relations than of some position, political, moralistic 
or religious, which had been adopted by the investi- 
gator. For example, Shotter concludes, near the be- 
ginning of his article on mother - infant interaction 
(1975), that the goal of personal development (and 
therefore developmental psychology) is 'to act delib- 
erately rather than spontaneously'. To adopt this 
kind of dogmatic position is to reinstitute the dualism 
between the appearance and the underlying 'essence' of 
development, dividing the analyst as by divine right 
from his subjects. Indeed, it is to assume psycholo- 
gical knowledge which we do not have and of a type we 
would be mistaken to seek. 
The weakness of the pragmatic analysis of 
communication lies in its ignorance of origin: on the 
one hand, the psychological origins of communication 
(e.g., of the illocutionary force), and on the other, 
the origins of the analyst's position vis -à -vis his 
investigation (i.e., his view of social relations). 
Either way a consideration of origins leads back to 
the field of social relations. For the truth of the 
investigation depends first, on the psychological 
processes which allow the investigator to make real 
discoveries in his involvement with others as a na- 
tural, historical individual, and secondly, on the 
possibility of representing those discoveries in a 
language which others can understand and, as a 
corollary, in whose terms he can comprehend his own 
3q-ß 
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position in the field of human relations. What saves 
such discoveries from relativism is that they are a 
product of the investigator's personal life, which is 
for him absolute. The individuality expressed in a 
finding about humans is to the researcher a gain in 
self -knowledge, to others it is his originality. That 
knowledge about our fellows can only be gained within 
a personal context is thus not a drawback to social 
research, but its precondition and its only true worth. 
This personal approach is therefore essential to any 
research into human relations, the vexing difficulty 
of which should not be glossed over. 
Our research into communication between 
mother and infant must begin with the delineation and 
description of the social forms in which we perceive 
them to participate: it is in terms of the nature and 
articulation of these forms that we will come to under- 
stand the psychological processes underlying mother - 
infant communication. That is why we emphasize a 
descriptive approach (Trevarthen, 1977). 
Our argument that Sarah takes part in social 
forms of life runs as follows. The majority of English 
speakers distinguish certain patterns of life as 
'social' (e.g., arguing, chatting, joking) and these 
patterns incorporate certain behaviours. In analysing 
our films of Sarah supposedly chatting with her mother, 
we recorded many of the social behaviours accepted as 
important in 'chatting' between adults (often in diverse 
cultures, see, e.g., Eibl -Eibesfeldt, 1970; Ekman, 
1973): facial expressions such as smiling, frowning, 
and surprise, vocalizations, crying, laughing, patterned 
eye- contact, spontaneous and reciprocal eye -brow flash- 
ing, gesture -like arm -movements and some speech -like 
lip and tongue- movements (see Trevarthen, 1977), imi- 
tation of and a degree of bodily synchrony with the 
mother (see Plate 1). Moreover, we found that Sarah 
showed these behaviours specifically in the context of 
'chatting'; the frequency of these behaviours while 
chatting was much greater than their frequency while 
attempting to grasp a suspended wooden ball (e.g., at 
9 weeks the chatting : reaching ratios were regard 
81 : 85, number of eyebrow flashes 17 : 5, number of 
tongue protrusions 61 : 8, number of mouth openings 
51 : 16, number of vocalizations 6 : 0, number of 
frowns 8 : 0, number of smiles 16 : 0, see Sylvester - 
Bradley, in preparation). Sarah exhibited not only 
social behaviours but also a basic distinction be- 
tween social and asocial contexts. We conclude that 
this distinction is of great psychological signifi- 
cance and in this cannot agree with many statements 
to the contrary in the developmental literature (e.g., 
Schaffer, 1971: 1, 31). Trevarthen (1976, 1977) in- 
corporates the idea of an inherent aptitude for per- 
ceiving persons as partners in communication and for 
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expressing communicatively, into the term 'inter - 
subjectivity' which both describes the nature of 
communication and presumably reflects some specific 
but unknown structure of the brain, with which the 
infant is born. 
We will now proceed with a more detailed 
discussion of those changes in Sarah's behaviour and 
her mother's baby talk outlined above in terms of a 
description of the social patterns in which Sarah and 
her mother took part. In this way we hope to establish 
not so much the presence or absence of their communi- 
cation as the forms in which it is constituted. 
FORMS OF ADAPTATION 
Conversational Form. Baby talk is social behav- 
iour and social behaviour must involve mutual adapta- 
tion at some level of description. At the most super- 
ficial level, baby talk sounds like half a conversa- 
tion (Snow, 1975). And further, if one describes the 
interchange as a conversation, one finds that the 
mother's baby talk adapts to the infant's acts. For 
example, subtle movements of Sarah's head, although 
often ignored, are often picked up as formal contri- 
butions to a conversation. At weeks, 
slight, alternating head -movements by Sarah produced 
an emphatic head -shake in her mother accompanied by 
an abrupt change from a succession of positive state- 
ments and questions to a negative statement: You're 
looking very pensive, aren't you? You're looking very 
pensive. Mmm. What are you doing? (Sarah's head 
moves laterally.) You don't want to smile (with em- 
phatic head -shake). No. etc. The mother, in treat- 
ing Sarah's behaviour as communicative, lends this 
episode the form of conversational turn -taking. But 
to say that the mother is holding a conversation with 
Sarah is in fact absurd: the interaction may be con- 
versational but it is not a conversation. In the 
first place, there is no exchange of ideas, and sec- 
ondly , even adult conversation cannot be adequately 
characterized by a simple transcription of what is 
spoken. An analysis of baby talk as a conversation 
is misplaced because it exaggerates the baby's con- 
scious achievement and it totally neglects baby talk's 
intersubjective origins. 
At another level, a primary origin of mother - 
child interaction is the mother's responsibility for 
satisfying her child's physiological needs. This res- 
ponsibility, however, is not obviously reflected in our 
mother's baby talk. She did not assume dominance, 
scarcely referring to herself at all (only 9.0% of all 
pronominal subjects were 'I'; 76.8% were 'you'; and 
only 2.7% of all her utterances referred to her own 
feelings or intentions and these were often playful, 
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e.g., 'I'11 bite your little hand off; 23.5% re- 
ferred to the infant's psychical state). Neither did 
she exercise much authority; only 2.9% of her utter- 
ances were imperative and these too were often play- 
ful (e.g., You let me go: when Sarah was holding her 
hair). Thus in the main, baby talk is not an accompani- 
ment to the management of physiological needs. These 
needs may be mentioned (e.g., You a bit hot, eh ?, or 
You wanna drink ?) but only amongst all the other varied 
references to Sarah, her body, her clothes and her gen- 
eral psychical state , which make up 84.3% of all the 
references in our corpus of baby talk. The mother 
appears to be playing a passive, receptive role in 
which she continually interprets back to Sarah Sarah's 
immediate state, her moods (e.g., You're giving me the 
cold shoulder), her facial expressions (e.g., You're 
not looking very happy), and her actions (e.g., You've 
got your hand in the air) as they happen. Thus, Th 
the first two weeks of our study, 83.8% of all verbs 
used were in the present tense (overall proportion: 
69.8%). In these early sessions this receptive role 
was particularly apparent. We wish to distinguish it 
as the defining characteristic of a social form we 
will call 'mirroring'. 
Mirroring. Mirroring is a strategy used in 
psychotherapy (see, for example, the transcriptions 
in Axline, 1947) which is particularly useful in early 
stages of treatment for establishing the therapist's 
emotional understanding of a patient, and also for 
developing the patient's consciousness of his own 
actions. It is a strategy demanding an attitude of 
mind which Freud (1912) described as the 'fundamental 
rule of psychoanalysis', namely, that the analyst 
'must adjust himself to the patient as a telephone re- 
ceiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone .. 
so (his) unconscious is able, from the derivatives of 
the unconscious which are communicated to him, to re- 
construct that unconscious, which has determined the 
patient's free associations' (cf. the infant's actions). 
This is an excellent description of the attitude of 
mind evinced by the mother, who appears in the role of 
an unconsciously skilled analyst. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the mother has a symbolic key or programme 
of categories for experience (as does the analyst: he 
uses the 'Freudian' or 'Jungian' system), a key which 
is partly idiosyncratic and partly cultural and which 
leads to a very selective construction of her baby's 
actions. This key operates obviously in the verbal 
sphere (in the adjectives used, e.g., 'grumpy', 
'cheeky', 'pensive'), but also programmes the non- 
verbal sphere of the interaction (as the movement 
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Although a mother's mirroring may just sound 
as if she is talking to herself it is not a wholly 
verbal activity, in fact verbal mirroring appears to 
be sometimes a substitute for and sometimes a projec- 
tion of a non -verbal interactive process into the 
verbal sphere. As far as the infant can recognize 
her own actions in the mirroring of her mother (and 
this ability would be no more than a reorganization of 
the imitative process which Sarah sometimes demonstrates, 
see Plate 1; cf. Maratos, 1973) it is the non -verbal 
modes of mirroring which must be primary. These modes 
are both visual (see Plate 1) and vocal. Thus for 
example, a cry may be mirrored concurrently by the 
mother in terms of amplitude, intonation and phrasing; 
it might also be repeated after Sarah had stopped cry- 
ing. The spheres of verbal and non -verbal mirroring 
may thus unite, a verbal interpretation being delivered 
in the form of the non -verbal sound it is mirroring 
(e.g., the mother says You're crying!; mirroring the 
cry in terms of amplitude and pitch . However, non- 
verbal and verbal mirroring do not always harmonize; 
they may conflict. For example, a long sequence of 
visually mirrored mouth movements (see Plate 1) fin- 
ished abruptly when one of Sarah's movements was in- 
terpreted verbally as a yáwn (i.e. Howowowowo (non- 
verbal mirroring of Sarah's mouth movements which cul- 
minate with a pseudo -yawn) Tt: Are you very bored ?). 
As Sarah grows older, her mother mirrors 
different things. In fact, mirroring is a social form 
ideally suited to incorporate the infant's changes of 
interest and development of ability. For example, 
Sarah's ability to touch and grasp objects showed a 
marked improvement during the study (Figure 3). This 
new ability and the associated interest in the out- 
side world is reflected in the mother's baby talk by 
a large overall increase in the proportion of references 
to bodies other than Sarah's (i.e., her clothes, her 
mother, her toys and other objects around the room, see 
Figure 3b). Thus mirroring remains an important 
pattern throughout the study and indeed into adulthood 
when speakers and listeners often complete each other's 
unfinished sentences, demonstrating the degree of their 
mutual understanding (see, for example, Ferguson, 1975, 
on 'silent interruptions' and 'predictive monitoring'). 
It is in terms of what 'mirroring' offers to 
the infant that we may begin to understand the changes 
outlined in the second section of this paper. These 
changes lead the communication to other forms of inter- 
action. It is clear that the mother is concerned at 
Sarah's increasingly antisocial behaviour at three 
months (see her comments, page 79 ). Her response to 
this behaviour is first to mirror it verbally (e.g., 
You're telling me off aren't you ?' You're not gonna 
have a chat today. Are you bored with Mummy; talk 
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all the time). Thus the correlation between the rise 
in verbal density of baby talk and the fall in Sarah's 
sociability can be seen as a part of the social form of 
mirroring. However, the recovery in Sarah's positive 
regard and smiling seems to be associated with a de- 
crease rather than this increase in verbal density (cf. 
Figures 1 and 2). We contend that this decrease re- 
flects the rising importance of an alternative social 
form to mirroring, best exemplified in games. 
Playful Form. The rise of the game -playing is 
indicated by the overall increase of contentless utter- 
ances in baby talk (see Figure 2a). Although this in- 
crease partly reflects the increasing number of Sarah's 
vocalizations - because vocalizations are usually imi- 
tated - one major contribution to it is the increasing 
number of rhythmically repeated verbal utterances (see 
page 78) for example, You're gonna play a game with 
me -you're goin to play a game. Goin to play a game. 
Goin to play a game. Hey: Hey: Hey: Goin to play 
a game. In chanting and dancing games like this, in 
their rhythm and music, thé verbal and non -verbal 
spheres are integrated in a new way. Games have a 
regular structure which lasts several seconds, and 
this structure is always accentuated vocally by the 
mother, and often by the baby too. Thus, a phase of 
action, which often has its own vocally stressed beat 
(e.g., butting Sarah in the stomach, worrying her fin- 
gers) is inevitably followed by a pause during which 
the mother looks at her baby and smiles, laughs or 
calls out. If the baby expresses enjoyment at this 
point, by happy animation or a call, the game will be 
renewed, often in a slightly altered form. 
We believe that this playful social form 
differs from mirroring in that it requires the mutual 
understanding and confidence which mirroring is 
adapted to foster. Mirroring is receptive while play 
is more assertive; thus, borrowing from Grice's termi- 
nology in the citation above, we would say that early 
on, the mother was developing her comprehension of the 
various 'effects' Sarah 'intended' to produce in her, 
passively letting her have her say, while in the later 
stage, the mother has gauged Sarah and can thus more 
actively have a say too. To do so, she has had to 
change her language into a form more compatible with 
Sarah's embryonic understanding and expectations. Thus, 
by the end of our study, the interaction between Sarah 
and her mother seemed as successful as at the beginning 
but in a different way and at a higher plane of com- 
plexity. Not only had Sarah's abilities and interests 
grown and changed, objects becoming more important, 
but 
the emergence of the playful form of social 
interaction 
had involved transformation of Sarah's social 
behaviours 
as well as her mother's baby talk. 
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In summary, we see the most fruitful way of 
understanding the complex variations in Sarah's be- 
haviour from 8 to 20 weeks and in her mother's baby 
talk to be as manifestations of a developing relation- 
ship. The growth of joint enterprise fostered in the 
forms of mirroring and play would seem to prepare nat- 
urally for more complex enterprises later, in which the 
growth of Sarah's understanding, both of people and of 
things, will take place in a predominantly social world. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have discussed baby talk as 
part and illustration of the mutual interactive adapta- 
tion between mother and child. 'Adaptation' is here 
less a biological than a psychological term: an infant's 
rejection of its mother would be strictly maladaptive 
in evolutionary terms were it not taking place within a 
psychological realm with its own systems of control and 
laws of growth. In our terms, an adaptation is a social 
form in which both mother and child share through their 
inherent similarities. Such similarities are not only 
the basis of mother -child interaction but also of the 
investigator's understanding of their communication. Al- 
though this shared core at the heart of each social form 
may vary in the complexity and content of its expression, 
it persists through life: while knowledge develops, the 
fundamental forms of sociability stay the same. For 
example, the onset of language is a cognitive milestone 
with enormous consequences in the pragmatics of communi- 
cation, but is it an interactive milestone? We think 
our work shows that it is not. Sarah's linguistic 
skills will be employed within pre- existing forms of 
interaction just as was her new interest and ability 
with objects. 
Although the main form stays the same, the 
student of interactive development is faced with a pro- 
cess of change. We must withstand the temptation to 
call this change progress because the formulation of 
development as progress destroys any curiosity for the 
actual nature of change. For this reason we have not 
considered the development we observed as a necessary 
progression of social forms; those forms were observed 
to a lesser or greater extent throughout our study and 
will continue to recur (see Trevarthen, 1976, for fur- 
ther discussion). A child does not disregard her 
mother for the last time at the age of fifteen weeks: 
Neither were the changes we recorded unidirectional. 
But then, in our view, social change does not gain 
sense from its place in a chronological progression 
but from the position of the individual concerned with- 
in the field of social relations at the time of change 
and the investigator's perception of that position. 
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What we have tried to demonstrate in this 
paper is less a theory of social development than a 
necessary orientation to our subject- matter. Thus, 
if our approach appears tautologous because we assume 
sociability in studying the baby, it is with good 
reason; because, as Samuel Beckett has remarked a 
tautology is the expression of a relation. The 
practical value of that relation, as the tautologous 
theory of biological evolution by 'survival of the 
fittest' shows, is the opening of new fields of des- 
cription to procedures of scientific verification. 
The aim of our argument then has been to illustrate 
the necessity and productivity of describing baby 
talk as an adaptation to the infant's communication 
within the field of social relations. 
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Appendix 5 (Part 1): BABYTALK OF SARAH'S MOTHER 
(All sessions) 
1. 9.5.75 (aged 8 weeks) 
Poor wee thing. Eh? Hello darling. What are we 
doing to you? What are we doing to Sarah? Eh? 
What are we doing? What are we doing? Eh? Oh 
really. That's the girl. That's a good girl. 
Yes. Yes. You brought up your wind. 
You're on candid camera. What are you doing? Eh? 
Are we going t'have a chat? Are you sitting comfort- 
ably? Are you comfortable? Eh? Sweetheart. 
Hello. Hello. Hello darling. Hello. Eh? Hello. 
You're looking pensive, aren't you. You're looking 
very pensive. Mmm. What are you doing? What are 
you doing? Eh? You don't want to smile. No. No. 
Eh? You don't want to smile. What we goin' to talk 
'bout than? Eh? You do look worried. Eh? Have 
you got worries? Eh? Are you worried? Are you 
darling? What's up? What's up? What's up? What 
are you doing up here? What are you doing up there? 
Eh? What are you doing up there? Silly girl. Yes 
you are. What do you see? What do you see? I 
don't think you're looking at me actually. I think 
you're looking behind me. I think you are. I do. 
I think you are. I think you're looking behind me. 
The lights are a bit too bright. Is it? The lights 
are bright my baby. Yes. Boobooboo. Yes. Yes it 
is sweetheart. Yes. It's a bit bright, isn't it. 
Eh? It's a bit bright. I'm sure you keep looking 
past me. There's something fascinating you behind me. 
Is there? Eh? Something fascinating. Is there? 
(Whistles) What's happening? What's happening? 
Boobedeboo. Boobedeboo. You've got your hand in the 
air. Who's got their hand in the air? Eh? Hello 
Sarah Ninnes. Hello Sarah Ninnes. Hello. Boo. 
Boobooboo. Boo. Hello. Hello. Boobedebooboo. 
I don't think you like the lights, do you. I don't 
think you like the lights. You're looking a wee bit 
grumpy, aren't you. Yes you are. Hey. Hey Sarah. 
Hey. You're looking a bit grumpy aren't you. Are 
you? You're looking a bit grumpy. Mmm. Mmm. 
Look at that face. Look at that little chin. Whose 
chin's that? Eh? Whose chin's that? You're going 
to sneeze. (Does) That's very antisocial. Sneeze 
all over people. Yes it is. Yes it is. Silly girl. 
Ohh. Ohhh. Oh. Yes. It's very antisocial. 
Sneeze all over people. Yes it is, isn't it. Eh? 
Isn't it. Yes. You don't look like you feel like 
chatting very much. No. Boobedeboo. Hello. 
Hello little one. Little one. Yes. Little Sarah. 
(Breathing game) What's happening? What's happening? 
Ahhh. You've hit me on the nose. You've hit me on 
the nose. Yes you did. (Breathing game) Eh? 
Hello? Boobeboo. Goodegoo. Little Sarah. Hello. 
Hello little Sarah. Hello. Little one. You're 
looking grumpy. Yes you are. I think you're looking 
very betty. Eh? Can you refute that with a smile? 
And a little chat? Yes. Yes. Oh googedegoo. 
Googedegoo. Hey. Googedegoo. Goo. Good girl. 
Hello. Gooph. I'll bite your hand off. Yes I will. 
Silly Sarah. I'm going to bite your little hand off. 
Yes I am. Yes I am. Chubby face. Chubby face. 
Oohh. (Laughs) Is it your chubby face? Yes you 
are. Yes it is. Yes it is. What a silly face. 
Eh? What a silly grin. What a silly grin. Yes. 
Ooh. Ooh. I'll bite your fingers. I'm gonna eat 
your hand up. Ooh. Ooh. Ah. Ah. Ah. Would 
you like your frilly nappy on the film? Would you? 
That'll be fun. Yes it would. With a few sound 
effects. (Laughs) Mm? Ooh. Ah? Hello. Ah.... 
Hello. Hello. Hello. Arms everywhere. Arms 
everywhere. Arms are a good thing. Yes they are. 
They just shoot out ail over the place. Yes they do. 
Yes they do. Boobedegoo. Hello. Oh: Oh. 
(Breathing game) Sound effects. (Blows one breath) 
Sound effects. (Kissing noise) Ho. (Kissing noise) 
Ho yea. (Kissing noise) Hhhho yea. Howo yea. 
Howowowowo. Oh: ('Pretend' yawn) Tt, are you very 
bored? Are you very bored? (Laughs) Eh? Are you 
very bored? Cheeky thing. Are you? Hello. (Mock 
yawn) (Simplified yawn sound) (More complicated 
mock yawn) Oo -oo. Oo -oo. Tt, are you very bored? 
You're bored with Mummy's face really aren't you. Eh? 
You're bored with Mummy's face really. Yes. I don't 
blame you. I don't blame you. There must be more 
interesting things. (Mock gulp /cough) (Sucks in 
spittle) (Blows raspberry) (Donald Duck quacking 
noise) Hello. What's that funny noise? Hello? 
(Pants twice, quietly) (Pants twice) See anything 
else interesting to look at? Nothing you can see? 
Just my face? That's boring. Isn't it. Eh? 
That's very boring (laughing). (Sighs) Gosh. Gosh. 
2. 15.5.25 (aged 9 weeks) 
What are you doing? What do you see? What do you 
see? Hello darling. Hello. Oo- oo- oo -oo. (Laughs) 
Hello. Hello. Are you going to have a talk today? 
Are you going to have a talk? Are you? Oooh. Goin' 
t'have - ahaha. Ahaha. You've had a busy day? 
You've had a busy day. Yes you have. Yes you have. 
Yes you have. You've had a busy day my darling. 
Hello. Bobedebop. Hello. Had a busy day? Eh? 
Had a busy day? Hello. 
Hello Sarah. What do you see? Boobooboo. Are 
we goin' to have a big talk about it? Oh yes. Oh, 
we goin' to have a big talk about it? Are we? Gain' 
to have a big talk about it? You're clever, aren't 
you. You're clever. You're a clever girl. Yes you 
are. Yes you are. You're very clever. Ooo. 
0o-ho. 0o-ho. Ooo. 0o -ao. You clever? Ooo. 
Yes you are. Aren't you. Co. You're a clever girl. 
Co, What's the matter? Eh? Wha - it's very hot. 
It's very hot with the lights. Yes it is. Yes it is. 
Yes it is. Eh? What's the matter? What you trying 
to grab? Oh struggle -struggle. Little one. Little 
struggle. Eh? Little struggle. Hello. Hello. 
Hello strug. Hello strug. Hello. Hello. Hello. 
You look like you're about to hit me. Are you? 
You're about to hit me. Eh? You wouldn' hit me would 
you? Eh? Little one. Oops. (Laughs) 0oopsee. 
Are you bored? Are you bored with Mummy? Talk all 
the time. Yes yes. (Blows) What is it? (Blows) 
What is it? (Blows) What is it? So hot. It's so hot. 
Isn't it. It's so hot little one. Hello. It's so 
hot. It's so hot. Yes. Booboo. (Kiss) Hello. 
Hello little one. Hello. Hello. (Breathing game) 
I'm going to kiss you. (Kiss) (Laughs) Hello. 
You look like you're gonna hit me. Are you? You 
gonna hit me? You a bit uncomfortable? A bit uncom- 
fortable. Are you? Struggle- struggle. Struggle - 
struggle. Struggle- Sarah. Sarah. Are you gonna 
struggle? (Breathing game) (Laughs) Are you gonna 
struggle? Oo -000. What's the matter? You got a 
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bit of wind or something, eh? (Breathing game) 
Little poppet. Little poppet. Little one. Eh? 
Are you quite comfortable or not? Hello. What are 
you doing, Sarah? Sarah. Eh? Are you gonna blow 
bubbles now? What are you doing? What are you doing? 
What are you doing? Eh? What are you doing? What 
are you doing? Oh, what are you doing? Oh Sarah. 
Oh what are you doing? You silly thing. You silly 
thing. Hello. What are you doing? (Pants) 0o -oo. 
Sarah. Oo. What are you doing? Yes. Little one. 
You're not looking very happy. You a bit hot? Eh? 
(Pants) Happy, are you? Eh? (Blows) What's that? 
(Blows) What's that, eh? (Blows) What's that, eh? 
Boo. What's that? Boom -boom. Eh? Boom -boom. 
Boom -boom. Eh? Oh: Eh? Gonna hit you. You look 
suspicious. You're a bit suspicious. You a bit 
suspicious? It's very hot, isn't it. Eh? It's 
very hot. Yes it is. It's very hot. Yes yes. 
It's very hot isn't it. Eh? (Blows) Look at all 
those bubbles. Look at all these bubble -bub- bub -bub- 
bub- bubble -bubbles. Look at all these bubbles. 
(Laughs) Look at all your bu- bu -bu- bubbles on your 
mouth. Look at them all, eh? Look at all your 
bubbles. Little one. Little one. (Pants) You 
gonna dribble. You're gonna dribble and I haven't got 
anything to help. No. You gonna dribble. (Pants) 
Eh? Hello blue eyes. Hello blue eyes. Yes. Aaow. 
Yes. Hello. Hello. Oo. You look like you're 
gonna fall out. Are you? You look like you're gonna 
fall over. Are you? Chicka -chicka. What do you 
see? What do you see? What do you see? 
3. 23.5.75 (aged 10 weeks 
(Laughs) You're looking sad, aren't you. Eh? 
(Laughs) No. Don't frown. Don't frown. No no no. 
No no no. Don't frown. (Laughs) Eh? Don't frown. 
Bubble -bubble -bubble. (Laughs) We gonna have a chat? 
You and me. Oh, you gonna blow up some of your Ribena 
by the look of it. You're gonna blow up some of your 
Ribena. What did you think of that? Eh? Sweet- 
heart. Eh? Hello. Oo, oh. Hey -hey. Hey -hey- 
hey. What did you think of that? Booboo. What did 
you think of that? Oh darling, don't cry. No. No 
no no. You don't look very happy today, do you. Eh? 
You don't look very happy today. What's the matter? 
Eh? Oo. What's the matter? Are you not very happy? 
Eh? Not very happy. Sarah. Hello. Hello. 
Hello. Are you complaining about it? Are you com- 
plaining about it? Yes. You're complaining about it. 
Ooo. It's not good enough, is it. Eh? It's not 
good enough. Ahh, sweetheart. Eh? Sarah. Sarah. 
Eh? 
Are you gonna have a grumpy day today? 
Sshh. Little one. Little one. What is it? 
Go. Go. You gonna get cross about it. You gonna 
tell me off for doing this to you. It's not good 
enough. Little one. It's not good enough. No. 
It's not good enough is it. Boobooboo. It's not 
good enough. Oo Sarah. Oh little one. Ah little 
one. Little one. What's the matter. Little one. 
Little one. What's the matter? You keep crying. 
You keep crying. 
0 a_ed 11 weeks 
Are you gonna tell a few jokes? Whaddya- think? 
Ho- whaddaya- think? Hoowo. Whaddaya- think? Ho -ho- 
ho. Whaddaya- think? Booboo, booboo. Whaddaya- 
think Sarah Ninnes? Booboo, booboo. Hello. Hello. 
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What you up to? What you up to? Eh? Are you gonna 
tell me a story? (Mock yawn) You're not long awake, 
are you. Eh? You're not long awake. No you're 
not. No you're not long awake. And did you have a 
good sleep? Did you have a good sleep? Did you? 
Suck -suck. Suck -suck. Ber -ber. Get your fingers 
out of your mouth. Come on. Come on. Ow -ow. 
(Laughs) Yes I will. 0 -wer. I'll chew them. 
I'll chew them. I'll chew your fingers. Ow. I'll 
chew your fingers. I will do so. I will. You're 
not going to have a talk with me today. Hey. Sarah. 
Hello. 0- wo -wo. You're not going to have a talk to 
me today. Do you not? Aw- ba- ba -ba. Ba. Ba. 
Not going to have a talk to me today. Just gonna sit 
quietly. Are you? Ow. 0- wer- wer -wer. 0 -werr. 
Just gonna sit quietly? Are you? Ow. I'll eat 
your fingers up. Ah, pikkinini. Pikkinini. Aow, 
what's the matter? Hey -hey. Hey -hey. Hey- hey -hey- 
hey. No we don't. No -no. Are you not comfortable 
darling? 0- wo- wo -wo. Ahhh Sarah. You gonna have a 
grizzle. Are you? You gonna have a grizzle. Ahh. 
Ah, sweetheart. Oh what is it? You complain about 
it. If you don't like it, you complain about it. 
(Laughs) Yes. You have your say. You have your 
say. Yes, o -wer. Ahhh. It's not good enough, is 
it. It's not good enough. Is it. It's not good 
enough. No. You haven't even had your Ribena have 
you. Hey. You haven't even had your Ribena. Noo. 
Just woken up. Yes, you've just woken up. And you're 
gonna suck your fingers. You're gonna suck your 
fingers, aren't you. As usual. Your new toy. 
(Makes sucking noise) Yes you are. Yes you are. 
Hello. Ah. (Makes sucking noise) Yes you are. 
A000w. Aoow. Ow. What a salivating sausage. Ow. 
What a salivating sausage. You're not gonna take your 
fingers out of your mouth when you talk to me. Are 
you not? Eh? Sarah. You're not gonna take your 
fingers out of your mouth. No you're not. You're 
not gonna take your fingers out. You're not gonna 
take your fingers out of your mouth when you talk to 
me. Are you not gonna take your fingers out. Are 
you not? Are you not gonna take your fingers out of 
your mouth. Eh? You're not? Do you want some 
Ribena? You think you might do? Aowowo Sarah. 
Aowowo. Ow sweetheart, eh? You wanna drink. 
5. 6.6.75 (aged 12 weeks) 
Sarah. You got a grubby face. Hey Sarah. Eh- 
bobede- bobede -bobede -boash. You not going to say 
Hello? Are you going to say Hello today? Sarah. 
Sarah, your hands are fascinating, aren't they. Sarah. 
Hello. Hello poppet. Hello poppet. Hello booboo. 
Hello booboo. C'mon. C'mon. Are you just goin' to 
suck your thumb? Are you just goin' to suck your 
thumb? Haaaa. Chew -chew -chew. Chew -chew -chew. 
Are you just going to suck your fingers the whole time. 
Are you? (Makes sucking noise) Are you just going 
to suck your fingers the whole time. Are you? Are 
you not going to talk to me? You're not going to talk 
to me? Ah. Yes, you have a bit of a conversation. 
(Laughs) (Makes sucking noise) Are you gonna have a 
bit of a conversation or are you just going to suck 
your fingers? Eh? Hello. Hello. Hello. Boo - 
booboo. Booboo. A- boobboboo. Hello booboo. 
Hello booboo. Hello booboo. Hello. Berammmm. 
Oh: Hello. Hello. Oh. Oh. Oh. (Laughs) 
Oh. Are you just gonna suck your fingers? Yes you 
are. Yes. Booboo. Booboo. Hello. Hello booboo. 
Ahhhh. Ahhhh. Yes. You just gonna suck your 
fingers the whole time. Are you? Oh - you're not. 
You don't know. You're just gonna suck your fingers 
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the whole time. Specially your thumb. That's the 
favourite, isn't it. 
Aren't they. Aren't t 
Aren't thumbs great. 
Aren't thumbs terrific 
What a good thing thumbs are. 
humbs great. Eh? (Laughs) 
Aren't thumbs terrific. Eh? 
. Sarah. Talk to me Booboo 
Booboo. Sarah. Hey. Aowerwerwer. Babababa. 
Babababa. Ber- ber -ber. Hey. Are you not going to 
be happy? Sarah. Sarah. Hello booboo. H've you 
got the pip with me. Hey - got the pip with me? 
Have you got the pip with me. Have you? Have you 
got the pip with me. Yes. I been - I been lugging 
you round today. Have you got the pip with me. 
Aowowowo. Aowowowo. Awoo. Hello. Ow- ow -ow. 
Oh, little one. Aow little one. What is it? What 
is it? Eh? Are you going to tell me off? What did 
I do wrong? Have I been lugging you all round town? 
N000. Ahh, little one. Little one. Ah little one. 
No, you're not going to cry. You're not going to cry. 
You're not going to cry. No you're not. Ah booboo. 
Hey booboo. Don't struggle. Hey booboo. Don't 
cry. Hey hey. You are. You're gonna have a grizzle. 
Aowowo. Aowowo. Owow. Oh, you're telling me off, 
aren't you. You're telling me off. What have I done. 
Eh? Are you telling me off? Are you gonna tell me 
off and suck your fingers? And Ribena's not good 
enough. And Ribena's not good enough. You wanna 
chocolate milk -shake. Didn't you? You wanna choco- 
late milk- shake. What's the matter? Eh? What's the 
matter? Aowowo. What's the matter? What's the 
matter? Hawowo. What are you telling me poppet. 
You're telling me off aren't you. Eh? Ah. Little 
one. Little one. Sshh. Little one. Little one. 
Hey. Are you gonna be grizzly? Are you gonna be 
grizzly? 
37 3 
6. 13.6.75 (aged 13 weeks) 
Hey. How you feeling on it? Have you noticed 
anything? Have you noticed anything different? Eh? 
Are you gonna bite it? Ah, don't put your thumb in 
your mouth. Booboo. Aa- booboo. (Laughs) Aa- 
booboo. Don't put your thumb in your mouth. You're 
not gonna get grizzly. Oh no. No- no -no. You're 
not gonna get grizzly. N000 -nonono. Ah poppet. 
Poppety -pop. Pop -pop -pop. What is it? What is it? 
You gonna get grizzly? You gonna get grizzly? Are 
you? Oh n0000 nono. Sarah. Booboo. Booboo. 
No- no -no. No- no -no. You gonna get grizzly darling? 
Are you? Are you gonna get grizzly? Mm- (kiss) -0000. 
That's not very good. That's not very good. No -no- 
no. That's not very good. You're not gonna have a 
chat today. You not gonna have your chat? You're 
just gonna have a grump. Sarah. Hello darling. 
Hey, sweetheart. What's the matter? 
It's just me you don't wanna talk to isn't it. 
Hello darling. Have you been playing with the ball? 
Have you been chasing the ball? Have you poppet? Eh? 
Have you been chasing the ball? Eh? Booboo. You 
been chasing the ball have you. You been chasing the 
ball. Oh. Not gonna tell me that you're sick of it 
all. I'm not the person you grump to. N000 -nonono. 
Hey poppet. Aaaa. Ah -ah. Do I only get the grizzle 
side? Sarah. (Laughs) Sarah. Did I go out and 
leave you last night? A'you giving me a hard time? 
A'you giving me a hard time. Eh? Diddleenddleer. 
Booboo. Hello booboo. Hello booboo -oo. Hello 
booboo. Hello booboo? (Laughs) (Kisses) Are you 
gonna ignore me? Are you gonna ignore me? Hey Sarah. 
Are you gonna ignore me? Are you? Eh? What's the 
matter? What's the matter? Hey booboo. You're not 
gonna chat to me today. You're giving me the cold 
shoulder. Aren't you. You're giving me the cold 
shoulder. 
Sarah. I'm here. You're not interested at all. 
You're hopeless. You're not gonna talk to anyone are 
you. 
Boobooboo. Boo. Hello booboo. (Laughs) Hey 
Sarah. Booboo. Are you - are you gonna say Hello to 
Mummy? Are you gonna say Hello to Mummy? Are you 
not gonna say Hello to Mummy. Are you not gonna say 
Hello to Mummy. Ooo- booboo. Hello darling. Hello. 
Sarah Ninnes. Sarah Ninnes. Hello. Ooohh. 
Grizzly -grizzle. What's the matter, you just had a 
feed. Ah- booboo. You not gonna talk to Mummy? Eh? 
You not gonna talk to Mummy? Lalalalala - ooh. 
(Kisses) (Clicks tongue) Hey Sarah. Sarah Ninnes. 
Hello. Hello. Hello darling. You not gonna have a 
chat at all? No. You're just gonna suck your thumb. 
You're just gonna suck your thumb. Aren't you. 
7. 20.6.75 (aged 14 weeks) 
Trouble is, usually you talk to everybody else far 
more excitedly than you talk to me. Nice to have a 
fresh face to talk to, isn't it. Eh? 
Hello booboo. Hello booboo. Ayaaa. What are 
you doing here again? What you doing here again 
booboo. Hey booboo. Aa- booboo. Aa- booboo. Hello 
doll. Aa-aa-haa. What we doing here again? What 
are we doing here again (singing)? You not very 
comfortable? You not very comfortable in there. Are 
37S 
you? Is it tight enough? Is it tight enough? Hey. 
Is it tight enough. Is it not tight enough. Aahhh. 
Are you not very happy in that chair? You lost your 
booty. You lost your booty. Lost your booty. 
Didn' you. You lost your booty. Yes you did. 
What's that? That's off your foot. That's off your 
foot. No? No? Eh? You not very secure in that 
darling? Boobooboo. Boobooboo. You not very 
secure in that? You not very secure in that? Shall 
I put it back down here? Can you talk to me? Can 
you talk to me? You going to talk to me? Tell me - 
what a grim life you have? You going to tell me what 
a grim life you have Sarah? Y're really struggling 
with this today aren't you. Eh? Hello booboo. 
Hello booboo. You're not very happy with this today, 
are you. Hello booboo. 
Hey. What's the story. What's the story. Hey 
Sarah. Sarah -Sarah -Sarah. Booboo. Hello booboo. 
You wanna see what's down there. You're not getting 
to see it. No, you're not getting to see it. Hello. 
Hello. Hello darl. Hello. What's that? You 
don't wanna talk today. You wanna play with things. 
You want to play with things. Booboo. Ah. Lalala- 
lalala. Lalalala. What's the matter? Hey. You 
wanna play with something don't you. You don't wanna 
talk. You don't want to talk. You don't wanna talk. 
She wants to play. ] ?aces are boring. Unless she'd 
talk to you. 
You're just being the passive listener. You're not 
going to say a word. Hello. Hello. Hello booboo. 
Sarah Ninnes. Hello little Sarah. Hello little 
Sarah. Hello booboo. Hello booboo. Booboo. 
Hello. Can you see them through there? Eh? Can 
you see them through there? Hello booboo. You're 
not going to talk to me are you. Eh? You're bored 
with me. You're bored with Mummy. Aaa- booboo. 
Hello booboo. Hello boo. Hello boo. Hello boo. 
(Clicks tongue) Babababa. Hello bababa. Aaoww. 
Aaaoww. Aow- bo -ao -o. Hello. Ba- ba -ba. Little 
Sarah ba -ba. Little Sarah ba -b -. Ao- woowoo. Ao- 
woowoo. Oo- bwerbwerbwer. Ah. Ah- ah- ah -ah. What 
is it? Hello? Hey. A'you not going to tell me 
anything? A'you just gonna dribble. A'you just 
gonna dribwerbwerbwer. Aaa -aow. Is that right? 
A'you - goin' to tell me off? Have you had enough of 
this? Have you had enough? (Audibly exhales) Have 
you had enough? Have you had enough? 
8. 27.6.75 (aged 15 weeks) 
Hello. You a good girl. Eh? You're a good girl. 
You a good girl. Are you? What's happening today? 
Do you know what's happening today? What a time -table 
we're having. Aren't we. Eh? What's happening 
today booboo. Owerwerwer. Pikkinini. Pikkinini. 
Pikkinini. Pikkinini. Pikkininipoo. You've got a 
hair in your mouth. Yes you have. Papapapapa. Hey. 
Pgh- gh -gh. Hey booboo. (Pants) Sarah. You talk 
to Mummy. You talk to Mummy. Hello booboo. Hello. 
Hello. Ow -ow. Are you gonna tell me a story today? 
So are you gonna tell me a story? You've not got any 
stories just now. Eh? Oo -oo. You not got any 
stories. Sarah Ninnes you're a booboo. Booboo. 
Sarah Ninnes is a boobooboo. Sarah Ninnes - . You 
not got any stories. Have you not got any stories? 
No? You're very intent on things aren't you at the 
moment. You're more intent on things. Booboo. 
Aoww. Boobooboo. Ow- ow- ow -ow. (Laughs) Ow -ow- 
ow. What're you doing? What you doing? Hey Sarah. 
Lalalala. Hey booboo. What you doing? What you 
doing? Eh? What you doing? (Clicks tongue) 
Papapapa. (Clicks tongue) Oh dear. 
9. 8.7.75 (aged 17 weeks) 
Yes. C'm - we're meant to talk. I suppose you 
think that you're gonna - give you this. Hey. Aa- 
ha. (Laughs) Are you gonna play with that? Are 
you gonna play with that? (Clicks tongue) Ahllo- 
booboo. Allo- booboo. (Clicks tongue) Ha. Ha -ah- 
ah. Ha- ah -ah. Hello. Sarah Ninnes - you're a 
booboo. (Clicks tongue) Hello darling. 
Would you rather I took this off her? Would you 
rather I took this off her? 
What's happening? Weyya. Hello Sarah. Oh, come 
on. You're cheating. You're gonna cheat aren't you. 
You're gonna cheat. You're gonna cheat. Ah- ha -ha. 
Ha- ha -ha. You're gonna cheat. Aa-aa-aa. You're 
gonna cheat. O0000. (Clicks tongue) (Clicks 
tongue) Booboo -baaa. (Laughs) (Laughs) Ah: 
Hey. Hey. Don't be such a bully. (Clicks tongue) 
Boobooboo -ber. Hello. (Laughs) Hello. Baba. 
Bababaa. (Laughs) Bababa. (Laughs) What's this: 
(Makes sucking noise)? (Sucking noise) (Laughs) 
You're cheeky. You're cheeky. Little booboo. Baba. 
Baba. Hello. Sucking's good eh. Eh -eh. (Clicks 
tongue) Boo. (Clicks tongue) Ha: (Clicks tongue) 
Babababa- baba -baba -baba. Boobooboo -ber. Booboobaa. 
(Makes Donald Duck quacking noise) (Donald Duck noise) 
(Laughs) You're silly. You're silly. (Clicks 
tongue) You're silly aren't you. (Clicks tongue) 
Yes. Hello. There's your toes with the funny bootees 
on. Hey -hey. (Sucking noise) (Clicks tongue) 
(Sucking noise) (Laughs) (Sucking noise) I'll eat 
your fingers up. What a piggy noise this is going to 
be isn't it. What a funny thing. Where's your thumb? 
Hey. Where's your thumb? (Sucking noise) I'll eat 
them. I'll eat your fingers. (Sucking noise) I'll 
eat your fingers. Yes I will. I'll eat your fingers. 
(Sucking noise) (Laughs) I'll eat your fingers. 
(Sucking /popping noise) Ah -ha. Who you hitting in 
the face? Hey. Sarah Ninnes. Ah -oo. Sarah 
Ninnes. Aa -oo. Sarah Ninnes. (Snorts) (Laughs) 
You got me by my nose. (Snorts) (Clicks tongue) 
Hello. Hello. 
_You're sucking hair there kid. You're sucking 
hair there kid. 
10. 14.7.75 (aged 18 weeks) 
Hello darling. Are you gonna chew your little 
dress? Are you gonna chew your little dress? Are 
you? Hello darling. Hello. Sarah. Sarah. Hello 
Sarah. Are you gonna look round the room? You're 
not gonna look at me. (Blows raspberry) Are you not 
gonna look at me? Little one. Little one. Do you 
want to look at something? You don't want to look at 
Mummy? Little dancing bear. Little dancing bear. 
You're a little dancing bear. You're a little dancing 
- . Hello darling. Hello. (Clicks tongue) Yoete not 
gonna talk to Mummy. Sarah. Hello. Hello. 
Hello. You're not gonna talk to Mummy. (Clicks 
tongue) You're not gonna talk to Mummy. Hey poppet. 
Poppet. Poppet. Poppet. Hello little poppet. 
Daddy's little poppet. (Makes noises) Are you gonna 
s- Are you gonna chew your dress. Are you gonna 
chew your dress. Are you gonna chew your dress. 
Bler- bier- bier -bier. Bier -bier. Are you gonna chew 
your dress? Eh? (Clicks tongue) Are you gonna 
chew your dress. Coo -oo. Sarah. Booboo. Hello 
Sarah. Hello Sarah. Hello. Hello Sarah. Hello. 
You don't know what you're gonna do today do you. No. 
No. Poppet. You're not gonna look at Mummy. Do 
you want your bear? (Clicks tongue) Hello little 
Sarah. Hello little Sarah. Are you gonna chew this 
all the time? Are you gonna chew this all the time? 
Are you? Why don't I take it off you. Why don't I 
take it off you. Hallo. Babababa. Babababa. 
Babababa. Babababa. Hello. Hello. Hello Sarah. 
Hello Sarah. Hello. (Clicks tongue) You not know 
what you're gonna do today but you're gonna chew this 
jacket aren't you. (Mock chewing) You're gonna chew 
your jacket. Yes you are. You're gonna chew your 
jacket aren't you. Eh? Going to chew your jacket. 
And your gonna cheat and look through the window. Yes 
you are. Mmm. What's the matter? What's the 
matter? Eh? (Sighs) Oh dear. Oh dear. Oh 
dear. Oh dear. Oh dear. Oh dear. Oh dear. Oh 
dear. Oh dear(with laugh). You're just gonna chew 
that aren't you. Quite happily. Quite happily. 
You're gonna chew that you're gonna chew that. Baba. 
Baba. Babababababa. Owowoowoowowo. Shall I take 
it off? I'm gonna take it off. Eh? Is it too hot? 
There we are. There we are. You don't know where 
you are. Eh? You don't know where you are. You 
don't know where you are. Eh? 
What do I do? What do I do? Talk to my baby. 
Babababy. Talk to my babababy. What can you see? 
Yes you've found out. You found out. You've found 
out what it's all about, haven't you? Eh? You found 
out. You've found out what it's all about. Ah. 
You don't like this being tied -in very much, do you. 
You've found out what it's all about. You've found 
out what it's all abouboubout. (Laughs) Hello 
booboo. What you looking at? Ah. You really do 
get a bit of a wriggle on. Hey. (Clicks tongue) 
Where's your dancing bear. (Laughs) You stop that. 
Let me go. You let me go. You let me go. (Clicks 
tongue) Nonono. Bee -bee -bee. Oh no- no -no. Don't 
you cry Sarah. Don't you cry. 
Yes you are. Oh no, you want to play with it. 
Look who's here. Hey sicky. Hey -hey. What's this? 
Blabla. (Clicks tongue) Ahh -ha. Went in the mouth. 
Sarah. Hello booboo. Hello. Hello. Are you 
gonna eat it? Are you gonna eat it? Ah darling. 
Has it got a sharp edge on it? Ahh darling. Ahh 
little one. Ahh little one. No- no -no. No- no -no. 
N0000- no- no -no. Hey. Yes? Was there something 
sharp on it? (Makes a noise) Was there something 
sharp on it? Hey darling. Sarah. Sarah. Eh? 
Sarah. Hello. Hello. Hello baba. Owowowo. 
Lalalalala. You can see through there can't you. 
You can see through there. Ooohh. Ooohh. Aahh. 
You can see. You've fathomed them out haven't you. 
Eh? Cuckoo. You've sussed them out. You've sussed 
them out. You can see what's in there. Hey. Hey. 
Sarah. Hey. Booboo. Lalalalalalala. (Kissing 
noise) Hey. Hey. (Clicks tongue) 
11. 23.7.75 (aged 19 weeks) 
Look at Mummy's big girl (laughing). Look at 
Mummy's big girl. What've we got here. Eh? Hey? 
Hey? (Blows raspberry) What've we got - You got a 
dress to chew, haven't you. You want this. You've 
seen it. You want it. Do you want it? (Laughs) 
You're not meant to hang. You're not meant to lean 
forward by that much. Bibedebababa. Hello. Ahhh. 
Hey Sarah. Sarah. Sarah. (Blows raspberry) Are 
.! 
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you gonna do that for me? Gonna do your new trick? 
Are you? You gonna do your new trick? Gonna do your 
new trick? Y'gonna do your new trick? Hey. Baba - 
baba. Ahhh. Baba. Hello. Y'gonna tell me a 
story? Or are you just gonna swallow this damn thing. 
Eh? Y'gonna tell me a story? Go on. Come on. 
Ahhh. Sarah. (Blows raspberry) What about your 
new rude noise? You're not gonna give us a shot of 
that? (Laughs) That's what happens. I'm not going 
after it. I'm not going after it. Boobooboo. I'm 
not going after it. Bababababababa. (Kisses) 
Ahhhh. (Blows raspberry) Come on. Ah -ah. (Suck - 
ing-in noise) Aren't skirts fun. Aren't dresses 
fun. Eh? Aren't dresses fun? You can get to chew 
them. Eh? Aren't dresses fun. (Blows raspberry) 
Aren't dresses fun. Is this very very tight? Eeh. 
Ahhhh. (Kisses) Bababababa. Booboobooboober. 
It's your new dress. Yes. Yes. That's a nice new 
dress. That's a nice new dress. (Clicks tongue) 
Yes. And there's your feet with socks on them. 
There's your feet with bootees on them. B -b- bootees. 
(Laughs) (Snorts) Hello. Yes, you got bootees on 
them. You got bootees on your feet haven't you. Do 
you wanna get at them? Do you wanna get at them? Eh? 
(Squeaky noise) Do you wanna get at them? Ahhh. 
(Laughs) Are you gonna show off your panties? Are 
you? Who's that? You can see them can't you. You 
can see them. (Laughs) Yes. You wanna get at your 
bootees. You want to get at your bootees (chanted). 
Ye -es. Hey. Sarah. A -boo. (Raspberry) (Laughs) 
(Raspberry) 
She's quite good -humoured today. 
12. 1 a ed 20 weeks 
Hello sweetheart. Beebeembeem. Hello sweetheart. 
Where are we. Where are we. (Laughs) Where are 
we. What are these things hanging away down here? 
(Blows raspberry) What are these things? Where are 
we? Are you gonna talk to me? Are you gonna talk? 
No. No you're not. Sarah. Blerblerbler. 
(Raspberry) (Raspberry) Look the other way why don't 
you. Sarah. Sarah. Sarah. Hello Sarah. Hello 
Sarah. Beebeebeebee. Hello Sarah. Boobooboo. 
(Clicks tongue) Hello? Hello? Hello Sarah. 
Hello Sarah. Hello? Hello Sarah. Hello Sarah? 
Hello? Hello? You gonna talk? Bumbumbum. A'you 
not gonna talk? Ah berberberber. Sarah Ninnes. 
Hello. Hello. Babababa. Ber. Berblaugh. 
Blaugh. Hello. You gonna play a game with me? You 
gonna play a game? You gointa play a game with me - 
you goin to play a game - goin to play a game - goin to 
play a game. Hey -hey -hey, goin'a play a game. 0o -oo. 
Hello funny face. Are you gonna talk? No. You're 
gonna look at anything else other than me. Sarah. 
Sarah. (Raspberry) Sarah. (Raspberry) Sarah. 
(Noise) Sarah - you've got cold hands haven't you. 
You've got cold hands. Hey booboo. Hey Sarah. 
(Tongue clicking /song) (Clicks tongue) Sarah, hello. 
(Pants) Huer. Hello. Baba. (Pants) (Whistles) 
(Clicks tongue) (Whistles) What do you want? Do 
You want your dolly? Do you want your dolly? Do you 
want your dolly? You don't seem to want too much. 
Hello. Hello. Ahhh. Aowowoo. Ah chicken. 
Yes, you want out. You want out. Oh booboo. There 
we are. You don't want to just talk to me. You want 
me to pick you up. You want me to pick you up. Oh 
beebee. Ah sweetheart. (Kiss) (Kiss) (Kiss) 
You'll probably be happier on your own. Owowowow. I 
gotta pick you up. A'you telling me? Are you 
telling me? Are you telling me? I've gotta pick you 
up. Is that what you're telling me. I gotta pick 
you up. I gotta pick you up. Bababwer. Oh, it's 
hot. Yes. You're hot booboo. Aow -aow. Aow - 
werwer. Berwerwer (laughing). Berwerwer. Give it 
back. Aow. Aow. (Laughs) (Kisses) (Sucking 
noise) Berberber. Berberberberber. Berberberber. 
Bababababa. (Sucking noise) Oh no, you don't want 
that game. Oh. No you don't want that game. What 
game do you want? What game? What game? What game 
do you want? Nice fingers. Lalalala. Lalalala. 
(Raspberry) (Sucking noise) (Laughs) Who can you 
see? What can you see? Eh? Oh you want me to pick 
you up baby. You want me to pick you up. You want 
me to pick you up (sung). (Raspberry) Ahhh -boo. 
Ahhh. 
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Appendix 5 (Part 2): BABYTALK OF THE MOTHERS 
OF JOANNA, ANGELA, LEIGH, JAKILENE AND JULIE 
(One session each) 
Joanna 7.5.76 (aged 10 weeks) 
Yes you are. Are you feeling better now? Are you? 
Are you feeling better now? Oh you're not to chew 
your hand. You're not to chew your hand. No. 
You're not to chew your hand. I can't see your face 
if you chew your hand. No. I can't see you smile. 
Eh? (laughs) Are you quite happy? Are you quite 
happy? Are you? Look you're all - . Look at your 
hands. You not - . Oh dear. That what you wanted 
rid of - eh? That what you wanted rid of? Is it? 
Is that better? Have you got rid of that? Have you? 
Yes. Quite happy being sick there are you? 'Re you 
quite happy being sick there? What? You tell me 
then. You tell me what your tummy's like eh? What? 
Tell me then. Tell me what your tummy's like. Eh? 
What is it then? Come on. Are you gonna be sick 
again? Eh? Gonna be sick again? No you're not are 
you. Don't chew your hand, it just makes you sick. 
(laughs) It just makes you sick, doesn't it? 
That'll just make you sick again. Won't it? A - . 
Oh dear: Oh dear. (laughs) If you want it. If 
you want to chew it. Oh goodness: Oh goodness - 
you'd think you were hungry. You'd think you were 
hungry. You're not hungry are you? You're not 
hungry. No you're not. You're wobbling about there, 
aren't you. What? Tell me then. Come on then. 
You have a big story then. Eh? No. No. You just 
make yourself worse doing that. You do. What. I 
don't want to see your tongue. I don't want to see 
your tongue. Look. You'll make yourself sick. 
You'll just make yourself sick. Aha. See there? 
You did - . That wee bit there. There y'are. There 
you go. Hah. Come on then. Just gonna sit there 
and be sick all day? Are you? What do you see round 
there? What do you see round there? Oh you're having 
a wee look round now. You're having a wee look round. 
You've got fed up with your Mummy. No? You're not 
fed up with your Mummy yet? What? Oh now - . What 
you doing now. You're filling your nappy. Aren't 
you? Aha? Is that what you were doing? Were you 
filling your nappy? Were you? And have you got rid 
of all your sick? (laughs) Aha - . You have, 
haven't you. Have you? Yes. You like sitting there 
kicking, do you? Do you like sitting there kicking? 
What? Tell me then. (laughs) Tell me then. Yes, 
see, you're gonna fall out of that. You'll fall out 
of that if you don't watch. You will too. You're 
goin' to fall out of it. What? Are you goin' to fall 
out of that. Eh? Yes. You giving 'em big smiles 
again, eh? Are you? You gonna tell me a story? 
Come on then. Tell me a big story. Come on tell me 
a big story then. What? What? Oh not again. 
You're not gonna be sick again are you? What? What 
is it then? Tell me then. 
Angela 28.6.76 (aged I0 weeks) 
Hey madam, what've you been doing? Hello darling. 
Hello dart. Give big smiles. Lovely smiles. Ha. 
You're a good girl aren't you. Do you like that? Do 
you like that? You been a very very good girl. Yes 
you are. You been extremely good girl. Mummy says 
she like, she's very proud of you. Very proud of you. 
Is that wet? Ph - oh dear. What have you got in it? 
Yes darling. What are you trying to tell me? What 
are you trying to tell me? Hm? Yes. We're going 
away tomorrow. What a good girl. There's a good 
girl. Were you sleeping all through the time? Were 
you sleepy? Enjoying a little sleep. Yes you were 
enjoying it. You were enjoying your sleep weren't 
you. Yes. Yes. You were enjoying your sleep 
weren't you. You were enjoying it. Yes. Yes. 
You'm big smiles. Big smiles. That's the thing. 
Yes. What is that? What is that? Yes, what is it? 
What is it? What are you looking at? What are you 
looking at? Yes, what's the matter? You're 
stretching your legs out. Are you cold? Cold 
tootsies. One two three. One two three. You've 
got cold tootsies haven't you. Mummy'll keep them 
warm for you. Mummy'll keep your tootsies warm for 
you. Will she? Will she? Mummy'll keep your 
tootsies warm for you. Yes darling. Mummy'll keep 
your tootsies warm for you. Aw. Yes. Yes. 
You're trying to get out of that seat aren't you. 
Going to have a little walk? Hm? Trying to get out 
of it. Yes you are. You trying to get out of that 
seat aren't you. Yes you are. Trying your level 
best. Yes you are. Yes. Yes you are. You're 
trying to tell me something too aren't you. Yes. 
What are you trying to tell me? (laughs) Yes you're 
trying to tell me something. Come on darling. Yes, 
what is the matter. Yes darling. (Angela farts) 
Oh dear: Are you doing something? Are you doing 
something? Yes you are. You've done something. - 
Your Mummy says you've done something have you? 
Y'need a little change. Yes. Need a little change, 
hm? Yes. You need a little change? You need a 
little change. Yes. What are you trying to d - . 
Trying big smiles for M - . Yes darling. O.K. 
What are you trying to tell - . You tell me something. 
That's it. Is that better? Nice and clean. Who's 
a nice little clean baby? Who is a nice little clean 
baby? Who's a clever baby? Who is a clever baby? 
Angela. Angela's a clever baby is she? Yes. Ye - . 
Yes who's a clever baby? Mummy's clever baby. 
Mummy's clever baby. Yes. You been a good girl? 
Who's been a good girl? Mummy says Angela's been a 
very good girl. You've been a very good girl. Yes. 
You've been a very good girl. You've been a very good 
girl. You tired? Oh. I don't think you are. You 
enjoying yourself? You enjoying yourself? Yes. 
You enjoying yourself? Mummy's little girl. Mummy's 
little girl. Who's Mummy's little baby. Come here. 
You can have my finger. Hold my finger. we 
are. Mummy says she can hold your finger. Yes. 
Let's have a smile. Who's a good girl? Who's a good 
girl? Yes. What else are you trying to tell your 
Mummy. You tired. O000 -up. What is that. What's 
so nice? What is it that's so nice. Are you watching 
that? That's the camera. Do you like it? Do you 
like it? 
Leigh weeks) 
Who's Mummy's darlin'? Hm. Pull your dress down. 
Will I pull your dress down? Will I pull your dress 
down? (beginning to chant) Oh: You're blowin' 
bubbles. (laughs) Who's my girl? Who's my girl? 
Are you getting fed up? Hn? Are you gettin' fed up? 
(laughs) Are you gettin' fed up? Give me a smile 
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then. Give me a smile. Are you gettin' fed up 
darlin'? (kiss) Eh? Are you gettin' fed up? Are 
you gettin' fed - . Oh dear; Hn? Ohhh. Here - 
here. Here. Are you gettin' fed up? Are you 
gettin' fed up? Eh? Who's my girl? Who's my girl? 
Eh? Where's my girl? Ohhh. Ohhh. Oh dear. Oh 
dear dear. Oh: Oh: Oh: Oh, my darlin'. Oh my 
girl. What's the matter: Oh. Ohhh dear. Oh. 
Ohhh dear. Oh darlin'. Here here here. Ahhh - . 
Jakilene 26.8.76 (aged 9 weeks) 
Jakilene. What do you see? What did you see? 
What did you see? Was that a wee mask? Was that a 
mask? Oo you're a slavery thing. You're a slavery 
thing. Come on then. Come on. Come on. Come on 
then. Come on then. What's wrong wi' you? Come 
on. What're ye seem'? Where are your hands? Your 
pretty hands. What are ye seem'? Jakilene. 
Where's the big smiles? Jakilene. Where's the big 
smiles? Where's the big smiles? Come on then. 
Come on then. Where's the big smile. Ho: What a 
big smile: Come on then. Come on. Come on then. 
Come on. Come on. Come on. Who's got tickly feet? 
Got tickly feet? Have you got tickly feet? Have 
you? Are you saying "Aye "? Have you got tickly 
feet? Have you got tickly feet? 'Ve you got tickly 
feet? You have so. You have so. You have so. 
Come on then. Come on then. (nose noise x 3) 
Ckkkk: (nose noise) Like you. Like you yourself. 
Like you yourself. What're you sayin'? You tellin' 
me stories? Are you tellin' me stories? Are you 
tellin' me stories? Are you tellin' me stories? 
Come on then. Come on then. Come on. Come on. 
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Ha. Oo, that's a big one. That's a big one. 
That's a big one. Oo. What? Boxing. What's that 
in your hand. What's that in your hand. What's in 
your hand. Come on then tell me stories. Come on 
then tell me stories. That's a big one. Tell me a 
big story. Tell me big stories. Eh? Come on. 
Come on. Tell me stories. Hn. Tell me stories. 
A -aa. Come on. Oh: (Jakilene is sick) Oh dear; 
Oh dear: Oh dear: Oh dear me: Aagh: Aagh: Oh 
she's a messy thing. Oh: You're a messy thing. 
There you are. There you are. Sshhh. You're a 
messy thing. You're a messy thing. You are so. 
You're a messy thing. You're a messy thing. Are you 
being sick all over the place? Are you being sick? 
You are so. Yes you - come on then. Come on then. 
Come on. Come on. Coh. Coh. A'ye boxing? A'y 
boxing? A'y boxing? Come on then. Come on then. 
Tell me a story. Tell me a story. Tell me a story. 
Jakilene. Jakilene. Jakilene. Jakilene. 
Jakilene. Come on then. A'you blowing bubbles? 
A'you blowing bubbles? A'you blowing bubbles? A'you 
blowing bubbles? Ho: Come on then: Come on then: 
Come on then: Come on. Come on then: Honey. 
Honey. You got tickly feet. You got tickly feet? 
Who's got tickly feet? Who's got tickly feet? Come 
on. Ho. Come on. Ho. Are you sicking. Are you 
sicking. Aghi (imitation of Jakilene) Aghi 
(imitation of Jakilene) Come on then. Come on, tell 
me stories. Tell me stories. Honey. Tell me 
stories. Hn. Oh dear: Oh dear, she's tired. Oh: 
She's tired. Jakilene's tired. Tell me stories. 
Look at you Look at you You're dribbling. You're 
a dribble. You're dribblin'. You're dribblin'. 
You're dribblin'. You're dribblin'. 
Julie 14.10.76 (aged 12 weeks) 
Where's the big girl? Where's the big girl? Eh? 
Where's the big girl? Julie: Where's the big girl? 
Where is she? Eh? Where is she? Eh? Where's the 
big girl? Eh? Where is she? Come on then. Tell 
me big stories. Come on. Come on. Yees. O000h. 
Tell me big stories. Eh? Tell me big stories then. 
Come on. Big smiles. Where's the big smiles. 
Yees. What do you see? Eh? What do you see? Eh? 
What did you see? Come on then. Tell me. Tell me 
then. What did you see? Come on. Tell me a big 
stories. Come on then. Yees. Come on then. Come 
on. Tell me a big stories. Come on. Come on then. 
Oooh. O000h what are you doing? What are you doing? 
What are you doing? W -what are you doing? Come on 
then. Yees. Come on. What do you see? What do 
you see? Eh? What do you see? Come on then. 
Come on. Tell me a big stories. Come on. Yees. 
Come on then. Come on hen. Tell me a big stories. 
Come on. Tell me the big stories then. Come on hen. 
Come on now. Come on then. What do you see? Eh? 
What do you see? Yees. Tell me. Yes. Tell me 
then. Tell me big stories. Yees. Yees. Yees. 
Come on hen. Tell me a story. Tell me the big 
story. Come on then. Come on then. Come on now. 
Yes. Tell me. What do you see? Come on hen. 
O000h. What do you see? Come on then. What did 
you see? Tell me. Come on. Tell me a big stories. 
Yees. Come on hen. Come on then. Come on. What 
did you see? Eh? What are you watching? Yees. 
What are you watching? Eh? What are you watching? 
Yees. What are you watching? What are you watching? 
Eh? O000h: What do you see? What did you see? 
What did you see? What do you see? What do you see? 
Y(/ 
What do you see? Eh? What do you see? Mm? Come 
on then. What did you see? Eh? What are you 
watching? Eh? What are you watching? Eh? Eh? 
What are you watching? What did you watch? Come on 
then. Come on then. Yees. What do you see? What 
did you see? Yees. Yees. What do you see? Tell 
me the big stories then. Tell me the big stories. 
Tell me. Tell me. Come on then. Yees. Ian -mm. 
Yees. O000h. What are you doing? What are you 
doing? What are you doing? Eh? What are you 
watching? What are you watching? What are you 
watching? What are you watching? Yees. 
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